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ABSTRACT 
In a context where cybersecurity is becoming a major concern of so many of the world’s 
countries, some in Central Africa seem not to be concerned. In the meantime, due to the 
strength of a growing economy, there is a growing penetration of information 
technologies in this region. Governments are striving to catch up to this reality. The 
Central African militaries, which are supposed to be the first line of defense for their 
governments' institutions, are dramatically behind the times. To address this situation, the 
governments of Central Africa need to adopt a collaborative cyber strategy based on 
common investment in secure cyber infrastructures. Such cooperation will help to create 
a strong cyber environment conducive of the confidence and trust necessary for the 
emergence of a cyber community of Central African States (C3AS). For Central African 
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A. PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION 
A growing number of cybersecurity incidents has taken place in African 
countries. These include anonymous calls and/or e-mails for blackmailing, web 
defacement of government sites, long service interruptions of websites, due to  
system failure or insufficient equipment, frequent scamming plots originating from the 
subregion, and smuggling of animal and natural resources facilitated by the  
Internet.1,2,3,4 Unfortunately, these incidents have shown that African governments are 
inadequately prepared to exercise authority in the cyber domain. This situation has forced 
some governments to legislate on the matter, but the laws are far from complete or 
enforceable.  Many steps are still needed for these laws to become enforceable, like penal 
procedures, specialized law-enforcement personnel, specialized infrastructures, and 
software. Lacking a sound cyberspace security strategy, Central African countries will 
likely allow vulnerabilities to continue to grow to the point that their cyberspaces will 
become safe havens for criminals and terrorists. Key issues in the cyber domain in 
Central Africa can be framed along two major axes: the inability of governments to seize 
the potential that the cyber domain offers to improve their efficiency, or cyber power;5 
and the risk posed by the lack of a cybersecurity strategy to guarantee the safe growth of 
cyberspace. 
 
                                                 
1 “How to Avoid Cameroonian Scams: Frauds Originating From Cameroon,” US Embassy Website, 
Accessed March 6, 2012, http://yaounde.usembassy.gov/scams_warning.html. 
2 Issa Sikiti, “Africa: Cybercrime Increase Worries, Vulnerable Groups Targeted,” All Africa, 
September 29, 2011, accessed June 10, 2012, http://allafrica.com/stories/201109290659.html. 
3 Ntaryike Divine, Jr., “Cameroon Urged to Act Against Cybercrime: Government proposes stricter 
monitoring of Internet,” Voice Of America News, February 10, 2011, accessed March 06, 2012, 
http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/central/ Cameroon-Internet-Scamming-10Feb11-
115732229.html. 
4 “Cameroon Wildlife Internet fraudster arrested,” WildLifeDirect, June 14, 2008, accessed March 6, 
2012, http://baraza.wildlifedirect.org/2008/06/14/cameroon-wildlife-internet-fraudster-arrested/. 
5 Sheldon B. John, “Deciphering Cyberpower: Strategic Purpose in Peace and War,” Strategic Studies 
Quarterly, Summer 2011, accessed April 02, 2012, http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2011/summer/sheldon.pdf. 
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B. PURPOSES AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
1. Significance of the Project and Rationale 
In the same manner in which it is growing around the world, cyberspace is 
growing in Central Africa—along with threats. Governments cannot disregard enforcing 
their authority in both physical and cyber space. There are some measures being taken to 
improve the presence of government in cyberspace. However, there is too much to be 
done with not enough means, from knowledge acquisition (basic, intermediate, and 
expert education), to building infrastructure and creation and enforcement of regulations. 
Most of these efforts are designed to make cyberspace operational. On the other hand, 
other initiatives concerned with securing the whole system and giving governments more 
control have been ignored and put off, to be worked out in the future. Central African 
militaries, whose basic roles are to guarantee their countries’ sovereignty, seem 
unprepared to fulfill their missions in the cyber realm. Opening this debate within the 
Central African military community is a good first step towards filling this gap. 
Increasing cybersecurity can lead to numerous positive spillover effects. Public 
trust in the Central African cyber domain will bring local economic entities to invest in 
the electronic-business sector. Similarly, more confidence will attract more international 
financial transactions and increase Central Africa's competitiveness. Limiting the amount 
of criminal acts in the regional cyber domain will diminish the negative perception of the 
region in the world, thus increasing its attractiveness, or soft power.6 An efficient cyber 
strategy that integrates a regional vision would help overcome the financial barrier to 
infrastructure investment. In the militaries of Central Africa, where the acknowledgement 
of cyberspace and cybersecurity is still in its infancy, debate on the matter will be quite 
beneficial, as it will help military planners define adequate future directives in order to 
counter and preempt cyber threats in a more globally integrated fashion. 
 
                                                 
6 Joseph S. Nye Jr, Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics, New York: Public Affairs, 
2004. 
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2. Statement of Purpose and Scope 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine how Central African governments can 
increase their cybersecurity in order to prevent cyberterrorism and crime. In addition, the 
study intends to analyze what kind of cyber strategy will best aid Central African 
governments' overall security. In this light, a Central African vision for cyberspace 
should encompass the lessons learned in the successes and failures already witnessed 
elsewhere across the world.  
In the area of security and cyberspace, militaries have played a significant role in 
the development of new technologies. The technologies used to defend and attack 
networks and information-technologies systems are often created in military facilities, as 
threat assessments have led strategists to believe that future battles will involve 
cyberspace.7,8,9 One of the prime missions of a military force is to be ready for any type 
of threat to the sovereignty of the state, and so must be the militaries of Central Africa.10 
In every society, government as the guarantor of civil liberties is bound to be 
ready to exercise authority in cyberspace, as in other realms. Many concerns exist about 
the authority of governments in the cyber domain. A gain in security, if not enforced 
adequately, may lead to the loss of individual liberties. To what level of individual liberty 
should members of a society compromise to benefit security?  
A security strategy in cyberspace will require two urgent and bold approaches. 
First, it should incorporate a regional approach with sharing of critical and often very 
sensitive information-technology resources to overcome the limited cyber capabilities of 
Central African countries. Second, it should include the development of harmonized 
regional and international norms. Geographically, this thesis will focus on the Economic 
                                                 
7 John Arquilla, “Cyberwar Is Already Upon Us: But Can It be Controlled?” Foreign Policy, April 
2012, accessed February 27, 2012, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/27/cyberwar_is_already_upon_us, 1. 
8 Richard A. Clarke,  and Robert K., Knake, “Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and 
What To Do About It,” (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2010), 64-68. 
9 John Arquilla, “From Blitzkrieg to Bitskrieg: The Military Encounter with Computers,” 
(Communication of the ACM 54, n°10 2011), 58–64. 
10 Alice R. Buchalter,  “Military Support to Civil Authorities: The  Role of the Departement of Defense 
in Support of Homeland Defense,” Federal Research Division Library of Congress, February 2007, 
accessed March 06, 2012, http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/CNGR_Milit-Support-Civil-Authorities.pdf. 
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Community of Central African States (ECCAS), which comprises Cameroon, the Central 
Republic of Africa, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon, the Republic of the Congo, and Sao Tome and Principe.11 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What are the measures that Central African countries can take to increase their 
cybersecurity?  
To answer this question, it is important to understand how cyberspace stands in 
Central Africa and to study the risks pertaining to cyberspace. A thorough examination of 
the roles of states in cyberspace will help illuminate the axes of leverage available for 
increasing cybersecurity. This analysis will also reflect on each state’s social, economic, 
and political atmospheres. Emphasis will be placed on the role of the military in 
achieving this goal. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
1. Methodology 
In this thesis research, the intention is to make an empirical study that examines 
the key factors that pertain to cybersecurity in Central Africa. The overall framework of 
this thesis will be twofold. First, it will examine and identify existing cyber assets and 
mechanisms that can lead to cyber risk. Second, it will determine the role of government 
in cyberspace and what axes of leverage are possible to mitigate existing threats. As a 
subset of the second frame, this research will analyze how the military can contribute to 
increasing cybersecurity in Central Africa. 
                                                 
11 “Communauté Economique des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale,” CEEAC-ECCAS, accessed August 23, 
2012, http://www.ceeac-eccas.org/. 
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2. Elements of the Framework 
a. Understanding Cyber Security Risks: The Case of the ECCAS 
Cybersecurity in the Central African region will be assessed based on the 
examination of five areas of risk in cyberspace: laws and regulations, infrastructures, 
information systems, business and industry, and society (see Figure 1).  This chart 
summarizes the five identified areas of risk (green boxes) and their dependent variables 
(yellow boxes), where cyber threats (blue boxes) can take advantage to create problems 
for governments. To be thorough in the evaluation of cybersecurity risk, we will assume 
that the likelihood of a cyber incident can be extrapolated from other places in the world 
where a similar set of conditions has led to security concerns. 
b. Roles of Governments in Cyberspace, Axes of Leverage: Case of 
ECCAS  
A government’s mission should be to give the people prosperity and 
stability (civil liberties, security, wealth, etc.) within their territory.  By definition, states 
play an important role in cyberspace, as it is part of a country's assets, and events in 
cyberspace can have direct impacts on the physical world. The assessment of the role of 
government in cyberspace will be done through the four instruments of national power: 
diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME). Figure 2 summarizes the 
objectives and actions (blue boxes) of governments in cyberspace in relation to the 
government’s power instruments (red boxes) and the areas in cyberspace (green boxes) 
where actions are needed, postulating how the action can be exercised (yellow boxes). 












Figure 1.  Areas of Risk from Cyber Threats 
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Figure 2.  Meeting Government Objectives in Cyberspace 
c. Solution for Empowering Cyberspace in Central Africa  
The salient question is to establish whether a regional approach to 
mitigating cyberspace risks (to improve productivity and quality of service) can offer the 
ECCAS community better chances of success than an approach based on individual, 
uncoordinated effort. Given the socioeconomic context, which is similar throughout the 
subregion, the preexisting collaborative background (sociologic, economic, and 
diplomatic), and the experience learned from across the world, the ECCAS community 
has everything to gain from combining their individual assets to improve cyber readiness.  
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In a context where actionable resources are rare and scattered across the 
ECCAS, one can hypothesize that a collaboration build upon the economic community 
already in place that promotes the sharing of cyber resources and capabilities within the 
region is a good starting point. Such cooperation will help create a strong cyber 
environment conducive of the confidence and trust necessary to initiate a “cyber 
community of Central African states” (C3AS). 
E. BLUEPRINT 
This thesis is organized into an introduction, five chapters, and seven appendixes. 
The first chapter, Chapter I – Introduction – presents the context and interest of this 
research, and finally defines the methodological framework of the thesis. 
Chapter II defines the cyberspace of Central Africa. It summarizes the cyber 
assets of Central Africa by examining five principal aspects: infrastructures; information 
systems; business and industry; laws, regulations, and administration; and society and 
culture. Each of these aspects organizes into multiple subsets of indicators.  
Chapter III raises concerns about the potential threats to which Central African 
states are exposed in their development of cyber capabilities.  This chapter emphasizes 
cyber intelligence and its prospects for the intelligence community. A final debate is 
made on the place of human intelligence in an environment where information 
technologies are thriving and growing. 
Chapter IV examines the role of Central African states in cyberspace, first by 
reviewing state objectives in that realm, then by examining how states can achieve their 
objectives. This latter concern will be explored using the constituent elements of state 
power, which are the political and diplomatic, the informational, the economic and social, 
and the military. This chapter suggests some ways to measure the effects of state 
elements of power on cyberspace.  
Chapter V considers how the military in Central Africa might handle 
technological changes. This chapter identifies the fronts of technological penetration and 
the sources of technological innovation within the military. It also examines the 
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relationship between Central African military doctrine and technology. In a context 
where the security aspects of cyberspace are yet to be developed, the overall goal is to 
find some venues to raise more interest within the military about cyberspace and cyber 
readiness.   
Chapter VI presents a general conclusion and proposes solutions to the security 
challenges of Central African cyberspace. The creation of a cyber community of Central 
African states, where mutualization of resources, cooperation, and increased engagement 
of a regional security apparatus are in place, can help to sustain stable development. 
The thesis closes with seven appendixes that give a thorough description of the 
states that constitute the Economic Community of Central African States. Each of these 
appendixes is organized into five subheadings that deal with infrastructure; information 
systems, business and industry; laws, regulations, and structural organizations; the use of 
information technologies in the society and culture; and criminal activities registered in 
the cyberspace in Central Africa.    
 10
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II. DEFINING CENTRAL AFRICAN CYBERSPACE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter gives a description and history of Central African cyberspace and 
cyber crimes or incidents. The subregion of Central Africa will be limited to the countries 
that are members of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), 
which comprise eight countries: Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon, and Sao Tome and Principe (see Figure 3). 
This chapter examines the cyberspace of the ECCAS by looking at infrastructure; 
information systems; business and industry; laws, regulations, and administration; and 
society and culture.  
The definition of cyberspace in this thesis encompasses all assets that contribute 
to information and communication technologies (ICT), including telecommunications 
infrastructure, energy, information technology (IT) services, laws and regulations, 
business and industries, and the society of ICT consumers.12, 13  
Though we would like to have statistical data at the subdivision (city) level for 
each country for a more accurate picture of its cyberspace, the reality of data collection 





                                                 
12 T. Unwin , “ICT4D, Information and communication technology for development,” Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
13 Kuehl, “From Cyberspace to Cyberpower: Defining the Problem,” 22. 
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Figure 3.  Economic Community of Central African States' Administrative 
Subdivisions and Capitals 
Overall, the following paragraphs provide a general overview of current activities 
and issues related to the cyberspace of the ECCAS subregion. The data presented here 
should be regarded as illustrative rather than exhaustive. ICT use in these countries is at a 
particularly dynamic stage, with new developments and announcements happening on a 
daily basis everywhere. Therefore, this analysis should be seen as “snapshots” that were 
current at the time they were taken; it is expected that certain facts and figures presented 
will become outdated very quickly. 
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In the ECCAS region, the existing reality of cyberspace is quite complex, 
although very limited. The overall index of cyber readiness for the region is evaluated as 
a two on a scale of one to seven, which places the region in the very bottom of the world 
list.14 
B. INFRASTRUCTURES 
From the infrastructure perspective, cyberspace in the Central Africa community 
is at the brink of a tipping point. The year 2012 was the promised year of 
accomplishment for many projects in all eight countries of the ECCAS subregion. These 
projects aimed to connect these partners to international undersea optical-fiber cables, 
followed by the interconnection of regional capitals in a Central African backbone, and 
finally by the interconnection of major cities through high-capacity communications 
links.15 The present telecommunication infrastructure landscape is dominated by wireless 
technology, either for distribution to the local population or for the interconnection of 
distant cities.16 Mobile telephony and mobile services are highly developed, especially in 
urban areas, although the rural sector does have an acceptable level of mobile penetration 
as compared to landline services. Surprisingly, and thanks to the portability of ICT, the 
ECCAS subregion is now benefiting from all the existing telecommunication solutions 
offered around the world. The miracle of competition has led to the introduction by  
 
                                                 
14 Soumitra Dutta and Beñat Bilbao-Osorio, “The Global Information Technology Report 2012: Living 
in a Hyperconnected World,” World Economic Forum, accessed June 10, 2012, 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/Global_IT_Report_2012.pdf, 197. 
15 Republic of Cameroon, “Télécommunications et TIC: Bilan du septennat des grandes ambitions,” 
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, February 2012, accessed August 2012, 
http://www.minpostel.gov.cm/index.php?option=com_content&view =article&id=125%3Ale-bilan-des-
telecommunications-et-tic-dans-un-ouvrage&catid=50%3Aa-la-une&lang=fr, 95.  
16 Mark D. J. Williams, Rebecca Mayer, and Michael Minges, “Africa’s ICT Infrastructure Building on 
the Mobile Revolution,” The World Bank edited by Vivien Foster and Cecilia Briceño-Garmendia, 2011, 




mobile-phone companies of 4G, 3G, GPRS, and CDMA networks for the population.17 
Internet access, when available, remains insignificant from a global world perspective 
and is still expensive, due to the reliance on satellite for bandwidth access in many 
ECCAS countries. The absence of local Internet-managing infrastructures like Internet 
eXchange Points (IXPs) contributes to a high cost for Internet access. Projects backed by 
the World Bank are underway to fill the gap, namely, the Central African backbone, the 
WASC optical-fiber link, the African telecommunications satellite RASCOM,18 and 
many others.19 
One of the issues that has a direct impact on ICT infrastructure development and 
exploitation is energy. Although the ECCAS region is endowed with huge potential 
hydroelectric energy in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cameroon, and Gabon, 
these countries have not yet come out with a genuine exploitation plan to overcome the 
energy gap in the region.20 ECCAS countries remain burdened by an energy gap with a 
direct impact on daily life: limited access to electricity in households, multiple power 
shortages, and bad distribution of electricity in urban and rural areas.21 These difficulties 
endanger existing ICT infrastructure and pose serious threat to cyberspace development. 
Figure 4 shows the status of broadband network infrastructures, access to undersea 
cables, power plants, roads and electricity networks in the subregion of Central Africa.  
                                                 
17 Acobo Garcia-Palencia, Juan Jose Rio, and Dimitris Lioulias, “ICT in Emerging Markets: A USD 
200 BLN OPPORTUNITY THAT CANNOT BE IGNORED,” Delta Partners – White Paper, May 2011, 
accessed June 10, 2012, http://www.deltapartnersgroup.com/ict-in-emerging-markets-a-usd-200-bln-
opportunity-that-cannot-be-ignored. 
18 “Members of the RASCOM Project,” RASCOM, March 2005, accessed June 28, 2012, 
http://www.rascom.org/info_detail.php?langue_id=1&id_r=7&id_sr=0&id_gr=2. 
19 “Equatorial Guinea Minister discusses telecommunications advances,” Equatorial Guinea News, 
July 29, 2010, accessed July 12, 2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zTutYbgoWR0&lr=1&uid=w-
fAmKLbw6kNshkn2_iTcg. 
20 Vivien Foster and Daniel Alberto Benitez, “The Democratic Republic of Congo’s Infrastructure: A 
Continental Perspective,” AICD Country Report, March 2010, accessed June 29, 2012, 
http://www.ppiaf.org/sites/ppiaf.org/files/publication/AICD-DRC-country-report.pdf, 6-8. 
21 Anton Eberhard, et al., “Africa’s Power Infrastructure Investment, Integration, Efficiency,” The 




Figure 4.  ECCAS Cyberspace Infrastructures (Optical-Fiber Network, Power Plants, 
Submarine Cable Access) 
C. INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND SERVICES 
With respect to services offered in ECCAS cyberspace, much still has to be done. 
Most of what exists revolves around mobile communications, Internet access for web 
navigation (with little local web hosting), and voice over IP becoming a potential area of 
development. Electronic banking, especially money transfer, is also a forthcoming 
activity. Technical services offered in the ICT realm, such as Internet eXchange Points, 
public key infrastructure (PKI), server farms, cloud computing, or virtual environments, 
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are awaited. Although some mobile companies propose extending services they already 
have implemented abroad, local services are nonexistent. Within state administrations, 
some efforts are being made to develop online services or build utility information 
systems, but they are sparse and badly coordinated. These efforts, which are usually 
encompassed in an electronic-government type initiative, consist of interconnection of 
public administration within the government, computerization of some critical public 
services, such as human resources, salary systems, national identification systems, and 
customs exchanges.22,23 In other places, the mere fact of introducing computers into daily 
tasks is viewed as enough and accounts for computerization of the public service. The 
military, for their part, are very close to their civilian counterparts in term of cyber 
readiness, although some expertise exists due to the types of weapon systems that they 
possess or the mechanisms within the military that drive them to be ready for new forms 
of threat. The introduction and evolution of information systems in ECCAS public 
administration is more the result of individuals with high leadership and personal 
attraction to technology taking action than a systematic plan driving, and accounting for, 
every step. Figure 5 below give an overview of the level of activity registered in 
cyberspace of Central Africa; this estimation is extrapolated from the number of Internet 
host servers and the size of the data traffic measures across the subregion. 
 
                                                 
22 “E-Government Survey 2012,” United Nation, New York (2012), accessed June 29, 2012, 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan048065.pdf. 




Figure 5.  ECCAS Information System Utilization  
D. LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND ADMINISTRATION 
Within the subregion, the legal framework is completely torn apart. There are 
countries in the ECCAS that are advanced in the process of regulation building and 
awareness of cyberspace legal challenges and those that are barely concerned by 
cyberspace issues. Generally, in all the states, one can find an administration that is in 
charge of ICT, but the recurring problem is that the laws, regulations, and organizational 
charts are either incomplete or totally obsolete for dealing with the speeding realm of  
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cyberspace.24 Central African countries are still limited by old telecommunications 
systems that were design for communication through microwave signals and wired 
analog telephony. All the issues related to electronic transactions or electronic venues are 
yet to be addressed; this opens the way for judicial discrepancies and criminal activities.25  
Another aspect that is common to the ECCAS subregion is the lack of cyberspace law-
enforcement expertise.26 The latest countries to have adopted cyber commerce and 
criminal laws have yet to acquire the expertise and infrastructure necessary to be fully 
operational. From a general perspective, according to data from a UN survey, and a failed 
state index of states in the subregion, heavy bureaucracies, and high levels of 
administrative corruption hinder the ability of governments to favor cyberspace 
development in the subregion of Central Africa (see Figure 6). 
 
                                                 
24 Ewelukwa, “Is Africa Ready for Electronic Commerce…,” 8. 
25 Rebecca Wanjiku, “Rising Cybercrime Pushes African Governments to Take Action,” CSO Online, 
December 19, 2011, accessed June 11, 2012, http://www.csoonline.com/article/696806/rising-cybercrime-
pushes-african-governments-to-take-action. 
26 Eric Agwe-Mbarika Akuta, Isaac Monari Ong’oa, and Chanika Renee Jones, “Combating Cyber 
Crime in Sub-Sahara Africa; A Discourse on Law, Policy and Practice,” Journal of Peace, Gender and 




Figure 6.  Laws and Regulations in ECCAS 
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E. BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY 
With respect to business and industry, the previous factors of infrastructure, 
network backbone, limited access to high-speed broadband, energy quality and supply, 
and regulation environment make it hard for ICT business and industries to prosper in the 
region. Nevertheless, a lot of small and medium enterprises (SME) exist, most of them 
branches of foreign companies or locals with contracts with foreign brands. The 
predominant sectors are web development, software engineering, telecommunication-
infrastructure construction, system integration, and retail. A few assembly lines have 
been spotted in two or three states, but their production is very limited and essentially 
aimed at local consumption. Internet service providers (ISPs) are developing very fast 
and are widespread. In the tertiary sector, cybercafés with mobile calling services are a 
common business. Most of the hardware equipment is imported and retail of ICT 
products can also be considered a dominant venue.  
As pointed out previously, electronic commerce is very low; the practice of 
selling goods online to citizens is thriving to take-off. Several reasons may be the cause, 
but one of the first is lack of trust. Indeed it is hard or even impossible to pinpoint cyber 
users in city address books. This, combined with the lack of an accountability 
mechanism, makes users not trust online sellers enough to send them their money without 
guarantee of receiving the merchandise. Although the seller might be trustworthy, 
delivery systems are either too expensive for the average consumer or they may not able 
to locate and serve the recipient. A kind of cyber commerce that shows some hope is the 
selling of downloadable products. Again, the question of customer-service interaction 
remains. For now, the categories of e-business that show positive trends are mobile-
phone-related businesses like bill payment, prepaid services, and, to a certain extent, 
downloadable materials.27,28 Figure 7 gives an overview of the size of business activity 
registered in cyberspace of Central Africa. 
                                                 
27 Sam Moss, “FirstRand Expands Further In Africa,” First Rand, March 30, 2005, accessed June 29, 
2012, http://www.firstrand.co.za/content/291/firstrand-expands-further-in-africa/. 
28 Anna McGovern, “Afrique : transferts d’argent au bout du fil,” Africa Time, February 21, 2012, 




Figure 7.  ECCAS Cyberspace Business and Industries Import/Export 
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F. SOCIETY 
ECCAS social interaction with ICT is quite complex. On the one hand, there is a 
high penetration of mobile phones, which makes it possible for people of all ages and 
levels of education to be “connected.” However, even though mobile communication 
devices are well spread into the population, their use remains limited to calling and 
texting; services that involve data-package exchange are far behind. Internet services, in 
the other hand, are a strong utility tool used by many people. The younger generation 
uses them for entertainment, social networking, and e-mail exchange. In the academic 
world, the Internet is becoming a genuine tool for accessing world knowledge and 
exchanging information within national and regional universities.29 In the professional 
world and public services, companies as well as administrations are progressively 
connecting to the Internet, offering more services to their personnel and customers; but 
this trend is limited by inadequate infrastructure, bandwidth, and the expense of end-user 
connectivity equipment.30 Figure 8 shows the penetration of cyber related activities 
(Internet user, Facebook user, online media freedom) in the society. What comes first 
usually is electronic mailing services, as they offer speed and quality to materials 
exchange, unlike aging faxes that randomly fail to transfer, when they even exist. 
Although some countries are moving to ATM systems for customers to retrieve money 
from their bank account, monetary deposits through automatic systems or automatic sales 
of merchandise are yet to be introduced (see Figure 7). The reliance on ICT for daily 
activities in private or public companies within the ECCAS region is not yet critical. 
Though certain companies do have information systems, they remain supplemental rather 
than core assets. In rural areas, apart from mobile-phone services that have found their 
way to the countryside, the Internet and all the other electronic services are notably 
absent and when they do exist, the service is poor and erratic. The news media, especially 
                                                 
29 Emmanuel Tonye, “La formation continue et à distance (FOCAD) en Afrique centrale: étude de 
faisabilité contextualisée,” AUF-RES@TICE Report, May 2008, accessed August 25, 2012, 
http://www.resatice.org/IMG/pdf/tonye.pdf. 
30 Glen Farrell and Shafika Isaacs, “Survey of ICT and Education in Africa: A Summary Report, Based 
on 53 Country Surveys,” Washington, DC: infoDev / World Bank, 2007, accessed August 23, 2012, 
http://www.infodev.org/en/Publication.353.html. 
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the press, has discovered in the Internet an excellent tool to overcome censorship of their 
releases. As a matter of fact, there is a blossoming trend of opposition (alternative) news 
agencies with websites, online blogs, and online-social-media discussions, generally 
hosted, animated, and nurtured from outside the country through the aid of diasporas and 
civil-rights organizations.31  
 
Figure 8.  ECCAS Internet Usage and Penetration 
                                                 
31 “Central African Republic: ‘La Facebookmania’ à La Centrafricaine,” OAfrica, accessed August 24, 
2012, http://www.oafrica.com/city-profile/central-african-republic-facebookmania/. 
 24
G. CONCLUSION  
Overall, the level of penetration of IT in the ECCAS region is low in comparison 
to the world standard and relative to its population size. The dependency on technology 
in daily life is thus insignificant. Nevertheless, the trend of advancement is positive and 
multiple efforts are underway to sustain this trend, as it is believed that ICT can help poor 
countries improve their economic conditions. 
The lack of efficient cyberspace use in Central Africa affects the economy and 
increases poverty while undermining state power in the region. The end of the year 2012 
will see the accomplishment of many projects aimed at developing information and 
communication infrastructures in Central Africa.32 Although the very existence of these 
projects is a good thing for the development of cyberspace in the region, numerous 
challenges exist. Economic difficulties and multiple sociopolitical crises tend to give an 
inconsistent development pattern to ICT movement. Countries have different approaches: 
some do merely nothing while others strive to start somewhere, but without needed 
resources or a coherent strategic plan. The result of these inconsistencies is the increase 
of risks and distrust in Central African cyberspace and the perception of cyberspace as a 
threat to the state and national security. Leading decision makers look at the development 
of cyberspace as a secondary matter, a luxury reserved for Western countries that 
Africans are not really ready for. Challenges that show up may be (but are not limited to) 




                                                 
32 The Central African Backbone project that intend to interconnect Cameroon, Chad, and Central 
Republic of Africa will be achieve this in 2012, additionally these countries are all constructing internal 
optical fiber networks and others information’s systems projects. See  “Central African Backbone Project - 
APL1A in Chad: Harmonization and Modernization of the Legal and Regulatory Framework for Electronic 




African rulers seem to be blinded by misconceptions and hype over the danger of 
the cyber realm, to the extent that real progress in ICT is the result of a private sector in 
search of new markets and consumers around the world—despite all the academic 
research that shows the importance of ICT in the fight against poverty.33,34 Although it is 
true that cyberspace presents some real risks to users, the many examples of 
socioeconomic growth observed in other areas of the world with the support of that realm 




                                                 
33 Brahima Sanou, “The Role of ICT in Advancing Growth in Least Developed Countries: Trends, 
Challenges and Opportunities,” ITU- Telecommunication Development Bureau, 2011, accessed August 23, 
2012, http://www.itu.int/pub/D-LDC-ICTLDC.2011. 
34 Yayehyirad Kitaw, “E-Government in @frica: Prospects, challenges and practices,” International 
Telecommunication Union, November 2006, accessed June 11, 2012, 
http://people.itu.int/~kitaw/egov/paper/E-Government_in_Africa.pdf, 6. 
35 Nnaemeka Ewelukwa, “Is Africa Ready for Electronic Commerce? A Critical Appraisal of the Legal 
Framework for Ecommerce in Africa,” ACICOL Conference Paper, January 14, 2011, accessed August 23, 
2012, http://www.acicol.com/__temp/Dr_N.pdf, 3-6. 
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III. THE CHALLENGE OF CYBER INTELLIGENCE IN 
CENTRAL AFRICA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
One of the greatest achievements of the twenty-first century is undoubtedly the 
revolution of information technology; it has made it possible for someone sitting in his 
shed, far in the extremity of the world—say the equatorial forest in Africa—through a 
computer connected with a satellite link to access overwhelming capabilities. With the 
necessary skills and tools, he is capable of actions considered two decades ago as 
miraculous. Many specialists say that “whatever knowledge someone may want, he will 
get it.” But to what degree is this statement true? Is all information available online? 
Does access to online information help one anticipate the next move of one’s neighbor? 
There are academics who argue that the information technology era has whistled the end 
of secrecy.36,37 In a world where dependency on technology for daily activities is 
becoming more necessary, the high processing capacity of computers or networks of 
computers will overcome the existing techniques of protection of information and 
ultimately expose secrets (protected information) or predict the unknown.38,39 To counter 
these arguments, others scholars object that even though one might access all available 
data, its overwhelming size will prevent the user from acknowledging the right 
information at the right time in order to take action accordingly.40 The relevance of this 
debate has a sounding board in the global intelligence community, where the answer to 
                                                 
36 Florini, Ann, “The End of Secrecy,” Foreign Policy ,N° 111 (1998):50-63, accessed June 9, 2012, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1149378, 1. 
37 Micah L. Sifry, “In the Age of WikiLeaks, the End of Secrecy?” The Nation, March 3, 2011, 
accessed June 09, 2012,  http://www.thenation.com/article/158988/age-wikileaks-end-secrecy, 1. 
38 Justin Wolfers  and Eric Zitzewitz, “Prediction Markets,”  Journal of Economic Perspectives 18, N° 
2(2004): 107–126, accessed June 9, 2012, http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/jwolfers/Papers/Prediction 
markets.pdf. 
39 Lynn Wu and Erik Brynjolfsson, “The Future of Prediction: How Google Searches Foreshadow 
Housing Prices and Sales,” ICIS 2009 Proceedings, Dec 2, 2009, accessed June 9, 2012, 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~bakos/wise/papers/wise2009-3b3_paper.pdf. 
40 Erik J. Dahl, “Warning of Terror: Explaining the Failure of Intelligence Against Terrorism,” Journal 
of Strategic Studies 28, n°1(2005), 46. 
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the dilemma has direct repercussions on intelligence-collection strategies.41 The question 
becomes whether to invest in information-technology techniques for collection and 
prediction (CYBINT) or to keep developing older techniques base on human interaction 
for collection and analysis (HUMINT). By CYBINT42 is meant all computer and network 
attacks and exploits made with the purpose, not to disrupt or create harm to computer 
systems, but to retrieve embedded information.43,44 It also encompasses prediction 
activity based on data stored in databases or available online.45,46 This type of activity 
requires specific skills and training, and generally needs important processing power, 
such as in code breaking or forecasting analysis.47 Although the basic tools for cyber 
espionage are available online, important infrastructural requirements are generally 
needed when the stakes become high.48 Overall, CYBINT is attractive because it offers 
limited lethal exposure and a great level of deniability for the performer.49 On the other 
hand, HUMINT, even though reputed as very risky for the performer, is one of the 
traditional means of information collection. Old as the world, HUMINT is solely based 
                                                 
41 Hamilton Bean, “No More Secrets: Open Source Information and the Reshaping of U.S. 
Intelligence,” Center for the Study of Intelligence 56, No.1, Santa Barbara CA: Praeger 2011, 218, accessed 
June 9, 2012, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-
studies/studies/vol.-56-no.-1/no-more-secrets-open-source-information-and-the-reshaping-of-u.s.-
intelligence.html. 
42 The term CYBINT is an invention of the author in an effort to summarizes into one word all the 
techniques of collecting information base on cyber technology; of course this might encompass some 
terminology already common in the intelligence community like OSINT for Open Source Intelligence, 
SIGINT for Signal Intelligence, and CNE/D for Computer Network Attack and Defense.  
43 Kevin G. Coleman, “Cyber Espionage Targets Sensitive Data,” SIP Trunking, December 29, 2008, 
accessed June 9, 2012, http://sip-trunking.tmcnet.com/topics/security/articles/47927-cyber-espionage-
targets-sensitive-data.htm, 1. 
44 John Villasenor, “The Flame Cyber Espionage Attack: Five Questions We Should Ask,” Forbes, 
June 04, 2012, accessed June 09, 2012, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnvillasenor/2012/06/04/the-flame-cyber-espionage-attack-five-
questions-we-should-ask/. 
45 Joe McKendrick, “Search data analysis opens up intelligence gathering,” SmartPlanet, March 25, 
2011, accessed June 09, 2012, http://www.smartplanet.com/blog/business-brains/search-data-analysis-
opens-up-intelligence-gathering/14601. 
46 “Intelligent Data Analysis: An International Journal,” IOS Press 16, N°6, May 9 2012, accessed June 
09, 2012, http://www.iospress.nl/journal/intelligent-data-analysis/. 
47 Dorothy Denning, “Computer Network Attack and Defense,” (lecture Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA, February, 2012). 
48 Dorothy Denning, discussions on necessary infrastructure for developing and testing large scale 
cyber-weapons like STUXNET, in Conflict in Cyberspace, (lecture Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
CA, February, 2012). 
49 Denning, “Conflict in Cyberspace.” 
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on man-to-man interaction, where in a cat-and-mouse game, deception, persuasion, 
coercion, and tricks are used to collect information from targeted individuals. Depending 
on the theater of operation, HUMINT can be very expensive for its sponsor, due 
essentially to human greed or the impossibility of total control over informants.50 While it 
is considered a worthwhile and obvious discussion when this debate over CYBINT 
versus HUMINT takes place in Western countries, there is uncertainty on the value of the 
same question in African countries. The point of this chapter is to raise awareness on the 
potential risks of cyber intelligence in the growing cyberspace of Central Africa, and on 
the flip side, to evaluate the opportunities that are available for intelligence collection by 
state agencies. Along with this discussion is the place of human intelligence; in the 
African context, cyber capabilities can provides undeniable support to that form of 
collection, which is predominant.     
B. THE ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM   
Many African nations are still emerging in their incipient walk towards 
information technology. Global statistics give cyber technology a penetration rate of 
nearly twenty percent.51 International telecommunication companies in search of 
economic opportunities are driving the progress by introducing more and more 
communication solutions and futuristic devices. 
To fill the technological gap, tremendous efforts are deployed by local states to 
build a suitable technological framework. Due to multidisciplinary needs and extended 
areas of concern, security aspects are barely addressed or not considered priorities, 
leading the way to multiple security risks as the criminal activity in the subregion shows  
(see Figure 9), some of which involve intelligence collection. 
                                                 
50 David Tucker, “Intelligence in the Information Age,” (lecture Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
CA, May, 2012). 




Figure 9.  ECCAS Criminal Activities in Cyberspace 
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Indeed, in the absence of operational governmental networks (intranet or secure 
extranet) or a platform for information exchange, many decision makers and high-ranking 
administrative personnel share classified data on commercial information systems with 
their personal accounts. In past years, several incidents have been registered involving 
intrusion into authorities’ mailboxes, identity theft, digital counterfeiting, financial 
extortion, and more, thus raising the alarm on intelligence-leak possibilities.52,53,54 These 
threats are worsened by a progressing cyberspace capability and ignorant users who are 
not fully trained in newly introduced technology. 
In such a context, where “defense” is barely developed, Africa’s intelligence 
community will certainly view the regional cyberspace as a gold mine for intelligence 
collection and might want to give up the human side, with all its defects and flaws, to 
increase their cyber-collection assets. But will it not be discarded too quickly? Does 
CYBINT really hold the promise of its flowers? Would it not be another hype like the 
Year 2000 (Y2K) computer bug? The end of the world promised a few decades ago was 
to come from computers. In a world where dependency on cyber would be at a hundred 
percent, such a scenario could be conceivable; but in Africa, based on its complex picture 
and the low level of cyber penetration, cyber-intelligence collection can only be a 
supplement to old techniques that put the individual, the human relationship, at the center 
of the collection effort. Nevertheless, because of the weakness of “defense,” those 
engaged in intelligence collection should not disregard cyber capabilities, nor disqualify 
human-based techniques already existing, but should consider a combined approach 
where cyber collection can help build the intelligence background. Occasionally, cyber 
means provide firsthand knowledge while human-based collection techniques complete 
the background with missing links, help unlock secure data collected through cyber 
means, or guide the analyst through the massive amount of information available in 
cyberspace. 
                                                 
52 Dirro Toralv, et al., “McAfee Threats Report: Second Quarter 2011,” McAfee® Labs, accessed June 
2012,  http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-quarterly-threat-q2-2011.pdf, 13-17. 
53 Franz-Stefan Gady, “Africa's Cyber WMD,” Foreign Policy, March 24, 2010, accessed June 2012, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/03/24/africas_cyber_wmd?page=0,0. 
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According to the available indicators of information-technology development  
in World Bank, World Economic Forum, and International Telecommunication Union 
statistics, sub-Saharan African countries are at the bottom in terms of readiness,  
usage, environment, and socioeconomic impact.55,56,57 The reasons for their primitive 
information systems range from politically unstable environments to poverty and social 
conditions. Obviously, information and communication technology was not a priority in 
the continent during the past decades; since then, multiple factors have forced African 
states to embrace ICT, generally without fully preparing the society for it. International 
companies in search of new markets are invading the subregion, going after a population 
of than a billion inhabitants.58 Unfortunately, this aggressive penetration happens in a 
context where the average level of education and literacy is very low, the cultural 
perception of technology still naïve, and the legal packages on ICT inadequate where it 
exists at all.59,60 A high level of technology is thus unavailable to the population, which 
barely understands its potential and as a consequence, uses it awkwardly. Many of the 
cyberspace devices commonly available are not well understood by users. The argument 
that prevails is that they help to perform a good job, or that these devices are fashionable. 
Globalization also contributes to the rush toward technology. People everywhere 
need to communicate and communicate faster. When a fax machine presents difficulties, 
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users hurry to e-mail as a stopgap: “scan it and e-mail to my Yahoo account!” E-mails are 
inexpensive and reliable in terms of quality of service, while SMS, chat rooms, and 
voice-mail are easy in a context where postal services are sometimes unreliable, 
expensive, or nonexistent. In the global world, the concept of “time is money” applies 
everywhere; business, administration, military, and others stuck in the countryside are 
obliged to use any practical means available to quickly satisfy their communication 
needs. 
One other motivation for penetration of ICT is the growing population and the 
needs that come with it. Governments are forced to embrace ICT because it provides 
solutions to handling an increasing amount of data, including the number of civil 
servants, the electronic-voting system, the social-security registration system, the ID-card 
system, the driving-license system, the birth-registration system, and many others. Needs 
are numerous and only technology offers reliable answers. African governments have 
recognized in information technology a powerful solution to overcome poverty through 
the improvement of communication and management of large amounts of information.61 
Thus, they have put the development of ICT in the list of priorities and encouraged their 
population to migrate towards it.62 National policies have been crafted to guide the 
endeavor; but when one looks closely at these policies, the principal topics of discussion 
are education, infrastructure, services, and promotion of usage.63,64 Very little, if 
anything, is said on security. When security is mentioned, it is generally a global concept 
rather than a set of straightforward, applicable policies. 
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C. CYBER INTELLIGENCE OPPORTUNITIES 
In many administrations, there is a dilemma between the need to access 
information for the purpose of efficiency and the need to protect secrets and ensure 
privacy. Usually, in the local context, the absence of regulation and the pressure of results 
will push decision makers to take the risk of deploying internal networks, which 
generally are exclusively wireless and rely on free, online messaging services for content 
exchange. To make things worse, generally no one in these organizations is trained in 
computer security awareness, or if so, the ratio per number of personnel is very low. Such 
behavioral patterns are witnessed even at the top levels of government institutions.65 
In the military, as in other security services, the situation is not much different. 
Information technology has not yet penetrated these services at the level of operations or 
command-and-control systems. IT is essentially used in an administrative context as a 
tool to enhance performance. It is thus used for bureaucratic purposes, such as human and 
logistics resources management, or headquarters paperwork. As in other administrations, 
there is a tremendous outbreak of personal computer usage at the individual level, for 
example, the office-secretary level. The inherent risk here is their use of the Internet, 
which is welcomed as a means of communication and document exchange. 
Unfortunately, there is a negative and calamitous mixture of personal with official 
activities. One is not surprised to find on personal and privately owned computers 
sensitive documents, which are exchanged over the Internet. It is not uncommon to find 
the secretary of a high-ranking official using her computer—the very same one that is 
meant for sensitive work—to spend long hours chatting online on social-network 
websites. 
This lack of security concerns was probably justified by the almost nonexistent or 
very low penetration of cyberspace and multiple other areas of preoccupations. Due to the 
need to start somewhere, decision makers did not have any reason to perceive cyberspace 
as a threat. In fact, up to that stage, it did not represent a security risk; on the contrary, 
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cyberspace was viewed, and is still viewed, as a catalyst to development.66 The emerging 
use of cyberspace is increasingly showing sources of security risk tied to the very nature 
of this realm: identity theft, extortion, information leakage, and other wrongdoing. Some 
governments are acting to catch up, passing new laws, creating regulatory boards, 
seeking counseling, and enacting other measures. 67,68 But these initiatives are still very 
weak and insufficient compared to the rate of growth of cyberspace. Many obstacles have 
still to be overcome, such as lack of qualified enforcement personnel, financing 
resources, infrastructure, forensics equipment, and organization. 69,70 
Surprisingly, there is a fraction of people that, due to their exposure to 
globalization and consciousness of the sensitivity of information they are in charge of, 
take measures at the personal level to guarantee their safety. These measures go from the 
use of highly secure passwords and separate computers for sensitive matters that will 
never be connected online, to strong encryption. Although these people show the right 
attitude, they still are embedded in an insecure environment that minimizes the chances 
of success. 
In this atmosphere of low security practices, the “defense” obviously is at a 
disadvantage; any technically savvy person will immediately sense the possibilities of 
cyber espionage, especially when one realizes that it is those who retain valuable 
information—the middle and upper class—who are generally accessible through 
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cyberspace.71 One could guess that the intelligence community might be charmed by this 
cheap and unrisky potential source of information collection. The reality is difficult to 
tell—not much documentation exists on the matter, whether of existing cases of cyber-
intelligence collection or on policies crafted to lead intelligence collection in that 
direction. What is certain is that the same illnesses that infect African state organization 
also infect their intelligence community: low levels of awareness, lack of technically 
savvy personnel (in quality and quantity), limited equipment, and lack of clearly define 
policies for cyber-asset utilization.72,73 What is interesting is that cyber spying is in some 
respects very cheap and easy to acquire or develop.74 It would probably take less time to 
develop than to put in place an acceptable defensive posture.  
Assuming the existence of directives and means to conduct cyber-based 
intelligence collection, it is not easy to predict how effective it would be. Based on the 
degree of penetration of IT in African society, one can think essentially of two broad 
categories of information open to intelligence collection. First, the background: like a 
new fashion that comes and goes, ICT is nowadays considered a “must have,” and 
cyberspace “the place to be!” News media, organizations, administrations, businesses, 
everyone that can afford it goes online, giving to those interested in information gathering 
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basic precautions before going online. This results generally in unfiltered information 
posted online, complete profiles published in chat rooms and social media, and sensitive 
matters discussed via cyber media. For this reason, when available online, background 
data can be dramatically accurate. The second type of information one can find online is 
operational. This is when key players (individuals in organizations) in certain events use 
their cyber devices to exchange information with the world, exposing themselves or their 
institutions to information leak or theft. This can be a gold mine. Indeed, the absence of 
regulation on handling sensitive data, the false privacy of a personal device, and undue 
confidence in a personal account presumed to be well protected by a strong password and 
in unlicensed security software can lead people to store and exchange data online. 
D. THE ROLE OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 
These phenomenal and appetizing opportunities have unfortunately multiple 
limitations when narrowed to the African context. The first to think of is the small-scale 
of targets. Not everyone has a computer or goes online. Most of the cyber activities are 
concentrated in urban areas; the rural areas and countryside are still out of the loop.75 The 
idea of absolute knowledge based on cyber penetration is therefore unrealistic. The 
second argument, which relates to the first, is that not all information is online. Although 
there is incentive in all sectors to go online, there is still much work to do. IT is still at its 
inception, and many of the archives dating from more than fifty years of existence for 
most African states are yet to be digitalized. The third reason is the mistrust of critical 
decision makers towards the use of cyber assets; being generally of the old school, they 
do not have a good understanding of how it works. They are thus obliged to request 
assistance in going cyber, e.g., initiating a cyber conference, sending e-mail, and 
operating encryption steps. They believe such needs unnecessarily increase layers in the 
information pipeline and perceive any technical intermediary who does not possess the 
necessary security clearance as a probable source of leakage. Fourth, and not final, in this 
non-exhaustive list is the paranoid attitude of some key players who may hold sensitive 
                                                 




information and also use cyberspace. This category of individual tends to put 
considerable individual base protection layers over his secrets, such as encryption, 
isolation of electronic devices, and deception. 
Though the cyberspace picture in sub-Saharan Africa is complex, cyber means of 
collection cannot be dismissed. Many barriers do exist, but it is hard for the intelligence 
community not to consider the potential cyberspace offers by the lack of an organized 
cyber defense strategy at the moment when everyone is embracing cyberspace.  
From a general perspective, two scenarios unfold when collecting intelligence 
from cyberspace. Either one may not find all the information needed (it may be protected 
by secure lock) or there may be too much data available, which will ultimately lead to 
confusion or waste of time. Either way, human intervention proves itself necessary for 
analysis, triage, or to provide missing links.76 One other way to combine human 
intelligence collection with cyber techniques is the use of social engineering and spying 
techniques, good terrain preparation, and study of individual habits, to locate and access 
protected cyber assets holding sensitive secrets. Information protected with strong 
encryption can take an exorbitant time to unlock through computation techniques; 
meanwhile, the involvement of human assets can ideally provide keys to unlock this 
data.77 
In sub-Saharan Africa, as in most developing countries, human intelligence is the 
principal means of intelligence collection. Intelligence is collected through the use of 
human infiltration of enemy lines, informants, exploitation of prisoners, and similar 
techniques. Being the predominant means of collection for decades, the intelligence 
community in Africa is well grounded in human intelligence and is not likely to move 
from it. For cultural, educational, and technological reasons, human intelligence will 
remain the main focus. When it comes to background-information gathering, cyberspace 
techniques will certainly provide initial help. Cyber-surveillance tools will certainly be 
added, to the extent of their affordability, to the toolbox of the intelligence community. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
Cyberspace in Africa is experiencing exponential growth, driven essentially by 
economic factors. The number of topics of concern regarding cyberspace are many, from 
infrastructure, laws and regulations to quality of service and security; in such a context, 
security is one of the least areas of concern. For the intelligence community, a cheap 
source of information has become available, due to all the misuses and unachieved steps 
of cyberspace development. Already burdened by the overall economic difficulties of the 
region and the risk of exposure of their human assets, the temptation to redirect 
intelligence collection efforts to cyberspace can be real. As discussed previously, that 
temptation has to be delayed or taken with caution. Multiple factors are in play, among 
which are the low level of cyberspace penetration and dependency on technology and the 
barrier posed by encryption and system isolation. But rather than dismissing cyber-
intelligence collection, it is necessary and good for the intelligence community to 
acknowledge the potential of cyberspace, develop capabilities in that realm, and use that 
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IV. THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN CYBERSPACE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
An ungoverned cyberspace poses a broad range of risks to the national security of 
a country. These risks go from system disruptions, cyber-intelligence leaks, and cyber 
terrorism to economic losses and many other issues not discussed in this chapter. 78,79 
These risks prompt the need for some entity to guarantee safety and security to actors in 
cyberspace. Usually, the exercise of authority can be offered in multiple forms and by 
several types of entities, but in the case of cyberspace, where the consequences of actions 
are deeply tied to events and infrastructure in the physical world, some aspects of this 
authority are most likely to devolve to the state and de facto to its government. 80,81  
Generally, problems that start in the realm of bits and bytes end up in the hands of 
real people in the real world, and result in requests for real compensation. Solutions are 
provided by the social mechanisms of the physical world, where state structures (justice, 
parliament, and executive bodies) are the master players. The repercussions of cyber-
domain activities in the physical domain compel state actors to have a presence in the 
cyber domain in order to exercise power over it. 
Evidently, this course of action is being observed everywhere in the world; states 
legislate on cyberspace, developing abilities to enforce new laws and even transforming 
that realm into a source of national power. All the cases witnessed around the world make 
it obvious that states have a role to play in cyberspace, as they already do in the physical 
world. But the patterns of development of this role differ from one state to another. 
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Although there is a general trend to go in the same direction, the patterns of involvement 
of states in cyberspace remain diverse and even unclear, particularly in Africa. 
In fact, in Central Africa it is unclear whether there is a unanimous vision of the 
state’s role in cyberspace. This might be due to the fact that the penetration rate of that 
realm is not the same everywhere, with some countries at the bottom of the cyber-
readiness index and others starting to discover the potential of cyberspace—along with its 
dangers. Cyberspace and the cyber technologies that go with it are fast-evolving domains, 
where concepts and capabilities change rapidly to become obsolete and dangerous to their 
users when they do not update. In this rapidly growing context, where boundaries are 
extremely fuzzy and most of the premises to be settled, it is more than crucial to examine 
what role the states in Central Africa have to play in cyberspace, given their 
socioeconomic and political reality. 
The point this chapter would like to make is that, given that actors in the cyber 
realm are primarily human beings (although some are artificial intelligence)—who give 
life, command and control to bytes—cyberspace is just an extension of the human 
existential plan, and thus is part of human society. The mechanisms that human societies 
have developed to live together should just be extended to this new realm and adapted to 
its reality. The state, which is representative of its communities, should therefore 
naturally exercise authority in cyberspace for matters that are relevant to its competences. 
Due to the nature of the cyber realm, with the extension of the state role comes inherent 
challenges, like boundaries, the universality of laws, authentication, and others. In 
Central Africa, these challenges are exacerbated by other variables tied to socioeconomic 
and political issues. To examine the role of states in the cyberspace of the ECCAS, one 
may use the framework of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) 
forms of power as it fits to the areas of power that states naturally possess.82 
The analysis of state roles will be conducted first by looking at state objectives, 
second by discussing the modes of action that exist within the instruments of power, and 
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finally by contemplating expected results in critical areas of cyberspace. Little emphasis 
will be made on military roles in the context of the limited resources that Central Africa 
suffers. 
B. STATE OBJECTIVES IN THE CYBERSPACE OF CENTRAL AFRICA 
In the growing context of ICT in Central Africa,83 multiple actors exist and 
contribute momentum. The business segment with IT service operators who are 
competing to provide their best and collect maximum revenues; private institutions that 
have their personal agenda and use ICT for that purpose; criminals that take advantage of 
flaws in the system to gather wealth; populations who are the principal consumers of ICT 
and thus the target of online predators; and the states whose interests are diverse and 
generally ambiguous. In this context, states have the most complex role in cyberspace. 
All who use ICT, particularly the virtual world of the Internet, when they are frustrated 
by the outcome of their interaction with other individuals or entities encountered in the 
cyber realm, seek help or arbitration from the state. In the ECCAS region, the 
bourgeoning reality of cyberspace is accompanied by a trend of side effects like 
frequency allocation, domain-name conflict, infrastructure sharing, identity theft, privacy 
invasion, and so on, that call for state intervention. Software counterfeiting and piracy 
represent a source of tax losses and revenues for both IT companies and the state. 
Although they are still low, thanks to the fact that the cyberspace is still nascent, criminal 
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As a result of their need to improve services to the population and the obligation 
to foster the economic prosperity of their people, states are also consumers of ICT 
services. Because of the anarchical development and penetration of ICT in state 
institutions, a serious potential for intelligence leaks or collection exists. The lack of 
suitable structures to manage domain names makes it possible for criminals around the 
world to build websites using segments of domain names reserved for ECCAS countries 
and offer illicit services, creating a dent in the region’s reputation.85,86 The capabilities 
that offer cyber technologies make it possible that a lawless segment of cyberspace can 
be the point of departure for cyber attacks on targets even outside the ECCAS region, 
with the attackers having the option to vanish without a trace. Cyber terrorism thus 
becomes a possible threat to ungoverned cyberspace. These anomalies and others not 
discussed here represent serious challenges for the smooth functioning of a society, as 
they undermine peace in cyberspace. Cyberspace, as a realm without boundaries, requires 
international collaboration and the involvement of a national authority for negotiation at 
the country level, roles which suit the characteristics of a state. 
C. STATE ELEMENTS OF POWER APPLIED TO THE CYBERSPACE OF 
CENTRAL AFRICA 
If the state’s role and presence in cyberspace seems obvious and even necessary, 
the approach to implement this role has been different across the world, in the ECCAS 
region in particular. The numerous priorities that the economic context generates make it 
an unpopular topic for decision makers and academics. But to deal with the growing size 
of cyberspace in the ECCAS region and tackle the rising trend of security concerns that 
naturally come with it, states need to increase their grasp of the domain. States can 
achieve that goal by using elements of power (diplomatic, informational, military, and 
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economic) that already operate for other areas of concern.87 A deployment of these 
elements of power in the cyber realm one help the states keep the upper hand. 
1. Political and Diplomatic 
In the diplomatic arena and in a larger sense the political, states have a role of 
national mobilization. Cyberspace in Central Africa is still in its infancy. To sustain the 
awakening process, there is a need to gather national resources. States have to find 
resources for the required investments in infrastructures and education. There is a need to 
create a collective interest in cyberspace and raise awareness of the advantages and 
dangers that exist within it. Such a mobilization can only be made at a national level, 
through the state. If politicians are able to create debate around the topic of cyberspace, 
people will be more inclined to understand the requirements that are necessary to develop 
that realm. Thus it will be easier to prioritize a fiscal budget for that purpose. The cyber 
realm is reputed not to have boundaries when it comes to its contents; this aspect raises 
some sovereignty issues when materials that can be damageable to the image of a country 
are released or when malicious actors operating outside the physical boundaries of the 
state threaten the interests of individuals.88 The need to address these issues that are out 
of a state’s jurisdiction requires diplomacy with neighbors and countries across the world. 
Additionally, the need to benefit from international infrastructure (the network 
backbone), or to open national infrastructure to the wide space of the world requires an 
international standard, prompting an active diplomatic role for states within the 
international community and an authoritative, regulatory, and organizational role within 
their country. An active diplomacy towards technology transfer would also help African 
states improve their cyber readiness and provide citizens protection against possible 
threats. Cyberspace represents a realm where individual liberties are at great risk. It is 
very common for rogue actors, business companies, and state actors— intelligence—to 
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cross the line between public and private space. 89,90 As guarantors of civil liberties, states 
have an obligation to protect the people. These issues are even more emphasized in the 
Central African region, where the average level of education is very low and IT is 
penetrating at a very fast rate, leaving users defenseless. The need for protection of 
individual liberties in cyberspace requires the state to provide adequate regulations and 
mechanisms. One mechanism that totally depends on the state is law enforcement; it only 
exists if the state puts it in place and allows law-enforcement agencies to operate 
independently.  
2. Information  
The second element of power that states can rely on to establish their presence in 
the cyber realm is informational power. IT can make the difference in improving mass-
media communication. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, populations not only expect states to 
provide a framework for cyberspace to operate, they also expect certain services. Some 
services can be effectively improved with the contribution of IT. In fact, providing a 
computerized platform for public access to state services and information has proven very 
positive for quality of life.91 In a context where access to information is very difficult, 
generates a lot of dissatisfaction, and lets people bend the laws, an increase in the 
information-access ratio within a state can be a tremendous source of credibility for the 
government and a natural means to fight corruption.92 States can also benefit from the use 
of cyberspace to increase their public-relations outreach. Through strategic 
communication policies waged in cyberspace, where the necessary investment can be 
relatively cheaper than a physical public-relations deployment, states can draw world 
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attention to regional attractions and generate tourism, economic investors, or simply 
positive awareness of their internal situation. At the local level, in a more practical sense, 
the national mobilization discussed previously will never be totally successful if it stays 
at the institutional level. Information campaigns in local news media will probably help 
to reach a larger audience on the advantages and dangers of embracing cyberspace. With 
regard to national security, cyberspace is a genuine means of intelligence collection. The 
multiple examples of sophisticated computer agents that gather information in the world 
on potential or real enemies prove this point.93 The States of the ECCAS must take 
advantage of the potential of intelligence gathering that sometimes does not require huge 
investment and is less lethal.94 Overall, regarding informational power, the state can have 
a feeding or collection role in cyberspace. Where traditional means of communication are 
rare due to cost, in a context where the targeted audience—the young—are online; where 
political activists are spreading altered news in cyberspace; and where context-sensitive 
information on geostrategic adversaries can be found online at low cost, the states of the 
ECCAS region are called to exercise an informational strategy in cyberspace. 
3. Economic and Social 
With regard to the economic and social consequences that cyberspace activities 
have on a country, governments are de facto called to play a role. The cyber economy 
encompasses all ICT business conducted, including calling in a private telephone booth, 
building infrastructures services, and producing software, electronic commerce, and web 
services.95 Although not very prominent or fully operational, this cyber economy is 
developing in Central Africa, typically in the form of small and medium enterprises 
(SME). The lack of a widely develop and decentralize banking system that reaches rural 
areas favors the rise of money transfer using mobile technologies. 
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Indeed, IT is a very dynamic sector in Central Africa; in some countries of the 
region, business in the IT sector accounts for 15% of country revenues. But much more 
incomes are yet to be made. That is where the state’s role can be critical. Along with 
adequate regulations and laws to promote the free market, a state can stimulate the cyber 
economy by supporting the creation of e-enterprises through specific programs.96 
By becoming a hub of cyber economics, the ECCAS can hold a dominant position 
in Africa, to the level of dictating policy to neighboring regions. And conversely, ECCAS 
is bordered by countries like Nigeria, Kenya, Rwanda, and Sudan, where the cyber 
economy is flourishing. If these countries take the lead in the cyber sector, this will create 
a dependency upon them which is not strategically positive for the ECCAS. The ability of 
the ECCAS to be autonomous in terms of ICT products and to generate revenues from 
cyberspace will give the region an economic independence that is not negligible in a 
strategic assessment of power. 
In conclusion, although it is not yet clear what the impact of cyberspace has on 
society nowadays, the world population is increasingly connecting online for multiple 
reasons.97 The digital world eases people’s effort to access desired information and 
resources. Additionally, a society that has satisfactory services from its rulers, or even 
better, information about what is going on in their country, will tend to not oppose, or to 
complain less. In this respect, governments have justification to promote and develop 
cyberspace. In the case of Central Africa, this perception seems also to be true. Indeed, 
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especially where roads are very bad in rural areas.98 Many will resort to a mobile call 
rather than endure five hours on a two-kilometer road, or use a mobile money transfer to 
satisfy a parent in a remote area where there are no banks. In the last decade, the practice 
of mobile SMS exchange has almost changed the mode of social mobilization and news 
propagation. For alternative sources of information, people resort to online news, to the 
detriment of satellite services, which are very expensive. Many non-governmental 
organizations now use cyberspace to promote their agenda, thanks to wireless 
technologies that bypasses limitations from absence of landlines. This growing change 
that is happening in Central African society through ICT and cyberspace in general begs 
for government attention, not necessarily for control and regulation, but as a mean by 
which the government can improve the quality of life of its people. 
4. Military 
In the physical realm, the military and, in a broader sense, the security apparatus, 
has always been among the principal assets that guarantee the existence of states. In 
Africa, they are considered to be the cradle of peace and development.99 The security 
forces provide protection to government institutions and enforcement and dissuasive arms 
for the respect of laws. They also provide for the protection of national integrity from 
inside and outside threats. In some countries of the ECCAS region, they even provide 
direct contribution to social and economic development.100 For all these reasons, the role 
of the security apparatus in the physical realm is obvious, but in the cyber realm, the 
reality of this role is still undefined. Despite the use of military and other security forces 
to protect critical communication infrastructures, based on their recognition as national-
security assets, and despite the participation of the military in frequency-management 
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boards, the relation of the military to cyberspace is tiny. In fact, the military in Central 
Africa are merely ICT consumers; they use it as performance enhancers. But the actual 
role of the security apparatus can be more important. Indeed, in the developing context of 
cyberspace in the ECCAS region, the roadmaps ahead of the states are very dense.101 
Priorities are multiple and cover infrastructure, education, laws, business, and security— 
this latter being withhold for the final stage,102 leaving the newly created cyberspace 
vulnerable to diverse forms of dangers. Up front, in parallel with all other efforts, the 
security apparatus has to take the lead and bring their experience with crime and 
instability in the physical world into the nascent cyber realm, making sure that networks, 
information systems, and laws will not have to be rebuilt because down the road they fail 
to meet security requirements. The experience of the military regarding secrets protection 
can be necessary to help identify or define priorities on what to protect immediately when 
moving to online capabilities. An immediate sector that the military can take advantage 
of is intelligence collection through the numerous collection tools available online.103  
From another perspective, the military, although not connected to cyberspace, is 
immersed in ICT that is embedded in various weapon systems. In a context where 
countries lack expertise in security matters in cyberspace, it can be economically 
effective to employ the military potential, which is easy to adapt and disciplined, to 
protect and design countermeasures against cyber criminals. In a more statutory sense, 
the police and national gendarmerie, which enforce law and order in the physical realm, 
should do the same in the cyber realm, as they are the ones with whom citizen complaints 
are filed. The security apparatus is a government’s means for exercising authority. If 
these governments want to exercise that authority in cyberspace, the security apparatus 
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has to be present also in the cyber realm. This presence means possessing the forensic 
and active and defensive capabilities necessary to give power to the state.104 
D. AREAS OF MEASUREMENT OF THE EFFECT OF STATE ELEMENTS 
OF POWER ON CYBER SPACE 
The active role of governments in cyberspace can be measured by the observation 
of specific indicators in the sectors of infrastructure, information systems, legal systems, 
and business.105 
In the case of information infrastructure, the action or presence of states in 
cyberspace can be assessed through its investment in critical infrastructures like optical 
fiber networks, Internet eXchange point, server farms, power generation, and distribution. 
Along with these infrastructures, which one may qualify as heavy and core blocks, there 
are those that contribute to the coordination and control of cyberspace; these are 
authoritative and administrative boards that provide the necessary interface for 
management, operations, and interaction with cyberspace actors. The structural role of 
the state can also be measured by assessing the development of educational and research 
capabilities, which contributes to the training and awareness requirements of the 
population.  
The other sector of concern for states is information systems. Indeed, for 
infrastructures to be profitable, states need to run multiple services organized in terms of 
information systems. Some of the root services that give cyberspace its full capabilities 
are so sensitive that they have to be run by the state as a matter of national security or 
sovereignty. These are certification authorities, national databases, interoperability and 
interconnection services, and some virtual environments.  
With respect to laws and regulations, the state’s role in cyberspace can be 
measured by the effective production of a national grand strategy for cyberspace, 
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adequate laws, national policies, and governmental directives, and the establishment of 
mechanisms for continuous screening of the legal framework for holes and 
inconsistencies, so that corrections can be made. In the absence of the means to produce 
infrastructures or information systems, states have to define well-suited laws that protect 
the country and its citizen from any form of alien hegemony. On this subject, one other 
indicator of the state presence is ability to enforce laws and regulations. This happens 
through the empowerment of competent structures on the matter: the police, military, and 
ad hoc boards. 
In the business and industrial sectors, governments can be qualified based on their 
promotion and development of mechanism that favor business. These are, for example, 
taxation programs for cyber companies, supporting funds for small enterprises, and the 
promotion of national cyber products within the state and to foreign spheres.106 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has looked at government objectives in cyberspace in relation to the 
government’s power instruments and the areas in cyberspace where actions are needed, 
postulating how those actions can be taken. Although this model is not perfect, it can help 
decision makers in Central Africa, and particularly in the military, have a better picture of 
the challenges that cyberspace presents.  
In summary, although cyberspace is essentially immaterial, a government 
presence and authority is needed within it for various reasons. Indeed, cyberspace 
provides opportunities for multiple forms of actors to coexist and sometimes even to 
challenge the natural order of powers well established in the physical world. In the 
physical world, resources are static and located in specific geographical places and are 
subject to regulations based on territories; in cyberspace, these notions are more elusive. 
Cyberspace gives more margin of maneuver to entities like non-state actors, especially 
criminal groups that can now wage war against a state without having to cross borders or 
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be located where they can be retaliated against.107 Single individuals can now access 
resources previously unreachable by the lack of interconnection or absence of digital 
versions. For these reasons, one can say that cyberspace has undermined the power of 
states in favor of newly empowered actors.108 But on the other hand, states have plenty to 
gain from being present in cyberspace, even if they are merely pushed by fate due to the 
technological evolution of the world. The economic benefits, the political fallout, or the 
benefit added to the quality of life for the population outweigh the backlash that may 
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V. MILITARY AND TECHNOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Central Africa has been continuously torn by armed conflicts, be it within 
individual countries in the form of civil war, political unrest, and military coups, or 
transnational, from rebel groups and separatist movements. Armies of the Central African 
region have generally dealt with their conflicts at the local level (internally), but in some 
exceptional cases, have put together a multinational force to cope with the problem. 
All these security issues arise in an extremely complex geographical environment 
that is continuously changing, from desert and savanna in the north (Chad and the north 
of Cameroon), equatorial forest in the center, northwest, and south (the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC), Central African Republic (CAR), Republic of the Congo, 
Gabon, and Cameroon), to swamp and ocean in the southwest (Cameroon, Equatorial 
Guinea, and Gabon). The Central African region is also endowed with considerable 
natural resources of all kinds—oil, diamond, gold, copper, and timber being the most 
valuable—giving them powerful means for fundraising during crises. Despite this 
potential wealth, the region remains extremely poor and accounts for most of the bottom-
listed countries in the United Nations human-development index.109 
This complex geographical and socioeconomic situation has impelled the 
militaries in the Central African region to adjust their force structures and equipment in 
order to succeed in their mission. In most of the cases, this would have not been possible 
without the help of technology. Extremely advanced technology is central to some units, 
like the “Batallion d’Intervention Rapide (BIR),”110 the special-forces unit of the 
Cameroonian defense forces, while other units are still far behind, such as the Central 
African Republic defense forces. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to try to understand how technology affects the 
military in Central Africa. The chapter will try to expand from that point to look at 
potential roles of the military in the sphere of security issues and nation-building roles, at 
a local and regional scope, in support of civilian efforts. Indeed, in African history, the 
military have generally been involved in national affairs, due to having seized political 
power or as a way of citizen contribution to a resourceful organization in peacetime. 
In Central Africa, as in many parts of Africa, the armies are the remnants of old 
colonial forces left by foreign powers in the aftermath of national independence achieved 
in the sixties. Fifty years later, these armies have evolved slowly but steadily and in quite 
similar patterns. Countries with relative peace tend to have armies that are more 
organized, well educated, better trained, but not very experienced as far as combat is 
concerned; on the other hand, countries engaged in active conflicts or regular instability 
are less organized and educated, but possess long experience in combat exposure. Due to 
limited resources, the internal structures of all these armies are usually unbalanced, with, 
on one side, elite forces, well trained and equipped, and on the other the conventional 
forces, having fewer resources, aging personnel, and dysfunction within the organization. 
B. FRONTS OF TECHNOLOGY PENETRATION 
Within the general context describe above, one can identify two fronts of 
technological penetration into military organizations in Central Africa: through the 
acquisition of weapons systems and through administrative and headquarters need of 
performance enhancers. In this respect, the different military branches—army, air force, 
navy, and other specific branches—are penetrated by technology due to mission 
requirements. In Chad, North Cameroon, and the CAR for example, a specific type of 
light 4x4 Toyota-pickup-like vehicle has proven to be the best vector for troop 
transportation and deployment. These vehicles also fit the need to cover large areas with 
a short intervention time and small teams of four to six soldiers. Initially designed and 
introduced in the region for the commercial purpose of goods transportation across the 
desert, the vehicle caught the attention of the military for its performance and cost. The  
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use of Global Positioning System (GPS) devices became necessary when these armies 
were confronted with vehicle losses as they traveled further in the desert and unmapped 
areas.  
As in many other cases, operational requirements provide the leading principle 
guiding the acquisition of new technologies such as communications, command and 
control, surveillance, offensive systems, and defensive systems. This mode of 
technological evolution in militaries capabilities generally comes with various forms of 
knowledge transfer. Usually, countries at war or with urgent needs are not prepared to 
master the knowledge behind weapon system and rely on third party (local or foreign 
contractor) for maintenance. All that is needed is the minimum knowledge required for 
the system to operate. Conversely, those countries in relative stability have more time to 
learn and master the basics of weapon systems they acquire, including first-and second-
level maintenance, providing personnel with expertise rare in the subregion and profitable 
for the nation in other economic sectors. 
From a more tactical military operations standpoint, the possession of an 
innovative weapon system has proven crucial to the issue of conflict in the subregion. 
The side with efficient and cheaper weaponry is likely to sustain its campaign and impose 
a stalemate on its adversary, forcing him to the negotiation table or to retreat and accept 
defeat. This was the case in Chad in February 2008, when the forces loyal to the 
government repelled a rebel assault on the capital city with the support of two helicopters 
and air-surveillance information.111 This was also the case in Cameroon in 1994, when an 
outnumbered unit of Cameroonian forces was able to stop the advance of Nigerian forces 
on the Bakassi Peninsula with high-precision artillery fire, imposing a stalemate in a 
conflict that was finally arbitrated by the International Court of Justice.112 
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Technology, through new weapon systems, enhances logistics and 
telecommunications systems, and plays the role of force multiplier, providing the state, 
which is generally in a disadvantaged position, the superiority needed to overcome its 
foes. 
On another front, technology in Central Africa penetrates militaries through their 
administrations and headquarters. Indeed, in all these decision places, there is the 
progressive use of information technology to help improve the situational awareness of 
forces, gather intelligence, and improve the managerial system of human and logistic 
resources. Opinions have progressively shifted from seeing computer systems as sources 
of leaks in an organization ill of secrecy, to sources of efficiency in dealing with huge 
amounts of data (personnel, money, and material). The urgent desire for results has 
simply surpassed the apprehension about technological weakness.  
The national gendarmerie, a paramilitary police corps inherited from the French 
colonists and spread through all the countries of the Central African region, provides a 
police function for the rural and border population, and also in urban centers, acting 
jointly with regular police forces. They have been continuously submitted to security 
challenges of various natures. The introduction of information technology in their daily 
tasks is considered one of their major evolutions in the past decade, providing them with 
the ability to improve emergency response and quality of service. Again on this front, but 
not as much as for weapons systems, technology is not acquired with the knowhow that 
goes with it. Central African militaries are more often end users of commercial, off-the-
shelf (COTS) equipment than of professional and purposely designed devices—at least in 
the early stages. 
Although information technologies are used to foster good performance in 
administrations, the whole system remains driven by old concepts and doctrine. There is 
not yet a reliance on technological assets to determine the way ahead. The impact of 
technology on military affairs in Central Africa is more likely to be considered indirect, 
supportive instead of driving. Indeed, none of the military in the region can claim to have 
a superior basis of technological potential. Nonetheless, decision makers are now relying 
on new technologies to provide specific solutions in the geographical and economic 
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environment. For example, the BIR special forces in Cameroon have come to use 
technology like broadband wireless communication to operate in the southwest, where 
there was no other available affordable solution. The service was put in place in the form 
of a private business company offering information technology services to a population in 
a remote and enclosed area, with Special Forces the first and major client. 
C. SOURCES OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 
In the movement toward innovative ideas and solutions to fit the local 
environment, two models for introducing new ideas have generally prevailed: the insider 
and the externally influenced models. The introduction of new ideas, when they come 
from inside the military, are often initiated by young officers trained abroad and freshly 
incorporated in their unit. They generally tend to introduce innovative solutions at the 
granular level in a bottom-up approach. For instance, topics like access to the Internet and 
local distribution of Internet services in their office and unit are ideas that spread among a 
network of friends. Other ideas, like the use of personal GPS in remote areas and of 
personal computers to organize daily tasks or to enhance group presentations finally end 
up defining the new mode of working as they are adopted by others in the chain of 
command. This type of approach has the advantage of being more attractive and trusted 
by the innovator’s peers. The most organized and systematic insider model comes from 
the foreign-military advisory system, the famous “Assistance Militaire Technique.” 
These are military personnel of foreign powers embedded in local armies at all levels. 
They provide the locals with advice on the best ways to solve a given problem and 
simultaneously, through special funding from their governments, acquire and introduce 
technological solutions and training. Despite the limited budget available to these 
advisers, they are genuine conduits of technological change in African militaries. 
Technology also flows through the military organization via external agents. 
These are local or foreign private companies that are conscious of the multiple needs and 
challenges faced by African security apparatus and come out with customized solutions 
for the local environment. Key selling points are generally the environment and price. 
The services offered covers multiple domains with the most important being software 
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engineering, communications systems, surveillance, and weapons systems. Since the 
private operators are primarily business peoples, with a principal objective of making 
money, they do not always offer business models that fit the available budget or the 
commander’s mission priorities. Indeed, their conception of military operations is 
hampered by lack of experience in African military affairs. 
Beside the three informal vectors for introduction of technology presented above, 
there are also formal procedures. These are built-in organizational structures in the 
military that are in charge of permanent observation and scrutiny of the global market for 
new process and solutions. Without research and development structures, these 
departments are often involved in military cooperation with foreign powers in search of 
new or refurbished equipment, new technology, and training at all levels for military 
personnel. 
D. TECHNOLOGY AND MILITARY DOCTRINE 
For all these modes of innovation, the main concept is adaptability. Indeed, 
technology is often introduced to try to adapt to an existing operational context. To our 
knowledge, there has not been a single case in the region where technology was the 
leading concept. None of the military strategies was built on a specific capability offered 
by new technology. In this respect, one can says that technology in Central Africa fits the 
doctrine of use of forces or combat and never the inverse. Nevertheless, at the tactical 
level, the possession of equipment of high reliability and performance contributes to 
optimizing a commander’s confidence in his strategies. Moreover, the introduction of 
innovative solutions usually leads to changes in tactics on the field, rendering military 
units more zealous and willing to take more risk because of their feeling of superiority. 
The driving factors of innovation introduced in the military are generally major 
events in the tactical arena that bring social, emotional, or political consequences. One 
can cite rebel breakthroughs with sounding actions (Chad, the Republic of the Congo, the 
CAR, Cameroon), badly managed social unrest (Cameroon, Gabon), increasing 
transnational criminal activities (Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, the CAR, Chad, the 
DRC), and noncompliance with international agreements (e.g., changes in standards, 
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participation in foreign military operations). After disastrous events that undermine the 
national image, political leaders and commanders look for new solutions to prevent a 
repetition, and thus are more inclined to listen to innovative answers suggested by private 
and well-connected contractors, young officers, or foreign military advisers. For these 
innovations to happen generally takes many years, for several reasons. There is the 
resistance of the old generation, the “vieille garde.” Despite the usefulness of all the 
solutions proposed which are sometimes proof-ready, conflict of generations, ignorance 
because of lack of education, the risk of losing one’s influential position in the system, 
corruption and personal interest, many of the old line oppose the implementation of new 
ideas. Beside these human factors, the economic climate also hinders the advancement or 
sustainment of newly introduced innovation. Indeed, most of these changes come with an 
increase in organizational spending that, at least in the starting phase, are not welcomed 
by decision makers. This is where political leadership matters. The personal qualities and 
receptivity of leaders at the head of the Defense Department and Commanders in Chief 
are often very important in weighting the balance of innovation. This influence can be 
illustrated with the case of the Republic of Gabon, where, under the leadership of the 
Defense Minister—the son of the former head of state and a fan of technology—the 
country made a tremendous breakthrough in their military medical capabilities, which has 
become one of the most advanced in the subregion.113 Or the case of Cameroon, where 
the commitment of the commander in chief gave the opportunity to generate a Special 
Forces unit—the BIR—endowed with advanced and sophisticated capabilities.114  
In spite of that leadership which favors the development of technology, the 
military in Central Africa have not been able to mandate some specific technologies in 
their units. The tendency remains to adapt available solutions to needs in a cost–benefit 
calculus. One can cite the use of virtual private networks to transit information through 
open computer networks, the customizing of commercial helicopters for combat missions 
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and military exhibitions during national events, and the use of COTS 3G/4G devices in 
the absence of access to professional communication systems, which are expensive. 
As soon as a technology is fully adopted by the military, it becomes a pseudo-
standard, integrated in the doctrine of force use. The military apparatus then uses its 
workforce, training facilities, capabilities, and discipline to develop expertise that is 
sometimes not available within the region’s civilian realm. Unless they are involved in 
peacekeeping operations or internal conflict, this potential remains dormant. But there are 
some exceptions: military capabilities in domains like civil engineering and logistic 
chains have often been used by the states to fill gaps in operational capabilities. In 
Cameroon, as in Gabon, for example, the military engineer corps is deeply involved in 
nation building, from roads and schools to government-building construction in remote 
areas. In the telecommunications realm, the military in the Congo (Brazzaville), Gabon, 
and, to a certain extent in Cameroon, play an important role in regulation and 
infrastructure deployment. 
E. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, as far as technology is concerned, military organizations in Central 
Africa exist in a global sociopolitical and economic context where they are very 
important actors. Thus, they are affected by the technological breakthroughs that might 
be suitable for the region. But like all armies, they experience many difficulties in the 
assimilation (or innovation) process. Overall, the militaries in Central African deal with 
technology in a submissive way, rather than being leading actors. Nevertheless, as soon 
as a technology is incorporated, they usually are quick to master it and excel in its 
utilization. These acquired abilities are generally not used to their full potential. Some 
military corps of the region, such as the engineer and signal corps, put their expertise to 
the service of nation building and can be used as models for the whole military 
organization to help develop a subregion that is striving to get out of its socioeconomic 
stagnation. One of the sectors where this contribution will certainly be welcome is 
information technology and cyberspace, where the security aspects are not yet 
implemented. 
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VI. GENERAL CONCLUSION 
The Economic Community of Central African States is an organization that 
already exists and possesses functioning organic structures.115 In a context where 
actionable resources are rare and scattered across the community, and because the cyber 
realm is said to be without borders,116 one can hypothesize that collaboration built upon 
existing assets that promotes the sharing of cyber resources and capabilities within the 
region would be a good point of beginning. Such cooperation will help to create a strong 
cyber environment conducive of the confidence and trust necessary to tip off a “Cyber 
Community of Central African States” (C3AS). 
A. THE CYBER COMMUNITY OF CENTRAL AFRICAN STATES (C3AS) 
One fundamental truth of cyberspace is that it is universally accessible—thus the 
idea of a borderless realm. This concept brings up the need to cooperate as the first 
variable of success especially in Central Africa where no country pretends to have all the 
resources or capabilities required to prevail. Given the fact that when a cyber resource is 
available online it can be useful to all in the region, and having an existing community of 
states where the pillars of regional cooperation are established, the countries of ECCAS 
should put together their resources in a mutual agreement and create a formal “Cyber 
Community of Central African States” (C3AS). Such a cyber community will strengthen 
the basis for Central African cyberspace and make it better prepared to face the 
challenges that come with it. Overall, countries in the region face the same sort of 
problems: poor infrastructures, education, and regulations. 
At the infrastructural level, interconnecting all regional networks will bring 
multiple advantages. First, those countries without access to undersea cables for high-
                                                 
115 ECCAS is a political and economic organization of Central African states that comprises 
Cameroon, Central Republic of Africa, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, 
Republic of Congo, and Sao Tome and Principe. See “Communauté Economique des Etats de l’Afrique 
Centrale,” CEEAC-ECCAS, accessed August 23, 2012, http://www.ceeac-eccas.org/. 
116 Daniel T. Kuehl, “From Cyberspace to Cyberpower: Defining the Problem,” in Franklin D. Kramer, 
Stuart Starr, and Larry K. Wentz, eds., Cyberpower and National Security (Washington, D.C.: National 
Defense UP, 2009), 24. 
 64
speed access to the Internet will be connected through their neighbors.117 Second, an 
interconnection through high-speed links will make it possible for countries of the region 
that possess core ICT infrastructures like IXP, PKI, or server farms to share with the 
others services that for now are only available from another continent.118 It will be even 
possible to create redundancy infrastructures to deal with eventual failure. 
Interconnection will also bring access to knowledge by linking regional universities or 
training centers.119 With regard to security, a mesh grid of interconnected networks of 
ECCAS countries will reduce the likeliness of a state’s being isolated from cyberspace 
due to a disagreement with neighbors who were network-access providers. The Central 
African backbone (CAB) project, which is now finishing the interconnection of three 
states of the subregion (Cameroon, Chad, and the Central Republic of Africa), and in its 
latter phase will interconnect the rest of the countries of the region while providing core-
infrastructural facilities like IXP, PKI, and server farms, constitute a sample of the model 
envisioned in the C3AS concept and is to be encourage. Other projects of this nature have 
to be developed to create a solid core for the C3AS. In that manner, as for the energy 
sector, the Central African region (Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon, and 
Gabon) disposes of a tremendous energy potential that can be developed and shared 
through an interconnected energy grid. This gives the region an opportunity to solve its 
energy gap, a good thing for ICT development. 
At the information-systems level, virtual environments and delocalization of 
resources are technologies that have been proven robust against attacks aimed at one 
geographically located information system.120 Therefore, through a collaborative 
endeavor, countries in Central African could develop multiple data-center 
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environments—a subregional computer cloud—which if interconnected can help to build 
cheaper distributed information systems that are robust and resilient to the benefit of all 
its members. Such a regional computer cloud will present tremendous economic 
advantages, as it will help reduce the amount of traffic out of the C3AS sphere, thus 
having an impact on the contractual bandwidth for external transaction.121  
A Central African cyber community will only be possible if there is a common 
desire to make it happen. This is to say, diplomatic efforts have to be paramount. Indeed, 
the decision makers of the ECCAS region have to come to together and put in place a 
global strategic plan that will set the path to a C3AS. The framework of the economic 
community (ECCAS) constitutes a background that only needs to be reinforced and 
strategized. In that respect, there are many contacts that exist between the different 
administrations in charge of ICT, but these exchanges remain just a forum for discussion 
and opportunities, not a community where members see themselves as engaged in the 
same struggle.122 This forum of exchanges between ICT leaders has to evolve into a 
decisional structure in charge of all the ICT strategies of the subregion, defining 
directives, regulations, and laws to be enacted by the parliaments. In that sense, all the 
countries of the subregion must harmonize their legal framework on ICT and have a 
comprehensive strategy of development. The less advanced will benefit from the 
achievements of the other members and the most advanced will benefit from the 
elimination of unstable areas within their vicinity. 
As noted earlier, education constitutes one of the strongest pieces of ICT 
development; in the ECCAS region, the countries are not at the same level in that matter. 
A collaborative initiative will facilitate access to training infrastructures to all members at 
a relatively low cost.123 The few available universities’ becoming centers of excellence 
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for regional training and research for the promotion of ICT may help create adequate 
training programs and technological solutions for the local needs of the population.124 
Another aspect that is crucial in this collaborative initiative is law enforcement. 
The growing trend of cyberspace crime, which for now revolves around scams and 
identity theft, calls for an intensive collaboration between law-enforcement agencies 
(exchange of information, continuation of investigation, training, and expertise 
sharing).125 
B. DEVELOPMENT OF TRUST IN THE C3AS 
The potential gain from a cyber community in Central Africa is significant. 
Indeed, when one considers that the region possesses a population of nearly 114 million 
inhabitants, mostly youth—who are grand consumers of ICT—developing a robust, 
resilient, and secure cyber environment can generate revenues for the states and 
economic gain for the population, not to mention the quality of life that comes as a bonus. 
The reluctance of foreign companies to sell or provide some category of service in 
Central Africa is a sign of mistrust. That is also true when it comes to electronic 
transactions, even within the region, where a lack of visibility on the means of recourses 
that consumers may have deters them from risking their money in cyberspace. The 
concept of a mutualization of resources—human, intellectual, infrastructural, political, 
and economic—in a common goal will create an environment conducive of trust. 
Generating confidence in cyberspace by promoting trust will fade away the various 
potential risks that exist in the C3AS, leaving a brighter future. 
When it comes to social behavior, there are several criteria that presumably can 
help build trust and therefore contribute to shaping the behavior of a population. In the 
case of cyberspace, things are not so different; potential actors in cyberspace (or 
consumers of cyber products) will also be sensitive to these elements of trust. As 
presented by Piotr Sztompka P in his book Trust,126 the first element of trust one can 
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think about is normative coherence; to the extent that people share the same values 
(morality, integrity, benevolence, skills level, and etc.), and have the same expectations, 
trust will be easier to build. In the case of ECCAS, this is quite true; people in the region 
share similar ethnocultural values, economic conditions, and the levels of technology. It 
will be much easier for people in Gabon to understand what are the needs and 
expectations of their neighbors in Cameroon, the Congo, or Equatorial Guinea, and vice-
versa. As a matter of fact, normative coherence is a criterion that is naturally given to the 
ECCAS, thanks to the common history of the people in that region. 
The second element of trust is accountability. Obviously, everyone that engages 
his money online will need to be able to follow the trail and be able to react in case of any 
attempt to divert it from the original aim by the recipient. On that question, services 
offered in cyberspace by people located in the geographical area of the ECCAS will 
reflect a better impression of safety to costumers within the region than if the provider is 
miles away. The simple fact of being located within the region becomes an advantage. 
Moreover, the establishment of uniform means of recourse within the C3AS will 
constitutes a strong step forward in accountability when there are disagreements. In a 
community where laws are enforced properly, those that provide services will be 
constrained by the reality of retaliation in case of failure to comply with contractual 
commitments. 
An educated population that understands how transactions in cyberspace work 
will be less reluctant to use it. The knowledge of this realm thus contributes to providing 
the population with the necessary confidence to counterbalance skepticism. 
Many cyber businesses are run by young, computer-savvy entrepreneurs in the 
backyard and bedrooms of private homes; bringing more visibility to their activities in 
line with who they are, how their services are provided, and with whom they are 




These transparency elements can only be provided in an environment where 
cyber-service providers are encouraged to step out of the darkness and make themselves 
known to the public. Such encouragement to go official will be promoted by a global 
strategy for the subregion.  
The feeling of security also plays an important role in trust development. At the 
level of the state, the assurance that cyberspace will not be a source of political instability 
or social unrest can be a strong incentive for decision makers to consider the advantages 
that may exist in that realm. At the user level, the absence of negative experiences 
encountered by user gives them the impression of security, which overall favors 
confidence in cyberspace use. At a regional level, a fully meshed network grid 
contributes to reducing the risk of network disruption against one of the member states, 
providing each state with the perception of security, a perspective that urges each to 
adhere to the interconnection concept. 
In conclusion, a C3AS environment that is trusted because of the existence of 
normative coherence, accountability, transparency, and security will be a perfect recipe 
for tipping the expansion of cyberspace in the subregion. This will permit foreign 
investors to provide the necessary momentum for this realm to become a true instrument 
for development and peace by fighting poverty. 
C. CONCLUSION 
At a moment where Central African region countries are moving towards 
cyberspace, with multiple efforts being done to bridge the numeric gap with the rest of 
the world, such as linking to high-speed broadband-transmission undersea cable and 
introducing information systems into the daily life of citizens in the administration and 
the private sector, there are many concerns regarding state control over this sprawling and 
boundless realm. Questions are asked about how cyberspace can change the daily life of 
Central African citizens, how the states can benefit, and what the risks of embracing the 
new reality are. Because of the socioeconomic context of the ECCAS region and the 
political reality in many of its countries, the approaches to cyberspace are diverse, from 
indifference to pseudo grand strategy. These different approaches expose the region to 
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the numerous risks that come with cyberspace and hinder the advantages that states could 
derive from it. For the states of the Central African region to find their way out of a time 
of much tragedy and enjoy the benefit of the power of cyberspace, they need to put their 
assets in common to form a “Cyber Community of Central African States” that will gives 
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APPENDIX A.  
THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON 
With a population of nearly twenty million inhabitants in 2012, the Republic of 
Cameroon is one of the leading countries in Central Africa in terms of economic, 
political, and educational factors. Despite Cameroon’s economic performance within the 
Central African subregion, the quality of its human resources, the wide variety of its 
cultural assets, its infrastructural potential, its strategic position which provides access to 
the sea to several countries in the region, and the political stability it enjoys, the country 
remains one in which ICT penetration and usage are relatively low. Ranked 125 over 
142 in the Networked Readiness Index (2.9/7) by the 2012 “Global Information 
Technology Report” of the World Economic Forum,127 Cameroon shows a bourgeoning 
activity in the information technology area.  
According to the findings of a national survey (Scan ICT) conducted in 2006 by 
the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (and updated in 2012), with support from 
development partners, telephony services were available in only 50.55% of the country, 
with a fixed teledensity of 3% and mobile teledensity of 90% in 2012. The survey also 
showed that less than 7% of institutions and enterprises were equipped with a computer, 
less than 27% of government services were connected to the Internet, and around 5% of 
Cameroon’s population uses the Internet. The data in Table 1 describes below, provides a 
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Table 1.   Socioeconomic Indicators: Cameroon  
N° Indicator  Value 
1-  Area 475,440 sq km 
2-  GDP  $47.12 billion (2011 est.) 
3-  Official languages  French (71%) and English (29%)
4-  Total population  20,129,878 (July 2012 est.) 
5-  Population rate between 0-14 years  40.5% (male 4,027,381/female 
3,956,219) 
6-  Youths (under 25, of which 47% are between 5 
and 24) 
63% 
7-  Life expectancy  54.71 years 
8-  Urbanized population  58% of total population (2010) 
9-  Average annual growth rate of urban population 3.3% annual rate of change 
(2010-15 est.) 
10- Per capita gross national income (US dollars) 
GNI  
$ 2 284 
11- Population below $1 a day  33.4 % 
 
A. INFRASTRUCTURES 
The technological landscape of Cameroon is profoundly diverse. It offers a 
variety of technologies for broadband data transportation to end-user distribution. The 
core network, which is essentially well develop in urban and rural area, comprises fixed 
dial-up telephone lines and HF and VHF communications for long-distance links. For 
many years, satellite-communications devices were the sole means to reach remote areas 
and connect with the external world, whether it were by phone, television, or Internet. 
Today, others forms of technologies have been introduce, like optical fiber for 
interconnection with undersea cable and very small-aperture terminals (VSAT). For 
urban communication, technologies like ADSL, GSM, GPRS, 3G, CDMA, WIFI, 
WIMAX, and optical fiber links are now common and accessible. 
In Cameroon, information technologies are provided to the population through a 
very limited number of operators. The Societé des Télécommunications du Cameroun, 
alias CAMTEL, a state-owned company, is the sole provider of land-fixed 
telecommunication services. Along with two other companies, MTN Cameroon and 
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ORANGE Cameroon, CAMTEL provides the country with mobile (wireless) 
communication services with a total number of ten million128 subscribers.  
CAMTEL is also the root company in charge of the exploitation of the undersea 
optical-fiber cables (SAT3/WASC) that terminate in Cameroon, which make CAMTEL 
one of the principal distributors of Internet to the rest of the low-level services providers. 
Internet services are provided to the population by nearly fifty129 operators, using a 
mosaic of technologies from dial-up to VSAT via wireless local loops.  
In the past five years, Cameroon has been developing a program with the aim of 
interconnecting all the country with a network of optical fiber for a backbone of nearly 
5000 Km.130 This program, which is supposed to reach completion this year (2012) will 
provide a particularly high level of interconnection unique in the subregion. Additionally, 
with the countries of the Central African region, Cameroon has acquired a 1500 km of 
optical fiber to interconnect with the republics of Chad and Central Africa.131 In order to 
guarantee the quality of its Internet access, the country has diversify its access to 
broadband Internet connection by taking shares in three other undersea optical-fiber cable 
networks (WACS, ACE, MAIN ONE) and is participating in the regional 
telecommunication satellite project, RASCOM.132  
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Cameroon does not yet have an Internet Exchange Point (IXP), but according to 
the state agency in charge of the promotion of IT, the project is on its way. Nonetheless, 
there are still numerous steps to bridge for the IXP to become reality.133 
The root of the telecommunication infrastructure that wired Cameroon is 
possessed by CAMTEL, the historic operator in the country. Indeed, by the fate of 
history, CAMTEL has inherited the entire backbone infrastructure that meshes the 
country to the district level and provides the necessary relays for dial-up exchange. Most 
of this infrastructure remains analog, with a progressive mutation to digital. It is the rate 
of this mutation that conditions the spread of the Internet in rural areas. 
With the outbreak of wireless technologies, GSM – 3G – 4G – and others, the 
major ICT actors of the country, competing for customers, are deploying, at their 
initiative, numerous “base stations” throughout the national territory. This new wireless 
movement creating a double speed for the penetration of IT in the country, making that 
some areas that have never seen any form of technology because of their isolation, 
suddenly are exposed to the latest available IT solution in the world. 
The existence of server farms is very limited and essentially concentrated in the 
hubs of the principal ICT services providers, which are all in the two cities of Douala and 
Yaounde. Due to the low level of electronic commerce, in the country, data centers are 
yet to be implemented locally. Nevertheless, some private companies and state 
organizations have considerable server infrastructure to handle their data: banking, water 
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To back up the information-technology infrastructure, Cameroon has a stable 
energy infrastructure. This energy infrastructure is 70% based on hydroelectric power, 
supplemented by thermal energy in areas not covered by the hydroelectric distribution 
network. Urban access to electricity is well covered, but the quality of the electricity 
produced needs improvement. Daily power outages remain serious issues that put cyber 
infrastructure at risk.  In rural areas, access to electricity remains difficult. At the 
individual level, people resort to power generators for their personal use, exclusively 
reserved for nighttime. This situation contributes to delay in technological penetration. 
For their relays and base stations to remain operational in remote areas, ICT operators use 
solutions like solar-powered systems combined with thermal generators. 
Cameroon has no real ICT industrial facilities as such; most of the equipment is 
imported, including access equipment (radio and television sets, computers, telephones) 
as well as routine-maintenance equipment. Thus, the country is totally dependent on 
imports as far as the acquisition of equipment and software for ICT development are 
concerned. 
B. INFORMATION SYSTEMS, BUSINESS, AND INDUSTRIES 
The infrastructure describe below operates with a quite diversified set of 
operating systems (OS). Generally, for industrial infrastructures, the operating systems 
are proprietary and are likely to be tied to the companies’ internal policies. But at the 
level of the end user, the most commonly used systems are Microsoft Windows, Linux, 
and Macintosh. The use of Open Source OS remains much less academic than 
professional.   
The services offered in Cameroon cyberspace gravitate around web hosting, 
communications (VOIP, SMS, e-fax, e-mail), and web navigation. Electronic commerce 
is having difficulties taking off. There are many small and medium enterprises marketing 
ICT products and services (although based mainly in Douala and Yaounde). Most of 
them are local branches of foreign firms or have concluded local representation 
agreements with such firms (e.g., Software solutions, Networking Solutions, RFID –  
 
 76
GeoTagging – GeoLocalization, and IT Security). However, the design, production, and 
marketing of local products and services are still rudimentary; hence Cameroon is more 
or less an ICT products consumer. 
One sector that has significantly embraced cyber is banking. From well-
established financial institutions to bourgeoning micro-finance companies, they all utilize 
IT to proceed in their daily tasks. Where IT becomes crucial is in money transfer, using 
the current GSM technology well disseminated across the country; micro-finance 
companies have developed a prolific and competitive new way of exchanging and 
making money transactions.  
In the public sector, a lot of effort is being done to use information technology. 
Three projects are being conducted: one by the state finance service, Integrated System 
for the Management of Public Finances (SIGEFI), another by the state human-resources 
service, Integrated System for the Computerized Management of State Personnel and 
Salaries (SIGIPES), and the last by the customs department (SYDONIA), for trans-
border customs clearance and tracking of merchandise. Other projects, like the digitalized 
electoral list, the social security and health systems, and the e-government system are in 
gestation. 
In prelude of the fully establishment of electronic commerce and other online 
transactions, the government of Cameroon in line with a law package, is acquiring a 
public key infrastructure (PKI). This infrastructure, which meant to be operational in 
2012, will provide the necessary platform for authentication and electronic signing for all 
Internet users of the country and the region.134 
Although the audiovisual sector has existed a long time, the liberalization of the 
sector has encouraged private initiatives. For instance, private newspapers, radio, and 
television have small resources for production and distribution. These new media have 
espoused IT to boost their business and reach a broad audience, resulting in the wide 
spread of private media on the Internet. However, content and a program productions 
industry is still awaited. Generally, the low quantity and quality of national audiovisual 
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production does not allow Cameroon to stand as a major player in the huge global 
market, with far more than merely economic implications. 
C. LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND ORGANIZATION 
1. Strategies and Policies 
At the strategic level, by inaugurating a multimedia resource center at the Lycée 
Général Leclerc in Yaounde in November 2001, the president of the republic defined the 
vision of a country “which is bracing up to adapt to the requirements of the information 
society.” In his address to the nation on 3 November 2004, in the wake of his election to a 
new seven-year term of office, he restated that “the country needs generalized Internet 
access.” In all respects, the context is thus favorable for strong action towards defining a 
bold ICT development and deployment policy and for formulating effective and coherent 
strategies to speed up Cameroon’s access to the global information and knowledge-based 
economy. “In the next 25–30 years, the target will be to move to the category of average 
access with a digital access index between 0.4 and 0.5. As concerns the telephone, the 
objective is to multiply by five the number of telephone lines and increase mobile 
telephone network coverage.”135 This statement from the grand strategy document of 
Cameroon for the next 25 years expresses the continuity of the desire of this country to 
develop its ICT environment. 
2. Laws and Regulations 
The legal and regulatory framework for the telecommunications sector is quite 
developed, with laws in place addressing telecommunications regulation,136 the 
establishment of Cameroon Telecommunications Corporation (CAMTEL),137 the 
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institution of minimal service in the telecommunications sector138 and modalities for the 
operation of telecommunication networks139 and provision for telecommunication 
services.140  
Recently, to deal with concerns that electronic commerce, mobile telephone 
services, and Internet access were not considered in previous legislation, two laws were 
enacted by the National Assembly. The first resolves the government need for a 
regulatory environment for the use of ICTs in business, the need to better protect IP and 
freedom of access to information, and the legal recognition of electronic signatures, EDI, 
and legality of contracts or transactions concluded on the web.141 The second law was 
designed to address cyber crimes and cybersecurity issues.142 This law on cyber crime, 
the first of its kind, set the framework and definition of cyber-crime terms and the 
framework of collaboration between the different national and international entities to 
tackle the cyber criminal. Although there is now a judicial framework for cybercrime in 
Cameroon, the country still needs to build infrastructure and train personnel to enforce 
these new laws. The national security forces are still inadequately suited for the task.  
It should be acknowledged that there is no harmonized legal framework for ICT 
regulation at the subregional level. 
3. Information Technology Administration and Management 
Organization, and Infrastructures 
A number of institutions are involved in the control and development of ICTs in 
Cameroon. The government has general oversight of the development and control 
process, but there are also dedicated institutions.  
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The presidency of the republic plays a determining role, since it defines and lays 
down guidelines for the national ICT policy. The authorities in Cameroon are conscious 
of the vital role this sector plays in economic development, good governance, and 
poverty reduction. The importance attached to this sector is evidenced by the fact that 
NAICT—the institution directly responsible for laying down guidelines and regulations 
for the ICT sector in Cameroon—is placed under the technical supervision of the 
presidency. 
The prime ministers’ office is responsible for monitoring, that is, ensuring that the 
national ICT policy is effectively implemented.  
A number of ministries are involved in the deployment and exploitation of ICTs 
at various levels, including the ministries of communication, trade, economy, and plans 
and infrastructures.  
Established in 2002 the NAICT (ANTIC in French) is responsible for 
harmonizing technical standards, providing design and development expertise to 
government ministries, coordinating establishment and monitoring of public-sector 
Internet, intranet, and extranet sites, contributing to technical training of instructors for 
universities, colleges, secondary, and primary schools, and training public-sector 
personnel.143  
The ministry of posts and telecommunications (MINPOSTEL)144 is particularly 
responsible for formulating, implementing and evaluating government policy in the 
domain of posts and telecommunications. It also has supervisory authority over the 
telecommunications regulatory board (TRB). MINPOSTEL’s duties further include 
contributing to the development of infrastructure and network access to new information 
and communication technologies.145  
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The TRB is the public institution particularly responsible for regulating, 
controlling, and monitoring the activities of the telecommunications sector in 
Cameroon.146 It is placed under the supervisory authority of MINPOSTEL. TRB has the 
duty of regulating, controlling, and monitoring the activities of businesses and operators 
involved in the telecommunications sector.147 
The National Centre for the Development of Computer Services was the first 
national body responsible for data processing and related issues. Its main duties include 
the computerization of ministries and public institutions. However, over time, CENADI’s 
role has been reduced to monitoring computerization programs and solving computer-
related problems in the ministry of finance. 
D. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN THE SOCIETY AND CULTURE 
1. Education 
Cameroon is among the sub-Saharan countries that are making enormous progress 
in the use of information and communications technologies (ICTs) in the various 
development sectors, including education. Private schools introduced ICTs into their 
curricula in the 1990s, but there is no specific policy guiding the teaching or use of ICTs 
in education, which has led to each private school applying its own teaching method or 
program. 
ICTs were officially introduced into education in 2001. The cyber education 
project launched since then by the government targets secondary and tertiary education. 
Primary schools are not yet concerned though there are personal initiative in this latter. 
Major achievements include establishing multimedia resource centers (MRCs) in 
universities, professional, and technological schools, and some government secondary 
schools; training monitors to manage MRCs; creating learning platforms; interconnecting 
                                                 
146 Republic of Cameroon, “Section 22-1 in Law No 98/14,” Cameroon National Assembly, July 14, 
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147 Republic of Cameroon, “Section 22-2 in Article 3-1 of Decree No 98/197,” Presidency of the 
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the ten state universities across the country, and establishing training units in professional 
schools and universities, some of which are now operational.  
However, such projects rely mainly on external funding, thus putting their 
sustainability in question. Moreover, government secondary schools have poor 
purchasing power, and no budget has been allotted to support ICT-related activities in 
schools. Most computers used in schools are donations. Private schools have not been 
involved in the project, thus creating a gap between the two educational systems. Most of 
the online learning resources accessible through the government secondary schools 
learning platform CAM-EDUC are in French, thus constituting a handicap for the 
English-speaking community. Moreover, all those online resources are based in Europe, 
indicating the need for empowering national stakeholders to enable them to produce 
online learning materials corresponding to the local environment.  
Specialists are trained mainly in higher education institutions, whose graduates 
are either specialized technicians (G.C.E. ‘A’ Level + 2/3) or engineers (G.C.E ‘A’ Level 
+ 4/5). It is difficult to open courses of study to train specialists in certain ICT fields 
(computer science, networks, telecommunications, electronics) owing to the low number 
of lecturers available in such branches (fewer than 20 full-time lecturers for all training 
establishments). The need to maintain a reasonable teacher/student ratio in these branches 
makes it impossible for establishments to train a certain number of specialists without 
jeopardizing the quality of training. With current national training capacities, Cameroon 
can more or less conveniently train about 100 engineers and 500 technicians annually. 
To overcome the inadequacies of the formal educational system and to meet 
current demands, many rapid training centers, of various calibers, have been set up and 
offer from introductory courses to office automation and the Internet to university 
degrees in computer science and related technologies.  
However, such training is most often tailored to individual needs to master the 




skills by the keen and willing students arises. There is really no system of standardizing 
training courses and learning (“proficiency certificate/diploma” for example) in order to 
give better recognition to the skills acquired. 
2. Access and Acceptance of Technology 
As of 2011, Cameroon’s population was just over 19 million and only 3.8 per cent 
of them Internet users. The cost of a computer (equivalent to annual per-capita income) 
makes this tool inaccessible to the majority of Cameroonians and constitutes a major 
obstacle to Internet access for the population. This is coupled with low offerings and the 
still-high cost of connectivity. There are still shadow areas in national communications 
coverage (15%) despite the satellite relay, which cause digital disparities between urban 
and rural areas. 
The number of fixed telephone lines available (174,000) is highly insufficient and 
does not foster the development in Cameroon of individual and professional uses of this 
technology; nearly half (48.4%) of enterprises have no fixed telephone line and hardly 
5% of them can boast of more than three lines; The cost of telephone calls (especially 
mobile) is still relatively high; Internet fees are relatively high compared to income levels 
in Cameroon for provision of service at acceptable speed, which is another obstacle to 
Internet demand by households.  
The rate of computer penetration in institutions is low: 66.2% of institutions have 
no computer, and only 6.2% have more than one computer. Consequently, the number of 
employees having access to a computer at the work place is relatively very low; in most 
ministries, ICTs are used essentially for office automation. Although the ICT equipment 
pools are often located within the central services, the external or de-concentrated 
services still rely on the typewriter. In the meantime, very few institutions are connected 
to the Internet (9.2%) and have a website (10.8%).  
In addition, wide disparities in income and educational levels prevent a large 
penetration of ICTs devices among the population. Cyber cafés are the chief mode of 
access for the vast majority of Cameroonian Internet users. 
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3. Social Status 
As regards culture, there is an acute global problem of protecting intellectual 
property. Therefore, nations are trying to adapt their laws to protect such investments and 
encourage creativity and the converting of cultural and artistic works into formats. The 
conversion of the natural and cultural heritage of the country into a digital format is a 
major economic challenge. Indeed, the artistic heritage stands as the leading business in 
the tourism and leisure industry, where the Internet serves as one of the best showcases. 
Libraries, archives, museums, and other national institutions of culture are not yet fully 
playing their role as content providers. In fact, very few of them have digital records or 
documentation that is easily accessible to the public. The absence of Cameroon’s cultural 
and natural heritage from the web is a major setback for the development of the culture, 
tourism, and leisure industry in Cameroon. 
The lack of attractive career prospects in local government services and 
enterprises is one of the factors aggravating the massive flight of ICT specialists abroad. 
Currently, there are 484,860 Facebook users in Cameroon, which makes it 
number 100 over 213 in the ranking of all Facebook statistics by country. Additionally, 
Facebook penetration in Cameroon is 2.51% compared to the country's population and 
64.65% in relation to number of Internet users. The total number of FB users in 
Cameroon, which has grown to more than 17,860 in the last six months, demonstrates the 
willingness of Cameroon’s Internet users to participate in social media. The largest age 
group of social network users is currently 18–24 with a total of 193,944 users, followed 
by users aged 25–34.148 
4. Information Technology Dependency 
The level of corporate use of ICTs in Cameroon is relatively low. As such, the 
most commonly encountered uses of ICTs are related to the specificities of the domain, 
such as commercial duties (purchasing and marketing), management duties 
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(administrative and finance) and production duties. The use of applications depends 
entirely on the duties of the enterprise. Enterprises with Internet connectivity quite often 
are involved with e-transactions, such as online banking transactions, mail exchange, and 
search of content.  
However, the use of e-transaction applications on legal and tax issues, which are 
common in other countries as a catalyst for economic development, is relatively low in 
Cameroon. In the public sector, the financial services (taxation, customs, treasury, 
salaries, and the budget) are relatively more advanced in ICT usage. In fact, these 
services are far better equipped than other government services. The oldest and largest 
state computerized management applications with inter-provincial networks are found in 
this sector. 
Therefore, in general, the relatively low level of ICT usage in government 
services is still bogging down the improvement of relations between these services and 
their users. New methods, whereby citizens and enterprises can access public 
administration through new technologies (mobile telephone, Internet), are in their infancy 
and need to be improved. 
E. CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES 
Regarding the cybersecurity picture in Cameroon, although there have been some 
actions taken to prepare the judicial background, much more has to be done to overcome 
the rising trend of cyber crime encountered in the country. Indeed, the level of criminal 
activities these last few years calls for serious actions. In his survey of world cyber 
criminal activities, McAfee, a renowned cybersecurity firm, qualified Cameroon as the 
“most dangerous in the world for unwary web surfers.” They found that “more than half 
the sites that McAfee tested in Cameroon's domain space—sites ending in the 
abbreviation ‘.cm’—were determined to be engaged in shady behavior, such as infecting 
visitors with password-stealing or spam-sending software.”149 This situation is essentially  
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due to the bad management of the domain name inherited by Cameroon and its appeal to 
scammers in the world, for whom the domain extension is very close to the popular dot-
com.  
The main concerns remain software piracy, online scammers,150 and animal and 
artisanal smuggling.   
Cyber activism is of some concern in the country, but the perpetrators are still 
mostly located out of the country in the Diaspora.151 Their action, though insignificant, 
has caught the attention of local authorities, causing some strong media outreach from the 
government.152 
The website ProjectHoneyPot.org, which conduct surveys of malicious activities 
online base on honey-pot servers, has generated the results presented in Table 2. These 
results show the existence of malicious activities from IP addresses within the Cameroon-
allocated range of IP addresses.153 
Table 2.   Honey Pot Results on Cameroon154  
N° Type of Attack Period of activity of the 50 
most recent IP 
Total number of 
attempts registered 
1 Harvester IP   Dec 2006 – June 2012 86 
2 Spam Server IP Feb 2007 – June 2012 30504 
3 Bad Web host IP May 2010 – June 2012 02 
4 Comment Spammer IP Dec 2007 – June 2012 44827 
5 Dictionary Attacker IP Feb 2007 – June 2012 44513 
6 Rule Breaker IP – June 2012 0 
7 Search Engine IP – June 2012 0 
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F. CONCLUSION 
Cameroon possesses a huge potential that could make it a major ICT development 
pole in the Central African region. In fact, the educational system, particularly higher 
education, despite its many problems, is fairly developed and could serve as a formidable 
ICTs launching point in Central Africa. On the other hand, the country is endowed with a 
fiber-optic backbone along the Chad–Cameroon pipeline that is still underutilized. 
Likewise, a landing point of the South African Telecommunication 3 (SAT 3) sub-marine 
















APPENDIX B.  
THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC  
The Central African Republic (CAR), a country of some four million people, is 
endowed with rich forest and mineral resources and geographically landlocked, located at 
the crossroads of sub-Saharan Africa. Approximately 20 percent of the population lives 
in Bangui, the capital city.155 The country is also at the crossroads of transition from 
extended instability to a new phase of peace and nation-building and economic recovery, 
with sustained support from the international community. The data in Table 3 describes 
below, provides a brief overview of the socioeconomic indicators pertaining to the 
country. 
The security situation remains tenuous. Despite the ceasefire signed by the 
government with the major dissident political group on 12 June 2011, which has brought 
stability to the northeast, concerns remain regarding the presence of the Lord’s 
Resistance Army in the southeast, and the fact that the main rebel groups in the north 
have not been disarmed. Continuing progress on security-sector reform, including 
restructuring of defense as well as modernization and support to the police and judiciary, 
are critical elements of the transition for the government. 
In this context, it is understandable that the development of cyberspace has not 
been a priority of the country. In 2006, The Korean Agency for Digital Opportunity and 
Promotion (KADO) and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) evaluate the 
country digital-opportunity index (DOI) to 0.09 in a scale of 0 to 1 for a rank of 
174/181.156 “The Digital Opportunity Index evaluates the opportunity, infrastructure and 
utilization of information and communication technologies worldwide…" Nevertheless, 
along with other efforts towards nation building, the sector of information technology has 
seen some improvement these last five years. The CAR has made significant progress in 
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some areas of its infrastructure. Important reforms providing for the liberalization of the 
water, power, and information and communications technology sectors have boosted 
performance. In particular, increased competition in the ICT market has contributed to 
the rapid expansion of mobile and Internet services. ICT is continuously making an 
important contribution to economic prospects (1.05 percentage points) as the expansion 
of mobile and Internet markets continue. Mobile penetration rose from 0.3 subscriptions 
per 100 people in 2000 to 15.2 in 2009, but is still below the rates of fragile states.157 
With only around half the population covered by a mobile signal, penetration remains 
behind the levels of comparable sub-Saharan peers.158 
Table 3.   Socioeconomic Indicators: The Central African Republic159  
N° Indicator  Value 
1-  Area 623,000 square km 
2-  GDP  $3.672 billion (2011 est.) 
3-  Official language  French  
4-  Total population  5,057,208 (July 2012 est.) 
5-  Population rate between 0-14 years  41% (male 1,021,144/female 1,007,819) 
6-  Population 15-64 years 55.3% (male 1,353,600/female 1,382,291) 
7-  Life expectancy  50.48 years 
8-  Urbanised population  39% of total population (2010) 
9-  Average annual growth rate of urban population  2.142% (2011 est.) 
10-  Per capita gross national income (US dollars) GNI  1 163 
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The technological landscape in the Central African Republic is very limited. The 
core network, which is essentially implemented in urban area is comprise of fixed dial-up 
telephone lines, HF and VHF communications for long distance links. Satellite 
communications devices are exclusively use for connection with the external world to 
permit the interconnection to international exchange hubs for phone, television, or 
Internet. Others forms of technologies like optical fiber interconnection cable, and very 
small aperture terminals (VSAT) are very recent and remain at the experimental level. 
For urban communication, the only technologies available are GSM, WIFI, WAN, 
WIMAX. 3G and 4G technologies are very rare, but they do exist.160 
Information technologies are provided to the population through a limited number 
of operators. The Societé Centrafricaine des Télécommunications, alias SOCATEL, a 
state-owned company, is the sole provider of land-line telecommunication services. 
Fixed-line subscriptions have been stagnant for several years, at about 0.2 subscribers per 
100 people, and 97 percent of the 9,000 existing lines are in Bangui. On average, only 20 
new lines per month are connected to the network. Given the shortage of traditional fixed 
lines, higher levels of ICT access come through wireless technologies. Thanks to the 
transfer of its monopoly on mobile telecommunication sector to private companies, four 
companies are now competing to provide GSM services to nearly 1,215,093 subscribers 
(2010 estimate); MOOV RCA, Orange RCA, Nation Link, and TELECEL RCA.161  
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Internet services are provided to the population by twelve162 operators using 
principally dial-up and wireless local loops technologies for distribution. Indeed, the poor 
condition of SOCATEL’s network has made the launch of DSL Internet services 
unlikely. Recently, Orange launched a wireless broadband service using WiMAX 
technology, but prices are still high at $671 per month for a 256 kilobyte-per-second 
(kbps) connection. Being landlocked, the CAR is reliant on costly satellite VSAT 
connectivity for international Internet access. To overcome this disadvantage, efforts are 
under way to establish fiber-optic links to undersea cables landing in neighboring 
Cameroon. The CAB, which runs across Cameroon, Chad, and the CAR will be 
operational in 2012. There is a project to interconnect CAR to the neighboring capitals of 
the subregions (the Congo, DRC, and Gabon) to help diversify the country sources of 
access to Internet. Continuing in the same perspective of diversification of its access 
means, CAR is a member of the African satellite project, RASCOM.163  
The Central African Republic does not possesses or plan to possesses an Internet 
Exchange Point (IXP), but as a member of the CAB project, the IXP that is planned to be 
built in phase II of the project will be shared by the three countries in the alliance. 
With regard to the energy sector, there is only one operator in the power sector, 
ENERCA, which produces, distributes, and markets electricity throughout the country. A 
newly appointed electricity regulator (ARSE) was created, but its capacity is still limited.  
Years of sociopolitical crisis in the CAR have left the power infrastructure in an 
embryonic state. Total installed capacity in the CAR is 39 MW, one of the lowest in sub-
Saharan Africa. The limited infrastructure available is decaying, due to scarce 
maintenance, and needs to be refurbished. The limited generation capacity consists of 
Boali 1 and Boali 2—the two main hydropower plants—with a capacity of 14.9 MW 
each, a diesel plant in Bangui with a capacity of 6 MW, an interconnected grid between 
Boali and Bangui that carries 34 MW of generated power, and a small distribution 
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network. In 2007 the government started construction of Boali 3, an additional 10 MW 
hydropower plant that is not yet operational. Further limitations derive from aging 
infrastructure stock and the pilfering of power equipment. There are frequent breakdowns 
at power plants, which reduce the supply of already-scarce energy resources—as 
happened in 2008, when the country faced a power crisis. Thermal generation is curtailed 
by the expensive price of diesel in the CAR, due to its transportation by routes from 
neighboring countries. This situation has affected secondary centers that rely on thermal 
sources for power. The limited availability of power translates into poor access to 
electricity. As of 2009, only one percent of the CAR’s population had access to 
electricity, totally concentrated in urban areas, especially the capital city Bangui. No one 
in rural areas benefits from electrification. The available electricity is erratic and 
unreliable. Outages in 2006 lasted as much as 950 hours during the year, with an average 
duration of 5.2 hours. Load shedding cut off power as much as eight hours a day in 2008 
and has reportedly increased to 13.5 hours a day on average. Among other factors, the 
CAR’s poor electricity infrastructure and fiber-optic links are major barriers to the 
expansion of the ICT sector. 
The Central African Republic has no ICT industrial facilities; all ICT equipment 
is imported, including access equipment (radio and television sets, computers, 
telephones) as well as routine maintenance equipment. Thus, the country is totally 
dependent on imports as far as the acquisition of equipment and software for ICT 
development are concerned. 
B. INFORMATION SYSTEMS, BUSINESS, AND INDUSTRIES 
Apart from proprietary systems use for telecommunication infrastructures, the 
bold majority of operating systems in use in the Central African Republic are Windows 
based. The services offered in the CAR cyberspace are exclusively web hosting, 
communications (VOIP, SMS, E-Fax, e-mail), and web navigation. The CAR is an ICT 
products consumer. 
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In the public sector, CAR is ranked 181/192 on the index of electronic 
government by the United Nation.164 
C. LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND ORGANIZATION 
1. Strategies and Policies 
In collaboration with various partners such as the European Union (EU) and the 
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), the CAR is currently building its global ICT 
policy, which has regained a momentum.165  
Indeed, in January 2002, a decree by the government kick-started the National 
Information and Communication Infrastructure (NICI) plan process. Consultation 
workshops were organized for members of the government, academia, private sector, 
telecom operators, and regulators. Subsequently, a baseline study was undertaken in June 
and July 2002.  Despite an ongoing conflict that stalled the process, the country has 
achieved a genuinely competitive market with no real dominant player, except in the 
landline market. The government is planning to hold a national workshop to validate and 
elaborate the draft NICI plan and achieve consensus.166  
2. Laws, Regulations, and Organization 
The legal and regulatory framework for the telecommunications sector does exist. 
A number of laws and regulations have been enacted for the sector, including Law No. 
07,020 of December 28, 2007, on the regulation of telecommunications; Law No. 07,021 
of December 28, 2007, setting the fees and charges on property and/or operation of 
                                                 
164 This index refers to the generic capacity or aptitude of the public sector to use ICT for encapsulating 
in public services and deploying to the public, high quality information (explicit knowledge) and effective 
communication tools that support human development. The index is comprised of three sub-indexes: Web 
Measure Index, Telecommunications Infrastructure Index and Human Capital Index, See 
http://www.ictforldc.com/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&layout=item&id=14&Itemid=10. 
165 Central African Republic, “Déclaration de politique sectorielle des telecommunications – TIC en 
Republique Centrafricaine,” March 9, 2007, accessed October 2, 2012, 
www.observatoiretic.org/documents/download/108. 
166 Economic Commission for Africa, “E-Strategies: National, Sectoral and Regional ICT Policies, 
Plans and Strategies,” AISI Sub-committee on Information and Communication Technology: ICT and 
Governance, April 3, 2003, accessed October 2, 2012, http://www.uneca.org/aisi/docs/e-strategies.pdf. 
 93
networks and telecommunications services applicable throughout the national territory;167 
Law No. 08,011 of February 13, 2008, on the organization's institutional and legal 
framework, applicable to businesses and public offices; Decree No. 96,241 of August 27, 
1996, approving the statutes of the agency for regulation of telecommunications; and 
Order No. 03,004 of May 27, 2007, setting the fees and charges in operating 
telecommunications throughout the country.168  
Apart from some few NGO-sponsored organizations in charge of the promotion 
of ICT in the country, the “Agence de Régulation des Télécommunications,” which has 
been in operation since April 2004, is the public institution responsible for regulating, 
controlling, and monitoring the activities of the telecommunications sector in the Central 
African Republic. It is placed under the supervisory authority of the ministry of posts and 
telecommunications. This agency has the duty of regulating, controlling, and monitoring 
the activities of businesses and operators involved in the telecommunications sector.  
Regarding its relations with the world, the CAR is a member of several 
international organizations of which is the ITU. At the regional level, it is active in the 
work of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) in the area 
of telecommunications and has participated in the region's efforts to harmonize the legal 
framework for telecommunications at the CEMAC level. Five guidelines for ministers 
responsible for telecommunications and new technologies of the CEMAC were adopted 
in 2008 and have yet to be enacted at the country level. These were in relation to: i) the 
protection of the rights of users of networks and electronic-communications services; ii) 
the harmonization of procedures for establishing and monitoring rates of electronic-
communications services; iii) interconnection and access to networks and electronic-
communication services, iv) universal service schemes in the electronic-communications 
sector, and iv) harmonization of the legal systems of electronic-communications  
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activities. The broader framework in which reforms are taking place include service 
liberalization in the context of the WTO and negotiations under the Economic Partnership 
Agreement with the European Union. 
Although there is now a judicial foundation for cyber activities in CAR, the 
country still needs to passes specific laws on cybercrime and cybersecurity, build the 
infrastructure, and train personnel to enforce these new laws. The national security forces 
are still inadequately suited for the task. 
D. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN THE SOCIETY AND CULTURE 
1. Education 
The Central African Republic (CAR) faces many challenges in making a greater 
effort in training, budgeting, and raising awareness concerning the use of ICTs. 
Introducing ICTs into basic education (especially in secondary education) is increasingly 
seen by many as a necessity, and the development of teacher skills is necessary to 
enhance the use of educational technology. The country has only one university and 
enrolment rates are low for most levels of education. To reverse this situation, the 
government has made some worthy efforts to promote basic education, such as the 
building of new schools in the capital and the provinces with assistance from the 
European Union and the World Bank.  
The National Education Development Plan (PNDE) sets the general strategy for 
reaching the objectives of quality, efficiency, accessibility, and equity in education for 
the next 10 years. The cyber education project launched since then by the government 
targets two sectors: secondary and tertiary education. Major achievements include 
establishing multimedia resource centers (MRCs) in universities and related institutions; 
training monitors to manage MRCs; and creating learning platforms.  
Specialists are trained mainly in higher-education institutions, whose graduates 
are either specialized technicians (G.C.E. ‘A’ Level + 2/3) or engineers (G.C.E ‘A’ Level 
+ 4/5). It is difficult to open courses of study to train specialists in certain ICT fields 
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(computer science, networks, telecommunications, and electronics) owing to the low 
number of lecturers available in such branches.  
The close collaboration between PNUD and UIT, the Central African 
government, and CISCO Systems has resulted in the creation of a local CISCO academy 
at the University of Bangui. Additionally, the department of higher education, with aid 
from the French Cooperation, initiated a program that aims to set up a network of all 
university institutions. This program has enabled the creation of a multimedia resource 
center (CRM). The CRM and CISCO Academy thus offer advanced training (a post-
bachelor’s professional degree) in conceiving, installing, and maintaining computer 
networks. Twelve students are trained every year in ICT vocations. In the future, the 
CRM aims to deal with tele-education and produce multimedia in CD-ROM format. A 
virtual campus for trainings in ICT has recently been installed by the Francophone 
Agency. Students are asked, at the end of their training, to carry out website creation 
projects, for example, for the university and the Pasteur Institute of Bangui).  
The ADEN project, led by the French Cooperation for Democratizing ICT Access 
with the aim of breaking the digital gap and encouraging the African production of 
content,169 has created a number of centers where students can access computers and the 
Internet and receive tutorials from teachers. Teachers use these centers to search for 
information and develop teaching materials. This project has been so successful that the 
government has approved and authorized total exemption from import tariffs on 
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The International Telecommunications Union launched a project to create a 
network of at least 100 multipurpose community callboxes (TCPs) in 20 African 
countries, including the Central African Republic.170 These TCPs will give communities 
access to ICT to enable them to participate in the information society. The TCPs will be 
managed by women, who can thus actively participate in the processes of development 
and decision-making on the African continent. This project is part of the commitment 
made by 175 countries that adopted an action plan during the first phase of the 
Information Society World Summit to make the advantages of ICT within all humanity’s 
reach. 
As part of its mission in the Central African Republic, the United Nations 
Program for Development (PNUD) has developed an ICT plan that concentrates on the 
social and economic objectives of the Millennium Declaration and has a primary 
objective of enabling universal access to the information society. These plans focus on 
policies related to education, health, employment, government efficiency, development of 
local content, and the social integration and the promotion of science, technology, and 
innovation. It is adapted to the country’s national characteristics, needs, and values and 
emphasizes the state’s central role in the formulation and implementation of a policy tied 
to ICT, in partnership with international organizations, the private sector, and civil 
society. Its goals are to:  
 Use new and existing technologies to create universal connectivity by 
distributing information and communication materials so that everyone 
can benefit from easy access, including the elderly and handicapped 
 Develop connectivity, including Internet access, in institutions receiving 
many people, such as digital community centers, schools, universities, 
libraries, post offices, community and cultural centers, archives, and 
museums 
                                                 
170 “L'UIT lance un projet de télécentres communautaires polyvalents en Afrique,” ITU, January 10, 
2005, accessed October 2, 2012, http://www.itu.int/newsarchive/press_releases/2005/02-fr.html. 
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 Find appropriate solutions for promoting ICTs adapted to the environment 
in remote, impoverished, and particularly rural zones, but also in poorly 
serviced or marginalized urban zones (e.g., by establishing multipurpose 
community access centers to guarantee integrated access to information 
and social services) 
 Find solutions to make access to ICT affordable in regions with low 
revenues 
 Supply information and applications in the language and cultural context 
that is most familiar to the user, which will encourage further ICT use 
 Include unwritten languages by using audio-digital tools 
2. Social Status 
The 2011 UNDP Human Development Report ranks CAR near the bottom of its 
human development index (179th out of 187 countries) and unlikely to meet its 
Millennium Development goals (MDG). The proportion of Central Africans living on $1 
a day has decreased slightly to 62%,  but it needs to be half that in order to reach the 2015 
goal, and the prevalence of underweight children under five has increased since 2003 to 
nearly 30 percent, a rate nearly three times the MDG target. There are also large 
socioeconomic and regional variations; for example, rates of HIV/AIDs have increased 
from 3.1% in 1990 to 4.7% in 2009 with rates of up to 15–18% in the west of CAR. 
Notable increases in service delivery include an increase in primary enrollment (58% in 
1990 to 91% in 2009); literacy rates from 34% in 1990 to 55% in 2009; and improved 
sanitation facilities and improved water sources from 11% and 58% in 1990 to 34% and 
67% in 2009, respectively. 
3. Access and Acceptance of Technology 
Given the underdevelopment of the basic network, access to ICT is for now only 
possible in urban areas and especially in the capital, where there are around 1,800 
Internet subscribers in a population of 600,000. Twenty private cyber cafés and some few 
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education centers offer Internet access on workdays. The estimated current Internet 
penetration rate in CAR is 2% of the population. 
Currently, there are 148,760 Facebook users in the Central African Republic, 
which makes it number 132 over 213 in the ranking of all Facebook statistics by country. 
Additionally, Facebook penetration in CAR is 3.07% of the country's population, and 
658.23% in relation to number of Internet users. The total number of FB users in CAR 
has grown by more than 25520 in the last 6 months, demonstrating the willingness of 
CAR’s Internet users to participate in social media. The largest age group of social 
network users is currently 18–24, with a total of 63,967 users, followed by users aged 25–
34.171 Twitter database does not show any activity coming from the Central African  
Republic. However, a handful of people from Bangui are active on Twitter.172 Internet 
happenings in Central Africa are hard to come by. For one, few independent news 
sources exist in the region. Those that do exist often cover human rights or politics or 
sports rather than tech news. However, a few bloggers from CAR keep the rest of the 
world informed of ICT developments in Bangui. Global Voices, an online website, has 
one story on the Central African Republic from the past year, and only three from the 
past two years. Various NGOs and aid organizations provide disaster news. Still, 
Facebook remains the go-to for those living in the Central African Republic. 
An assortment of sources provides a glimpse into how the Internet is touching the 
lives of those in CAR. Hippolyte Donossio, a web journalist, producer, and reporter from 
Bangui, has a broad social presence and maintains a WordPress blog. 
“BlogmandeBangos” posts to the Echos de Centrafrique blog. “Le Confident,” an 
independent newspaper, provides telecoms business news from SOCATEL. Another 
source is the government-run “Centrafrique-Presse,” based in Bangui and aligned with 
the incumbent party.173 
                                                 
171 “Central African Republic Facebook Statistics,” Social Bakers, accessed June 26, 2012, 
http://www.socialbakers.com/facebook-statistics/central-african-republic.  
172 “Central African Republic: ‘La Facebookmania’ à La Centrafricaine,” OAfrica, November 14, 2011, 
accessed October 2, 2012, http://www.oafrica.com/city-profile/central-african-republic-facebookmania/. 
173 “Central African Republic: ‘La Facebookmania’ à La Centrafricaine.” 
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4. Information Technology dependency 
Although there is a frenetic endorsement of social-media activities among Internet 
users in Central African Republic, the level of corporate use of ICTs is very low. As 
such, the most commonly encountered uses of ICTs are related to specific domains such 
as management duties (administrative and finance) and production duties. The use of the 
applications depends entirely on the duties of the enterprise. Enterprises with Internet 
connectivity, though rare, quite often are involved with e-transactions, like mailing and 
online research. Overall, there is no indication of dependency on technology at all in the 
CAR society. ICTs are still considered a luxury rather than a daily tool for life.  
E. CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES 
Regarding the cybersecurity picture in the CAR, nothing serious has been said on 
that domain. Due to its involvement in regional collaboration, authorities in the CAR 
have been brought to adopt resolution to develop the framework of cyberspace. But still 
the road remains long. There is a new trend of trafficking that uses the Internet for 
wildlife trade and smuggling. This is a form of crime that exploits the opportunities 
offered by new technologies to access a wide international market.174 In the Central 
African Republic, cybercrime activities are rare and essentially spam related. The website 
ProjectHoneyPot.org, which conducts surveys of malicious activities online based on 
honey-pot servers, generated the results presented in Table 4. These results show a very 
low amount of malicious activities coming from IP addresses within the country’s 
allocated range of IP addresses.175 They essentially revolve around spammed IP 
addresses. 
 
                                                 
174 Ononino, Alain Bernard, “Establishing Regional Wildlife Law Enforcement : Lesons From an 
Unusual NGOs –Government Partnership in the Central African Subregion,” Ninth International 
Conference on Environmental Compliance and Enforcement 2011, accessed October 2, 2012, 
http://inece.org/conference/9/proceedings/63_Ononino.pdf. 
175 “CAR: Directory of Spam Server Ips,” Honey Pot Project, accessed July 13, 2012, 
http://www.projecthoneypot.org/list_of_ips.php?t=s&ctry=CF&by=1. 
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Table 4.   Honey Pot Results in the Central African Republic176  
N° Type of Attack Period of activity of the 50 
most recent IP 
Total number of 
attempts registered 
1 Harvester IP   –June 2012 0 
2 Spam Server IP –June 2012 11 147 
3 Bad Web host IP –June 2012 0 
4 Comment Spammer IP –June 2012 38 
5 Dictionary Attacker IP –June 2012 11 747 
6 Rule Breaker IP – June 2012 0 
7 Search Engine IP – June 2012 0 
    
 
F. CONCLUSION 
In spite of its limited development of the moment, the ICT sector constitutes an 
engine of development in the future, thanks to very favorable trends. The prospects are 
promising with regard to the intentions of investment announced by big operators of 
telephony such as the group Orange, with all the potential fiscal fallout for the state.  
Considering the big challenges of development of the country, most of the actions 
of development during the last decades, in particular in the social sectors, basic 
infrastructures, and rural development, were done to the detriment of domains like ICT. 
As a result, administrations and companies use very little ICT; small and medium-sized 
enterprises, in particular tourist and cultural, are absent on the web. The public sector 
does not offer information and online services to citizens and economic operators. The 
needs of the specialized workforce hardened to ICT are underestimated and cannot be 
satisfied by training capabilities. ICTs are not introduced into programs of education and 
research yet. 
The telecommunications sector faces the constraints of legal, statutory and 
institutional weaknesses in the framework of the sector; basic infrastructures that are 
ruined due to lack of investment and acts of destruction; nonexistence of a dynamic, 
                                                 




competitive climate, allowing the development of ICT; and weakness in coverage of the 
national territory, offering few means of access to ICT.  
The government has begun to clarify the regulatory framework of the sector, in 
particular by specifying the rules of granting of licenses and by creating a regulatory 
agency. A new law fixing the legal framework of the sector is in the process of 
elaborating the basis of a detailed consultation of all the actors. Security issues with 
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APPENDIX C.  
THE REPUBLIC OF CHAD 
Chad is a Sahelo-Saharan country of 1.28 million square kilometers and a 
population of nearly 11 million. The country, located in the heart of Africa, is landlocked 
and presents a harsh climate. Though its soil is oil- and mineral rich, Chad is classified 
among the poorest countries on the human-development index. The level of poverty is 
characterized by a very low rate of schooling, strong population growth, a low rate of 
healthcare, and more. The data in Table 5 provides a brief overview of the socioeconomic 
indicators pertaining to the country. 
Chad has been plagued in recent years by multiple internal and external crises. 
Internally, the government of Chad continues to face off against the attacks of armed 
opposition groups based in the eastern part of the country and neighboring Sudan. This 
conflict has caused general instability in much of the country and hindered development 
efforts. 
According to a recent ranking of the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU), Chad is one of the countries with the lowest rate of penetration of information 
technologies and communications to the world (ICT). Ranked 138 over 142 in the 
Networked Readiness Index (2.6/7) by the 2012 Global Information Technology Report 
of the World Economic Forum,177 the government of Chad is showing a tremendous 
desire and effort to overcome the technological gaps of its country. 
The following indicators show the status of achievement for the efforts being 
conducted. The penetration rate of telephony services is estimate to be 35.4% of the 
population, with a landline teledensity of 0.4% and mobile teledensity of 35% in 2012.  
 
 
                                                 
177 Soumitra Dutta and Beñat Bilbao-Osorio, “The Global Information Technology Report 2012: 
Living in a Hyperconnected World,” World Economic Forum, 2012, accessed June 10, 2012, 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/Global_IT_Report_2012.pdf, 200. 
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The Internet penetration rate is estimate to involve around 2.3% of the population.178 
Indeed, until this year, Chad lacked a national backbone infrastructure and international 
fiber-optic access to support broadband services. All long-distance connections, both 
national and international, are currently made via satellite. However, this situation is 
gradually improving under the CAB project. 
Radio is by far the most widely used communication medium. Most privately 
owned and operated radio stations are based around N’Djamena in the southwest. A 
number of these stations are run by nonprofits and have a limited broadcast range.179 
Television is sparsely used in Chad. Television use is limited by the expense of owning a 
set, poor access to electricity, and government restrictions on broadcasting. 
Table 5.   Socioeconomic Indicators: Chad180  
N° Indicator  Value 
1-  Area 1.284 million sq km 
2-  GDP  $19.69 billion (2011 est.) 
3-  Official languages  French and Arabic  
4-  Total population  10,975,648 (July 2011 est.) 
5-  Population rate between 0-14 years  46% (male 2,510,656/female 2,441,780) 
6-  Population rate between  15-64 years 51% (male 2,531,896/female 2,960,406) 
7-  Life expectancy  48.69 years 
8-  Urbanized population  28% of total population (2010) 
9-  Average annual growth rate of urban population  4.6% annual rate of change (2010-15 est.) 
10-  Per capita gross national income (US dollars) GNI  $ 1,125181 
11-  Population below $1 a day  55%182 
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180 “The World FactBook: Chad,” CIA, September 11, 2012, accessed October 9, 2012, 
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181 “GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$),” The World Bank Group, accessed February 11, 2012,  
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The technological landscape in Chad is quite diverse. It offers a variety of 
technologies necessary for broadband data transportation to end-user distribution. The 
core network, which is essentially old and obsolete, is concentrated in urban areas and 
consists of fixed dial-up telephone lines and HF/VHF communications for long-distance 
links. Satellite-communication devices are extensively use to link and reach remote areas 
and connect with the external world for phone, television, or Internet. With the execution 
of the new NICI policies, others forms of technology have been introduced, like fiber-
optical interconnection with undersea cables from Cameroon and very small-aperture 
terminals (VSAT). For urban communications, technologies like ADSL, GSM, 3G, 
CDMA, WIFI, WIMAX, and others are progressively introduced. 
Information technologies are provided to the population, through there is a very 
limited number of operators. The Societé des Télécommunications du Tchad, alias 
SOTEL TCHAD, a state-owned company, is the sole provider of land-fixed 
telecommunication services. Along with two other companies, CELTEL Tchad and 
TIGO Tchad, SOTEL provides the country with mobile (wireless) communication 
services, with a total of 3.8 million subscribers in 2012.183  
SOTEL is also the company in charge of the exploitation of the optical-fiber cable 
network that connects Chad to Cameroon’s SAT3/WASC undersea terminal, which 
makes SOTEL one of the principal distributors of Internet to the rest of the low-level 
services providers. Internet services are provided to the population by nearly twelve184 
operators, using a mosaic of technologies, from dial-up to VSAT through wireless local-
loops systems.  
                                                 
183 Republic of Chad, “NICI Plan Tchad,” Ministry of Posts, Telecommunications, and New 
Technology, May 2007, accessed October 9, 2012, 
http://www.uneca.org/aisi/nici/Chad/Plan%20NICI_Tchad.pdf, 16. 
184 “Broadband Internet Service Providers (ISP) in Chad,” Who Is This IP, accessed October 9, 2012, 
http://www.whoisthisip.com/isp-ip-usage-country-Chad.php. 
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In the last five years, Chad has been developing a program of interconnecting all 
the country with a network of optical fiber for a backbone of nearly 2500 Km.185 This 
program, which is supposed to reach completion in 2012, will provide to the country a 
high level of interconnection. Additionally, with the other countries of the Central 
African region, Chad has acquired 640 Km of optical fiber to interconnect with the 
republics of Cameroon and Central Africa.186  
Along with the Central African backbone, there is a project to interconnect Chad 
to the capitals of the neighboring subregions (Nigeria, the Central African Republic, and 
Sudan) to help diversify sources of access to the Internet. Continuing in the same 
perspective of diversification of its access means, Chad is a member of the African 
satellite project, RASCOM.187  
Chad does not possesses, or plan to possesses, an Internet Exchange Point (IXP), 
but as a member of the CAB project, the IXP that is planned for Phase II of the project 
will be shared by the three countries in alliance.188 
In Chad, there is no evidence of server farms, except for server infrastructures in 
use by telecommunication operators to deal with their customers.  
Chad's energy infrastructure is exceptionally poor, even by the standards of other 
developing countries. Decades of civil war have taken their toll, and improvements have 
proceeded slowly. Mismanagement of the government-run power monopoly slowed the 
development of infrastructure in this essential sector. Chad's people have limited access 
                                                 
185 Republic of Chad, “NICI Plan Tchad,” Ministry of Posts, Telecommunications, and New 
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to power and electricity. In 2008, Chad generated 0.1 billion kilowatt hours of electricity 
from an installed capacity base of 32 megawatts.189  
Electricity and water services are confined to the capital, N'Djamena, where the 
country’s only major power station (22 MW) is located, and to a few regional capitals. 
Only 9% of households in N’Djamena have electricity. Even in these limited areas, 
electricity is extremely expensive and services are often cut off. Daily power outages 
remain serious issues that put at risk the electricity infrastructures.  Overall, less than 2% 
of Chad’s population has access to electricity. The rest of the population, urban or rural, 
relies on wood for fuel requirements and access to electricity on an individual level is 
ensured by using power generators, exclusively reserve for essential needs.190 
Nevertheless, some improvements are expected as the government liberalizes the 
energy and telecommunications sectors and gradually improves the transport 
infrastructure. World Bank loans to develop electricity have focused on increases in 
sustainable energy ($5.3 million) and improvements in equipment renovation  
($55 million).191 
Chad has no ICT industrial facilities. All equipment is imported, from access 
equipment (radio and television sets, computers, and telephones) to maintenance 
equipment. Thus, the country is totally dependent on importation, as far as ICT is 
concerned. 
B. INFORMATION SYSTEMS, BUSINESS, AND INDUSTRIES 
The ICT infrastructure in Chad operates with a quite diverse set of operating 
systems (OSs). As usual, industrial infrastructures use proprietary OSs and their types are 
likely tied to the companies’ internal policies. But at the level of the end-user, the most 
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commonly use systems are Microsoft Windows, Linux, and Macintosh base. The use of 
Open Source OS remains much less academic than professional.   
The services offer in Chadian cyberspace revolve around web hosting, 
communications (VOIP, SMS, E-Fax, e-mail), and web navigation. Electronic commerce 
is yet to be introduced. Some few small and medium enterprises (SME) marketing ICT 
products and services exist and are based mainly in N’Djamena. Most of them are local 
branches of foreign firms or have concluded local representation agreements with such 
firms (e.g., for software solutions, networking solutions, and IT security).  
One sector that has significantly embrace cyber technology is the banking sector, 
especially micro-finance companies. They usually rely on IT to proceed in their daily 
remote transactions. IT has becomes crucial in money transfer as the use of short message 
service (SMS) helps to transmit and encoded text via GSM technology carrying 
instructions on a money-transferring operation.192  
In the public sector, though Chad is ranked 189/190 on the index of electronic 
government by the United Nations in his 2012 survey,193 a lot is being done to use 
information technology. The presidency and three other ministries were already 
interconnected by a local area network by late 2010, with the ambition to extend that 
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194 Dany Dazoumbe Padire, “Télécommunications: Le Tchad se met à la technologie chinoise,” 
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worth noting is conducted by the state finance service: “Projet pour l’Amélioration de la 
Gestion des Finances Publiques (PAMFIP)”195 aims to computerized the management of 
public finance. 
C. LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND ORGANIZATION 
1. Strategies and Policies 
Following the example of many African countries, the government of Chad made 
development of information technologies and communication one of its priorities. The 
government has clearly recognized that besides the advantages they offer, ICTs constitute 
an effective instrument to fight against poverty and promote competitiveness in the 
economy and efficiency of governmental action.  
However, constraints still exist on the road towards the information society. The 
development of infrastructures, the strengthening of capacities, and an appropriate legal 
and statutory framework are major ICT needs. The Chadian government, conscious of 
this situation and eager to face the challenges of ICT development, undertook in 1998 
reforms of the telecommunications sector, which have led to greater liberalization, 
allowing the private sector to play a driving role in this sector. To follow up this effort, 
the Chadian government requested the support of the Economic Commission for Africa 
(ECA) and other partners for the development of a joint and coordinated plan of 
development (NICI). 
The National Strategy of Development of ICT, which was adopted in 2007, 
became a cornerstone that will allow Chad to channel all the energies towards common 
and shared objectives. The national strategy was translated into an action plan over five 
years with strategic objectives, clearly defined responsibilities, and a timetable of 
implementation. This national strategy, which integrates perfectly into the national 
                                                 
195 World Bank,“ Public Financial Management Capacity Building in Chad: Recruitment of a Firm 
Responsible for Setting Up a System for Managing Public Investment,” World Bank DEVEX, August 12, 





strategy of reduction of poverty, aims essentially at raising all the constraints which 
inhibit access to ICT and to set up an environment for a steady development of 
information technologies and communication. 
2. Laws, Regulations, and Organization 
The legal and regulatory framework for the telecommunications sector in Chad is 
still rudimentary. Two laws enacted in 1998 constitute the root platform of 
telecommunication in Chad.196 These two laws, which are at the root of the liberalization 
of the telecommunications sector, have allowed the creation and the implementation of 
the following structures: first, a ministry of posts and new technology of communication 
(MPNTC); this is the institution in charge of the national policy in ICT. Second, an office 
of regulation of telecommunications (OTRT); this is the authority in charge of the 
regulation, application, and implementation of the law and statutory texts of the 
telecommunications sector. Third, the Societé des Télécommunications du Tchad 
(SOTEL Chad), initially owned by the State; it is mainly charged with the exploitation of 
the basic network. According to the aforementioned law, SOTEL Tchad runs the 
activities of telecommunications.  In 2005, SOTEL Chad capital was opened to private 
investors. Since then, 60% of its capital has been taken by the private sector (foreign 
investors), 10% was given to the staff of SOTEL-Tchad, and the remaining share —30% 
of the capital—kept by the Chadian state.  Finally, the “Société des Postes et de 
l’Epargne (STPE),” which is totally owned by the state. This company is in charge of 
postal services and savings. 
Chad is a member of several international organizations, one of which is the ITU. 
At the regional level, it is active in the work of the Central African Economic and 
Monetary Community (CEMAC) in the area of telecommunications and has participated 
in the region's efforts to harmonize the legal framework for telecommunications at the 
CEMAC level.  
                                                 
196 Two laws enacted in August 17, 1998, one N°008/PR/98 creating and organizing the Postal services 
and the other N°009/ PR/98, organizing telecommunications services. 
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Overall, the legal framework of ICT in Chad is characterized by the existence of 
numerous gaps in the law. Indeed, substantive law ignores the numerous activities that 
develop in the ICTS sector worldwide. The concept of new information technologies and 
communication and the Internet does not appear in the law on telecommunications. Also, 
the text of law is silent on the repression of possible breaches by via information 
technologies and of communication. Moreover, the institutional framework of ICT is 
characterized by the existence of several organisms with conflicting goals. Indeed, the 
increasing convergence of sectors of the broadcasting, telecommunications, and computer 
systems towards the all-digital exposes the different regulatory bodies of these sectors to 
frequent jurisdiction conflicts that could damage their efficiency.197 
D. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN THE SOCIETY AND CULTURE 
1. Education 
The history of the educational system of Chad has been negatively impacted by 
the civil wars that have divided and impoverished the country for 20 years, following its 
independence from France. Since 1996, some degree of political and social stability has 
taken hold, and it has had a positive influence on education. There have been 
improvements. The literacy rate has increased from 15 percent in 1960, to 20 percent in 
1985, 48% in 1996, to 46.26 in 2009, according to a World Bank report published in 
2010. 
Chad’s education system follows the French model. A Chadian’s typical formal 
education begins at kindergarten, followed by six years of primary (elementary) 
education, seven years of secondary education, and seven years of higher education. 
Although Chad is a bilingual country (French and Arabic), French is the language of  
 
                                                 
197 Republic of Chad, “NICI Plan Tchad,” Ministry of Posts, Telecommunications, and New 
Technology, May 2007, accessed October 9, 2012, 
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instruction in the majority of educational institutions.198 Despite vigorous efforts aimed at 
training new faculty, it is estimated that 30 percent of primary school teachers hold no 
professional qualifications. The teacher–student ratio is 1:65 in rural areas and can be as 
high as 1:100 in large agglomerations such as Moundou, Sarh, Bongor, Abéché, Dobra, 
and N'Djamena, the capital. The Chadian government has launched efforts to promote the 
teaching of the standard curriculum in many of the local tribal languages. However, many 
parents, working through the influential parents' associations, tend to resist this, as they 
insist that their children be taught in French, especially in southern Chad.199 
Higher education in Chad is provided by public and private institutions. Public 
institutions, which count three universities and seven schools and institutes, include the 
University of Ndjamena, the Institut Universitaire des Sciences et Techniques in Abeche, 
and the Institut Universitaire des Techniques Agricoles in Sarh.200 The University of 
N'Djamena, which was established by government decree in 1971, serves as the main 
centre of higher learning. The University of N'Djamena is committed in a project of IT 
modernization, allowing the students to have broadband access to the resources of the 
Internet. The university is evaluating new multimedia technologies, among which are 
courses offered by private teaching companies. Finally, the university has created a 
partnership with other regional and international institutions, especially an international 
extension (Euclide) who works as a relocated digital campus. 
Private colleges are also represented; and the most prominent are King Faisal 
University in Sarh and the Institut Supérieur de Gestion in Abeché. Both institutes were 
recently opened and offer a two-year training program leading to an ssociate degrees 
known as a Brevet de Technicien Supérieur (BTS). 
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Chad has a two-tier system of vocational and technical education. Students can 
enter a six-year program leading to the CAP, or Certificat d'Aptitude Professionelle 
(professional skills certification), in a variety of manual and technical fields.  
Specific ICT-relevant educational programs are still very few and do not satisfy 
Chadian needs for qualify personnel to boost ICT in the country. According to the NICI 
plan for Chad, the need for IT specialists is estimated to be around 1500 engineers for the 
next five years. But the answers to this void are yet to be determined and implemented. 
2. Social Status 
Chad is one of the least developed countries in the world, ranking 183 (out of 
187) in the 2011 UNDP human-development index. Almost all relevant indicators point 
to severe problems: 83% of the population lives below the poverty line of $2 per day; in 
the 2010 global-hunger index, Chad ranks fourth from the bottom; the Gini coefficient of 
39.8 in 2003 shows the unequal distribution of income. As oil revenues have not been 
directed at reducing poverty, it is expected that poverty has risen once more, but there are 
no data available. Poverty is primarily concentrated in rural areas, where 87% of the 
country’s poor live.201 Poverty in Chad has been aggravated by various conflicts during 
its 50 years of independence. Tensions between ethnic groups in the north and south have 
further contributed to political and economic instability. Moreover, Chad is subject to 
spillover effects from crises in neighboring Sudan and the Central African Republic.  
Economic development in Chad is inhibited by its landlocked location and the 
desert climate in the north. The Sahelian zone (central and eastern Chad) is particularly 
affected by chronic food deficits. The arrival of thousands of Sudanese refugees in the 
area since late 2003 has put additional pressure on limited resources, placing further 
stress on the already highly vulnerable local population.202 
                                                 
201 “BTI 2012 | Chad Country Report,” The BTI Project, accessed June 25, 2012,  http://www.bti-
project.org/country-reports/wca/tcd. 
202 “Country Profile : Chad,” World Food Program, accessed June 25, 2012, 
http://www.wfp.org/countries/Chad/Overview. 
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3. Access to and Acceptance of Technology 
Given the harsh socioeconomic context and the underdevelopment of basic 
telecommunications networks, access to ICT is for now only possible in urban areas and 
especially in the capital towns, where there are around 12,200 Internet subscribers out of 
a population of 808,000.203 Cyber cafés remain the chief mode of access for the vast 
majority of Chadian Internet users. The estimated current Internet penetration rate in 
Chad is 1.8% of the population, which counts around eleven million inhabitants.  
Although computer-based Internet does not exist formally in Moussoro, 
some residents try to use ‘Internet’ on their mobile phones. Reports 
indicate it is unbearably slow at peak use times, and slow at other times 
(this network is basically the US equivalent of Edge, not 3G). 
Furthermore, I found no residents who have mobile devices that rival the 
usefulness of an iPhone or even a Blackberry. This is a contrast to 
N’Djamena, which has good mobile network coverage and many residents 
on smartphones (I saw real, Apple-made iPhones, and Android phones are 
the new fad).204 
Currently, there are 32,220 Facebook users in Chad, which makes it the number 
175 over 213 in the ranking of all Facebook statistics by country. Facebook penetration in 
Chad is 0.31% of the country's population, and 17.16% in relation to the number of 
Internet users. Curiously, in the Chadian case, the total number of FB users in Chad is 
declining, having fallen off by 5,780 in the last 6 months. This trend demonstrates a lack 
of interest in social media by Chadian Internet users. The largest age group of social 
network users is currently 18–24 with a total of 12,244 users, followed by users between 
the ages of 25 –34.205 The Twitter database does not show any activity in Chad. However, 
there are a handful of people from N’Djaména who are active on Twitter.206  
                                                 
203  According to UN DATA of 2009 the density of Internet user in Chad is 1.5%, See “Country 
Profile: Chad,” UNData, accessed June 25, 2012, http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=CHAD. 
204 James Gibson, “Bringing computers to rural Chad (Tchad),” OAfrica, June 21, 2012, accessed June 
26, 2012, http://www.oafrica.com/education/bringing-computers-to-rural-chad-tchad/. 
205 “Chad Facebook Statistics,” Social Bakers, accessed June 26, 2012, 
http://www.socialbakers.com/facebook-statistics/chad. 
206 Alwihda Info, “Tchad : « Révolution des médias sociaux: Atouts et inconvénients dans les pays des 
jeunes démocraties » (Débat),” Twitter, May 24, 2012, accessed June 26, 2012, 
http://twitter.com/alwihdainfo/statuses/205733895327592449. 
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Chadian civil society is still really not active in ICT. Diverse reasons explain it: 
absence of suitable policy on the subject, the high price of computer hardware and high 
cost of electricity, as well as other financial burdens (taxes and customs). The domain of 
ICT in Chad has not yet attracted investors, who rather prefer to bet on sectors like rural 
development. Initiatives for the development of ICT for this reason blocked. And other 
actors within civil society hesitate to dash into the adventure.  
Furthermore, civil society seems to be much more attracted by the socioeconomic 
and political situation of the country than the question of ICT. In the media, most 
criticisms come are of the void in the legal framework on the use of ICT. Indeed, the 
absence of an appropriate legal framework does not allow for good promotion of ICT in 
the Chadian media. The high council on communications (HCC), the authority on 
regulation of communications in Chad, has proposed the revision of Law 29 (on the 
regime of the press). But, at the moment, no answer has been given by the executive.  
All the actors in the civil society are unanimous: their needs in ICT are enormous 
considering the numerous difficulties they meet; these needs crystallize around access 
and training to ICT.207 Amongst the principle needs are:  
- the lack of public and private structures specialized for ICT 
- the limitation of the OTRT for access to the Internet via the satellite 
- the high cost of taxes to companies and ceaseless cuts of electricity, which make 
the costs of access to ICT higher 
- lack of interest from Chadian businessmen, who invest little in the field of ICT 
- the difficultly of access to sources of funding for training and creation of 
structures focused on ICT 
                                                 
207 Dany Danzoumbe PADIRE, “Implication de la Société Civile de l’Afrique Centrale dans les 
Politiques des TIC : Cas du Tchad,” Institut Panos Afrique de l’Ouest, accessed June 26, 2012, 
http://www.cipaco.org/sources/etudeSC_Tchad.pdf, 19. 
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4. Information Technology Dependency 
As confirmed by the low level of activity in social media and the views of civil 
society collectively, information technology use in Chad remains very low. Although the 
state is engaged in a large program of development of ICT, the level of corporate use of 
ICTs is very low. As such, the most commonly encountered uses of ICTs are related to 
specific domain such as management duties (administrative and finance) and production 
duties. The use of the applications depends entirely on the duties of the enterprise. 
Overall, there is no indication of dependency on technology at all in Chad. 
E. CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES 
Regarding the cybersecurity picture in Chad, again nothing serious has been said 
on that domain. Despite of its involvement in regional collaboration, authorities still in 
Chad have to adopt and develop a legal framework of cyberspace. The types of 
cybercrime activities known in Chad, though rare, are essentially spam related.  
The website ProjectHoneyPot.org, which conducts surveys of malicious activities 
online base on honey-pot servers generated the results presented in Table 6. These results 
show a very low amount of malicious activity from IP addresses within Chad’s allocated 
range of IP addresses.208 They essentially revolve around spamming IP addresses. 
Table 6.   Honey Pot Results for Chad209  
N° Type of Attack Period of activity of the 50 
most recent IP 
Total number of 
attempts registered 
1 Harvester IP   July 2008 –June 2012 0 
2 Spam Server IP –June 2012 4 731 
3 Bad Web host IP –June 2012 0 
4 Comment Spammer IP –June 2012 0 
5 Dictionary Attacker IP July 2008 –June 2012 4 722 
6 Rule Breaker IP – June 2012 0 
7 Search Engine IP – June 2012 0 
                                                 
208 Project Honey Pot, “Chad : Directory Of Spam Server PIs - CHAD,” Project Honey Pot, accessed 
June 26, 2012, http://www.projecthoneypot.org/list_of_ips.php?t=s&ctry=TD&by=1. 
209 Project Honey Pot, “Chad : Directory Of Spam Server PIs.” 
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F. CONCLUSION 
Despite being Africa’s latest exporter of oil, Chad has one of the least developed 
telecommunications markets in the world. Penetration rates in all market sectors—fixed, 
mobile and Internet—are well below African averages. 
Considering the big challenges for development in the country, most of the 
actions of development during the last decades, in particular in the social, basic 
infrastructure, and rural development sectors, were done to the detriment of domains like 
ICT. As a result, administrations and companies use very little ICT; small and medium-
sized enterprises are absent on the web. The public sector does not offer information and 
online services to citizens and economic operators. The needs of the specialized 
workforce hardened to ICT cannot be satisfied by training capabilities. ICTs are not 
introduced into the programs of education and research yet. 
The telecommunications sector faces the following constraints: weakness of the 
legal, statutory, and institutional framework of the sector; basic infrastructures that are 
ruined due to the lack of investment or deliberately destroyed; nonexistence of a 
dynamic, competitive climate allowing the development of ICT; and weakness in the 
coverage of the national territory and means of access to ICT. 
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APPENDIX D.  
THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 
Located in the heart of Africa, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is 
the size of Eastern Europe (2.3 million square kilometers) and endowed with immense 
natural resources: rich forest, mineral resources, fauna, and an important hydrographic 
network. Since its independence in the sixties, the DRC has been plague by multiple 
conflicts, internal and external. This has left it in humanitarian crisis. Although the DRC 
has been relatively stable since the last quarter of 2002, there are still sporadic violent 
conflicts in the eastern part of the country. Following peace negotiations, a transitional 
government formed by representatives of different parties prepared the way between 
2003 and 2006 for the inauguration of a democratic republic.  
Since then, The DRC has undergone rapid changes in a short period of time; with 
70 million people, it is one of the largest markets on the continent. In the past decade, 
DRC has witnessed an exponential growth of global trade and has had an impact on local 
economic performance. The onset of the digital age has made it natural for the DRC to 
transform itself into a continental telecommunication hub capable of attracting the 
attention of major companies in the ICT industry. Though ICT has not yet permeated 
every facet of the way people in DRC work, live, learn and play, the government clearly 
shows that it is focused and committed to do so.210  
In 2006, the Korean Agency for Digital Opportunity and Promotion (KADO) and 
the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) evaluated the country’s digital 
opportunity index (DOI) to 0.08 on a scale of 0 to 1 for a rank of 176/181.211  
Nevertheless, along with other efforts of nation building, the sector of information 
technology has seen some improvement these last five years. An increased competition in 
                                                 
210 Kyamusoke Bamusulanga Nta-Bote, “ICT in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” Global-ICT, 
2007, accessed June 27, 2012, http://www.connect-world.com/~cwiml/index.php/magazine/global-
ict/item/3212-ict-in-the-democratic-republic-of-congo. 
211 The Digital Opportunity Index (DOI) evaluates the opportunity, infrastructure and utilization of 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) worldwide, See “The Digital Opportunity Index 
(DOI)," World Information Society Report 2007,  Chapter Three, ITU-UNCTAD (2007), 
http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/doi/material/WISR07-chapter3.pdf, 38. 
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the ICT market has contributed to the rapid expansion of mobile and Internet services. 
Mobile penetration has reached 65 subscriptions per 100 in 2009.212 With only around 
half the population covered by a mobile signal, penetration remains below the levels of 
comparable sub-Saharan peers. 
Table 7.   Socioeconomic Indicators: Democratic Republic of the Congo213  
N° Indicator  Value 
1-  Area 2,344,858 square km 
2-  GDP  $25.19 billion (2011 est.) 
3-  Official language  French  
4-  Total population  73,599,190 (July 2012 est.) 
5-  Population rate between 0-14 years  44.4% (male 16,031,347/female 
15,811,818) 
6-  Population 15-64 years 53% (male 18,919,942/female 19,116,204) 
7-  Life expectancy  55.74 years 
8-  Urbanized population  35% of total population (2010) 
9-  Average annual growth rate of urban population  4.5% (2011 est.) 
10-  Per capita gross national income (US dollars) GNI  675 
11-  Population below $1 a day  59.2% 
 
A. INFRASTRUCTURES 
With regard to the country size and population, the technological landscape in 
DRC is very limited. As a result of political instability since the mid-1990s, the national 
telecom system is one of the least developed in the region. Rural areas, where almost 





                                                 
212 Vivien Foster and Daniel Alberto Benitez, “The Democratic Republic of Congo’s Infrastructure: A 
Continental Perspective,” AICD Country Report, March 2010, accessed June 29, 2012, 
http://www.ppiaf.org/sites/ppiaf.org/files/publication/AICD-DRC-country-report.pdf, 8. 
213 “Africa: Congo, Democratic Republic of the,” The CIA World FactBook, June 25, 2012, accessed 
June 28, 2012, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html. 
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The core of the network, which is essentially implemented in urban areas, consists 
of fixed dial-up telephone lines and HF and VHF communications for long distance links. 
Satellite communications devices are exclusively used for connection with the external 
world to permit the interconnection to international exchange hubs of phone, television, 
and Internet. Others forms of technologies like optical-fiber interconnection cable and 
very small-aperture terminals (VSAT) are very recent and remain at the development 
stage. For urban communication, the only technologies available are GSM, WIFI, and 
WIMAX. 3G and 4G technologies are very rare, but they do exist.214 
Information technologies are provided to the population through a quite a large 
number of operators by the regional standard. The Congolese office of post and 
telecommunications (OCPT), the state-owned and only legitimate telecommunications 
operator, theoretically has had a monopoly on the sector under 1970 legislation, and is the 
sole provider of landline telecommunication services. But it has been unable to provide a 
modern telecom network and unsuccessful in finding major investors for privatization. 
Due to a virtually nonexistent network of fixed phones, the DRC has turned to mobile 
technologies, to the extent of becoming the country with highest ratio of mobile versus 
fixed phone users in the world. And though the DRC has accommodated and experiment 
with the GSM system since 1987, it still needs more investments in the sector to expand 
coverage and usage.215 Given the shortage of traditional fixed lines and recognizing the 
need for telecommunications infrastructure, the government is only loosely regulating the 
sector, thus leaving it to private operators to introduce high levels of ICT access through 
wireless technologies. By 2001, some 16 private operators had been granted mobile 
telephony licenses and the subscriber base was growing at triple-digit rates per year. The 
major mobile operators in the country are Zain Congo DRC (Bharti Airtel Limited), 
Vodacom Congo (Vodacom Group (Pty) Ltd), Congo Chine Télécoms (CCT), Tigo DRC 
                                                 
214 “RD Congo: Africell, sixième opérateur de télécommunications, sur les rails,” TIC & Telecom, June 
21, 2012, accessed June 27, 2012, http://www.agenceecofin.com/mobile/2106-5430-rd-congo-africell-
sixieme-operateur-de-telecommunications-sur-les-rails. 
215 “Research and Markets: Democratic Republic of Congo - Telecoms, Mobile and Broadband – 
2011,” March 21, 2011, accessed June 27, 2012, http://www.fiercewireless.com/press-releases/research-
and-markets-democratic-republic-congo-telecoms-mobile-and-broadban. 
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(Millicom International Cellular S.A.), Standard Telecom Democratic Republic of Congo 
(Megapass), and Supercell, competing for a total estimated 10 million subscribers.216  
Internet services are provided to the population by seventy-five217 operators using 
principally dial-up and wireless local-loop technologies for distribution, essentially 
WiMAX technology—but prices are still high due to the fact that DRC is still reliant on 
costly satellite VSAT connectivity for international Internet access.  
With support from China, OCPT has started a national optical-fiber backbone 
rollout of 11,000 Km (estimated) and rehabilitation of fixed-line networks that will 
ultimately also provide access to fiber-optic submarine cables for low-cost, high-quality 
international bandwidth. Access to international fiber bandwidth is expected in July 
2012.218 Along with the West African Submarine Cable System (WACS), there is a 
project to interconnect the DRC to the neighboring capitals of the subregions (the Congo, 
the CAR, and Gabon) through the CAB to help diversify sources of access to the Internet. 
Continuing in the same perspective of diversification of access, the DRC is a member of 
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The Democratic Republic of the Congo is the only country within the Economic 
Community of Central African States to possess an Internet Exchange Point (IXP). The 
project, which has been led since 2002 by a group of private internet services providers, 
had the objective of reducing the cost of Internet traffic in the country. From what one 
can find, this IXP project remains a private enterprise between a group of business 
operators, rather than a nationwide project to bridge the digital gap. It is unfortunate that 
there is not much data on value added by the existence of this infrastructure. 
The country is endowed with the largest economically exploitable hydropower 
resources in Africa, giving it the potential to meet its own energy demands and become 
the continent’s largest power exporter. Inland waterways can provide low-cost surface 
transport, with only relatively modest investments needed to improve navigability. 
Unfortunately, years of sociopolitical crisis in the DRC have seriously damaged the 
power infrastructure. Only a tiny fraction of the DRC’s hydropower potential is 
developed, and much of that has fallen into disrepair. Only 2,400 MW of the 100,000 
MW potential has actually been developed as installed capacity, and only 1,000 MW of 
this capacity is actually in functioning order. Backup generators account for half of total 
installed capacity. Furthermore, high international oil prices have put enormous pressure 
on the country, especially the region dependent on diesel and heavy fuel oil for power 
generation. The only part of the country’s power system that is interconnected is the 
high-voltage transmission line running from the Inga site in Bas Congo to Katanga and 
on to Zambia.  
As a result, the power supply is heavily constrained and subject to blackouts, 
placing major limitations on private activity. According to an AICD report, about 40 
percent of firms in the DRC own and operate their own backup generator to shield 
themselves from frequent power interruptions, which cause significant production losses. 
This is one of the higher percentages of generator ownership in Africa. The Platt’s 
power-generation database indicates that almost half of the installed generation capacity 
in the DRC is owned and operated by private companies for the purpose of self supply. 
Timber mills in the Kinshasa area spend up to 63 cents per kWh to run diesel-powered 
backup generators when needed. In the Katanga region, mining companies depend 
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primarily on power from the Inga hydro plant, but due to dilapidated infrastructure, 
supplies are highly unreliable, with 19 interruptions reported on average per month. 
Overall, the Katanga region is estimated to have a power supply deficit of 900 MW. Due 
to these deficiencies, mining companies have developed their own local hydroelectric 
schemes at a cost of around 10 cents per kWh. Millicom International Cellular SA 
reported in 2007 that 75 percent of their sites were powered by diesel-powered generators 
that they source, install, maintain, and refuel, which increases their cost of operations and 
affects profitability.220 Furthermore, the weak financial performance of the power utility, 
Société Nationale d’Electricité (SNEL), has led to a hemorrhage of resources in the 
sector. According to the AICD country report on DRC, “the SNEL displays very high 
levels of inefficiency, compared with other African power utilities, though its 
performance is typical for fragile states.”221 One of the DRC’s most urgent infrastructure 
challenges is to increase the generation of power and deliver it in a more cost-effective 
manner. The same report concludes that in order to meet domestic demand, DRC power 
capacity must be increased by 35 percent by 2015. Providing reliable public supplies 
could reduce the price of power to the urban private sector from 23 cents to 4 cents per 
kilowatt-hour. 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo has no ICT industrial facilities; all the 
ICT equipments are imported, including access equipment (radio and television sets, 
computers, telephones) as well as routine maintenance equipment. Thus, the country is 
totally dependent on imports, as far as the acquisition of equipment and software for ICT 
development are concerned. However, there are some companies that provide industrial 
services such as the construction and exploitation of mobile-telecommunication 
towers.222 
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B. INFORMATION SYSTEMS, BUSINESS, AND INDUSTRIES 
Apart from proprietary systems for telecommunication infrastructures, the bold 
majority of OSs in use in the DRC are Windows based. The services offered in DRC 
cyberspace are exclusively web hosting, communications (VOIP, SMS, e-mail), and web 
navigation.  
The country has been often associated with risks such as unstable political 
environments, unpredictable economic performance, and lack of financing and skilled 
staff. In recent years, there has been political determination to address these perceptions. 
And as a result, the government nourishes the hope that companies like Cisco, Motorola, 
Alcatel Lucent, ZTE, Nokia, and others will open offices in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo. 
In DRC, the banking system is reputed to be very poor; around 20,000 active bank 
accounts were available in 2005. This situation has opened the way to mobile banking. 
Companies like South African CELPAY provide a comprehensive mobile banking 
service between users, including the ability to make payments in real time using GSM 
airtime recharge.223  
Software engineering companies and IT engineering providers (networks and 
applications), though they exist, are very few in the DRC and are organized in the form of 
small and medium enterprises (SME). Among the notable are BSCERCTOOL, 
BERISASOFT, CGLM, and GROUJIC (an association of young software engineers with 
the aim of creating a business startup). In the rural areas, these SMEs work with NGOs to 
offer some IT services that fit the needs of the population for their daily task.  
In the public sector, the DRC is ranked 174/190 on the index of electronic 
government by the United Nation.224 Currently, several projects for implementation of 
networks and computerization are introduced by diverse government administrations, but 
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with a lack of coordination, each of them is realized independently. The construction of a 
governmental intranet in optical fiber with the cooperation of the Korean government is 
underway. In 2008, four institutions were connected to the office of the presidency: the 
prime minister’s office, the ministry of public service, the ministry of foreign affairs, and 
the ministry of international cooperation. In 2009, six other ministries joined the network: 
the ministries of plans, finances, budget, justice, infrastructures, public works and 
reconstruction, and posts, telephones, and telecommunications. The connection of the rest 
of the government was scheduled by 2010. However, most government services are still 
paper-based in DRC. The government agency that oversees government construction 
projects still uses almost exclusively drawing papers and brushes to design projects. 
Record keeping is a challenge in almost every sector. 
C. LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND ORGANIZATION 
1. Strategies and Policies 
In a speech giving by the Congolese minister of telecommunications in 2007 at 
the ITU conference, the DRC government made it clear that it has “made a conscious 
effort and commitment to give key stakeholders, the people, public, and private sectors 
the opportunity as a government to contribute with their ideas and hence share in the 
creation of Congo’s telecommunications and digital future.”225  He continued by saying, 
“We support, and will continue to support, all ICT companies planning to do business in 
the DRC market.” Although there is a clearly expressed will to develop the ICT sector in 
the DRC, the legislative framework remain very poor.  
In 2004, the DRC teamed up with the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Africa (UNECA) to develop a national information and communication infrastructure 
(NICI) plan. But due to political unrest in the country, the process was stalled for several 
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ict/item/3212-ict-in-the-democratic-republic-of-congo. 
 127
years.226  With the normalization of the political arena since 2007, the NICI process has 
restarted; and so far, the plan has achieved significant results in terms of e-government 
and national backbone infrastructure. However, a lot still have to be done, especially on 
the legal framework.  
The more comprehensive initiative is the collaboration between government, civil 
society, media, and private sectors for an innovative approach and a multi-stakeholder 
alliance on ICT for development policy. This is known as the multi sector ICT dynamic 
(DMTIC), with the objective of democratizing access to ICTs in the DRC and 
transforming them into a real tool of empowerment and social development. The DMTIC 
was formed as a non-profit-making organization after a multi-stakeholder roundtable 
organized in January 2005 in Kinshasa.  
2.  Laws, Regulations, and Organization 
The legal and regulatory framework for the telecommunications sector remains 
rudimentary. The legal framework governing the sector was enacted in 2002. It defines a 
model of markets where a public operator develops a network of infrastructures, 
supplying to the other operators (private/public) the interconnection and capacities of 
national and international transmission. Unfortunately, the implementation of this legal 
framework collides with the absence of certain texts ruling the operational deployment, 
texts which are still in a state of project, particularly the texts defining the management 
and control of the electromagnetic spectrum.  
Four institutions are responsible for ICT management in the DRC: the ministries 
of posts and telecommunications and of press and information; the high authority on 
media (HAM), and the posts and telecommunications regulatory authority (ARPTC). 
They have often been in conflict or tangled in power struggles because legislation does 
not clearly express their respective responsibilities.227  ICTs are under the mandate of the 
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ministry of posts and telecommunications. The Congolese office of posts and 
telecommunications (OCPT) also falls under the authority of the ministry. However, the 
regulating agency, the ARPTC, falls under the authority of the president. The ministry of 
press and information is responsible for services and institutions relating to the 
audiovisual sector. Under its jurisdiction is the public media regulator, HAM, which was 
created as an institution to strengthen democracy for the duration of the transitional 
government. It will be replaced by an audiovisual and communications high council 
(CSAC), as stated in Article 212 of the Congolese constitution. 
There is no evidence of a legal framework to address cybersecurity issues or 
crimes in cyberspace. Neither are legal aspects of e-commerce has yet been developed. 
D. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN THE SOCIETY AND CULTURE 
1. Education 
In most elementary schools, secondary schools, and colleges across the country, 
education is not supported by ICT systems, except in very few private and public 
institutions. Where ICT exists, it is marred by several challenges, including lack of stable 
electricity and adequate facilities, unavailability of qualified educators, problems in 
retention of qualified educators, especially in rural areas, and lack of security for schools 
and equipment, and more.  
Due to the sociopolitical context of the last three decades, different governments 
of the DRC have been spending less money throughout the years on education. The 
educational system is essentially funded by parents. The rate of schooling is 52% and the 
general illiteracy rate in 2011 was very high at 32.7%, and even greater among women, at 
45.9%. Primary schooling has diminished, due to the isolation of the region, the limited 
revenue of parents to pay school fees, the lack of infrastructure and school materials, and 
the poor quality of instruction. The duration of compulsory education is six years for 
children between six and 12 years of age. Although children are expected to spend three 
years in pre-school, this rarely happens, except in some urban zones. Primary school is 
divided into three cycles of two years per cycle. Secondary education consists of one long 
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cycle and a short cycle. The long cycle has a general, a standard, and a technical field. 
The short cycle concerns professional education and consists of four years of training, 
beginning immediately after primary education, or three years of training after the 
common studies in secondary school.  
There are also engineering schools that offer training in craftwork for three to four 
years. Higher education is composed of a first cycle of three years and a second of two to 
three years, depending on the field of study. Three types of higher education are  
organized in the Democratic Republic of Congo: university education, advanced teacher 
training, and advanced technical training. The third cycle offers the degree of advanced 
studies (DES) and the doctorate. 
The DRC’s education system is out of date and doesn’t meet people’s needs. 
Based on the Belgium system since independence in 1960s, its contents are unreformed. 
Actually, the economic structure has completely changed: more than 70% of the 
economy is informal. Since there is a lack of formal jobs, university graduates are 
unemployed or underemployed in the informal sector, so that there is a misallocation of 
resources inside the economy.228 
A national policy on ICT use in education was launched in 2004, within which 
two main priorities were identified: the Internet network and electronic governance. 
These priorities are reflected in action at the university, basic education, and community 
levels. 
At the university level, the following initiatives were taken: 
The Virtual Francophone Campus works to unite higher-education institutions 
through the organization of distance-training sessions and the facilitation of research in 
the fields of science and technology. 
Education For Change (EFC) consultants have been engaged by Vlaamse 
Interuniversitaire Road University Development Cooperation (VLIR-UOS) and Conseil 
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Interuniversitaire de la Communauté française de Belgique–Commission Universitaire 
pour le développement (CIUF-CUD) in Belgium to identify needs and opportunities to 
strengthen ICT capacity in the DRC through a transversal program involving seven 
universities. This will draw on lessons from the experience and results of existing and  
ongoing work at the universities of Kinshasa (UNIKIN) and Lubumbashi (UNILU). The 
work also seeks to facilitate networking among a variety of teaching and research 
programs.229 
The University of Kinshasa and a group of dedicated teachers enacted a program 
to interconnect all Congolese universities. Using an optical-fiber backbone, their project 
now serves 10 UNIKIN establishments. It aims to prevent the continued departure of 
university specialists and meet the growing demand for distance-training programs. The 
project was made possible by a grant from Belgium.  
The linking of the universities of Kinshasa and Lubumbashi to reliable VSAT 
connections through a VLIR-funded (Free University of Brussels/Belgium) project has 
opened the doors to new research opportunities for both universities. However, the cost 
of such a link remains expensive—Kinshasa and Lubumbashi are separated by a distance 
of approximately 1,600 kilometers. Contacts have been made recently with the African 
Virtual University (AVU) to find ways of decreasing costs. 
The Polytechnic faculty serves as the regional platform for the Cisco Academy 
and provides hosting for students from Congo Brazzaville, the DRC, and other 
surrounding countries. 
In terms of major initiatives to welcome more people into the Information Age, 
ICT training seems particularly dynamic. For example, some primary schools are making 
an effort to orient their students towards computer technology at an early age. There are 
several private training centers in the capital that offer short courses on network 
management and developing web servers and online databases. In this model, there is a 
real market in technology training to meet a high demand.  
                                                 
229 “ICT programme in and for universities in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),” Education 
For Change, March 2, 2007, accessed June 30, 2012, http://www.efc.co.uk/news/article.jsp?id=15. 
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The Virtual African University (UVA) and the Francophone Academic Agency 
(AUF) have set up the Virtual Francophone University (UVF).230 This allows its users to 
share academic resources formulated in French using a network established by the 
partnership. 
As of early 2005, the African Centre of Cultural Exchange (CAFEC) worked in 
close collaboration with some Congolese organizations (ASSIC, JUSDATA, etc.) to set 
up a Congolese action for the popularization of ICT. This has won the support of 
Alternatives, a Canadian NGO settled in the DRC. CAFEC also managed to create the 
National Network of Congolese NGOs for the Promotion of ICT (REPRONTIC), which 
currently involves 23 Congolese NGOs and is a source of much interest from 
PNUD/DRC.231 
As a key instrument in the French cooperation policy for digital gap reduction, 
ADEN has implemented digital inclusion programs in 11 sub-Saharan French, English, 
and Portuguese-speaking countries. Provided with a substantive budget, it has three 
goals: democratizing access to ICT; training local populations; and supporting Internet 
uses, contents, and applications for development. Multiple centers have been founded in 
the country.232 These centers are resources for the masses eager to access the Internet, but 
constant problems are experienced, such as poor electrical-power provision, low 
attendance due to the population base’s being away from the centers, and faulty computer 
materials and accessories. 
The International Education and Resource Network (iEARN), a nonprofit 
organization empowering teachers and young people to use the Internet to work together 
online on collaborative projects, is based in Kinshasa-Limete in the Democratic Republic 
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232 “ADEN project: Appui au désenclavement numérique,” accessed June 30, 2012,  http://euroafrica-
ict.org.sigma-orionis.com/downloads/Awareness_Workshops/Nigeria/Alexandre_Foulon.pdf, 2. 
 132
of the Congo.233 Despite the lack of Internet access in the country, students and teachers 
can benefit from the iEARN network, which enables them to learn how to use computers. 
Although ICT education in the public schools still seems to be in its infancy in the 
DRC, the recently published Development Strategy for Primary, Secondary and 
Professional Education (2010/11 – 2015/16) recognizes the need to use ICT to contribute 
to capacity building and increase teachers’ capabilities.234 The curriculum for computer 
education in secondary schools envisions that every student should be able to use the 
Internet for web browsing and e-mailing by the end of the second year, and aims to teach 
students how to implement available security measures such as password protection and 
antivirus software to protect their computer.235 
2. Social Status 
The 2011 UNDP Human Development Report ranks DRC at the bottom of its 
human-development index (187th out of 187 countries). Despite recent progress, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo still suffers from inadequate incomes, limited 
schooling opportunities, and life expectancies far below world averages, due in great part 
to deaths from preventable and treatable diseases such as malaria and AIDS. These 
problems are compounded by the destructive legacy of armed conflict. In the DRC, more 
than three million people died from warfare and conflict-linked illness in recent years, 
prompting the largest peacekeeping operation in UN history.236 
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Gross domestic product (GDP) growth slowed in 2011 in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo to 6.5% as a result of global inflationary trends and a highly charged 
political atmosphere inside the country, and is expected to fall to 5.1% in 2012 before 
picking up again to 6% in 2013. The country faces a major challenge in youth 
employment. More than 70% of those aged 15 to 24 have no jobs, with urban areas 
particularly affected. The DRC does not have a real policy to put young people to work. 
The shortage of jobs helps increase the size of the informal sector and the weakness of 
supportive structures leads many young people into a life of crime. 
3. Access and Acceptance of Technology 
The penetration of ICT is small. For example, the proportion of households 
having a computer was, in 2007, 0.3% (against 10.1 in Cameroon, 5.0 in Congo 
Brazzaville, and 4.3 in the Gabon) and households having access to the Internet of 0.2% 
(against respectively 5.2, 1.4, and 3.6 in the countries above).  
For now, wireless technology seems to provide the best hope to bridge the digital 
divide. This has been demonstrated by the imaginative use of GSM phones. The 
development of services such as mobile broadband and WiMAX offers scalable solutions 
for real access to low-income communities and developed communities in sparsely 
settled areas.  
Thanks to the economies of scale generated by the vast global market, the cost of 
buying and using a mobile phone is falling steadily and mobile penetration is rising 
rapidly in the country. There is, nevertheless, still much to do to improve the affordability 
of telecommunications. Some of the Congolese regard mobile phones and broadband 
Internet as luxuries rather than essential communication tools. In large cities, the 
Congolese have access to the Internet in cybercafés, mainly to read and send e-mails. 
More and more young people go to cafes to use social networks, but the very slow 
connection speed generally prevents video playback.  
Currently, there are 807,560 Facebook users in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, which makes it number 87 over 213 in the ranking of all Facebook statistics by 
country. Facebook penetration in the DRC is 1.14% of the country's population, and 
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221.25% in relation to number of Internet users. This number, though already low with 
regard to the size of the population, has been decreasing during the past six months, 
showing a lack of interest in social media by the population. The largest age group of 
social network users is currently 18–24, with a total of 298,797 users, followed those 
aged 25–34.237 The Twitter database does not show any activity coming from the DRC, 
although there are some Twitters accounts captioning topics on the DRC, those accounts 
are usually operated by people outside the DRC, either for political activism or 
commercial purposes.238  
Internet happenings in the DRC are hard to come by. For one, few independent 
news sources exist in the region. Those who do exist often cover human rights or politics. 
However, a few bloggers from the DRC keep the world informed of ICT developments in 
Kinshasa. Various NGOs and aid organizations provide disaster news. 
4. Information Technology Dependency 
The level of corporate use of ICTs is very low. As such, the most commonly 
encountered uses of ICTs are related to specific domains such as management 
(administrative and finance) and production duties. The use of the applications depends 
entirely on the duties of the enterprise. Enterprises with Internet connectivity, though 
rare, quite often are involved with e-transactions, like mailing and online research 
activities. Overall, there is no indication of dependency on technology at all in the DRC 
society. ICTs are still considered a luxury rather than a daily tool for life. 
E. CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES 
Regarding the cybersecurity picture in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as 
always, nothing serious has been said or exists on that domain. At the level of 
development of ICT in the country, cybersecurity issues are not considered a problem. 
The problem of developing access and utilization of technologies outweighs security 
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issues. In the absence of a clearly define legal framework for ICT, it is premature to look 
for specific laws or regulations regarding cyber crimes in particular. Allegedly, as part of 
a global effort tied to the e-government endeavor, the country is preparing a set of laws 
that will set the basis of all cyber activities.  
Overall, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, cybercrime activities are either 
rare or not documented, leading to a void of reliable information.  
The website ProjectHoneyPot.org which conducts surveys of malicious activities 
online based on honey-pot servers, generated the results presented in Table 8. These 
results show a very low amount of malicious activity from IP addresses within the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo’s allocated range of IP addresses.239 The little activity 
registered revolve essentially revolving around spamming. 
Table 8.   Honey Pot Results for the Democratic Republic of the Congo240  
N° Type of Attack Period of activity of the 50 
most recent IP 
Total number of 
attempts registered 
1 Harvester IP   –June 2012 1 
2 Spam Server IP December 2005 –June 2012 56 212 
3 Bad Web host IP –June 2012 0 
4 Comment Spammer IP –June 2012 6 142 
5 Dictionary Attacker IP December 2005 –June 2012 56 212 
6 Rule Breaker IP – June 2012 0 
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240 “Democratic Republic of the Congo: Directory of Spam Server Ips,” Honey Pot Project, accessed 
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F. CONCLUSION 
In spite of its limited development at present, the prospects are promising with 
regard to the intentions of investment announced by big operators of telephony and the 
final connection of the country to the optical fiber.241 
 
                                                 
241 “International bandwidth finally on the horizon for DR Congo,” OAfrica, July 11, 2012, accessed 
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APPENDIX E.  
THE REPUBLIC OF EQUATORIAL GUINEA 
The Republic of Equatorial Guinea is a country located in central West Africa 
bordering the Bight of Biafra between Cameroon and Gabon; it shares maritime borders 
with Nigeria and São Tomé and Príncipe. With an area of 28,000 km2, it is one of the 
smallest United Nations members from continental Africa, having a population estimated 
at half a million, of which 67% live in rural areas. It comprises two parts: a continental 
region (Río Muni), including several small offshore islands like Corisco, Elobey Grande 
and Elobey Chico, and an insular region, containing Annobón island and Bioko island, 
where the capital Malabo is situated. It is one of the few territories in mainland Africa 
where Spanish is an official language, besides the Spanish exclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. 
The discovery of sizeable deposits of oil and gas in the 1990s has altered the 
economic and political status of the country. Equatorial Guinea was suddenly 
transformed into one of Africa’s fastest growing economies and one of the main 
destinations of foreign investment on the continent. In 2007, Equatorial Guinea’s GDP 
was 60 times larger than in 1995. In 2007, oil and gas accounted for an estimated 91% of 
GDP, 91% of government revenue, and 99% of exports. Increasing oil production has 
allowed the government to follow an expansionary fiscal policy: public spending 
increased by an estimated average of 44% per year since 2003. Though its soil is oil and 
mineral rich, Equatorial Guinea is classified at 136 over 187 on the UNDP Human 
Development Index of 2011,242 showing that the oil revenues have not yet been 
distributed in all levels of society. 
In 2006, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) evaluated the 
country’s digital opportunity index (DOI) to 0.27 in a scale of 0 to 1, for a rank of 
131/181.243  However, the country is engaged in the process of developing ICT access 
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nationwide. The following indicators show the status of these efforts: the penetration rate 
of telephony services is estimate to be 72% of the population, with a landline teledensity 
of 2% and mobile teledensity of 70% in 2009. The Internet penetration rate is estimate to 
be around 3% of the population.244 
Table 9.   Socioeconomic Indicators: Equatorial Guinea245 
N° Indicator  Value 
1-  Area 28,051 sq km 
2-  GDP  $26.11 billion (2011 est.) 
3-  Official languages  Spanish (official) 67.6%, French 
(official)  and others 32.4%  
4-  Total population  685,991 (July 2011 est.) 
5-  Population rate between 0-14 years  41.5% (male 140,946/female 
136,294) 
6-  Population rate between  15-64 years 54.4% (male 179,141/female 
184,358) 
7-  Life expectancy  62.75 years 
8-  Urbanized population  40% of total population (2010) 
9-  Average annual growth rate of urban 
population  
3.1% annual rate of change (2010-15 
est.) 
10- Per capita gross national income (US 
dollars) GNI  
$ 37,990246 
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Its small size and the recently discovered oil reserves have given to the country 
tremendous advantages and opportunities to rapidly overcome the digital gap. Thus, 
telecommunications have improved dramatically in recent years. The Guinea Ecuatorial 
Comunicaciones Sociedad Anonima (GECOMSA), a joint venture between the state 
(51% of the stakes) and the China (which owns a 49% stake), provides telephone service 
in the major cities through an efficient, digital, fixed network and good mobile 
coverage.248 Although less than 2% of the population has a fixed-line connection, mobile 
telecoms grew at an average rate of 80% since year 2000, and by 2007 almost one half of 
the population was using mobile phones. This rapid growth has caused periodic 
disruptions to services, as the telecoms infrastructure has not expanded at the same speed. 
As a result, the government decided to increase competition in the sector and awarded a 
second mobile-phone license to Saudi Arabia’s HIST Telecom in 2008.249  
Satellites solutions remain and are commonly used for ICT access in remote 
areas. Meanwhile, urban communications are dominated by technologies like ADSL, 
GSM, 3G, WIFI, and WIMAX. 
Internet access remains limited, although Internet cafés have spread to all major 
urban centers. Internet Services are provided to the population by nearly 14250 operators, 
using various technologies from dial-up to VSAT via wireless local-loop systems.  
Equatorial Guinea's ministry of transport, technology, posts, and 
telecommunications is working to deploy advanced telecommunications services, 
including phone and Internet, throughout the entire country as part of the goals set forth 
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by the government in the Horizon 2020 plan.251 Various projects are already underway, 
including the deployment of a fiber-optic submarine cable between the mainland and 
island region, as well as the development of a backbone network for the entire nation. In 
addition to the fiber-optic cable project, Equatorial Guinea is participating in a project 
supported by France Telecom and 14 African operators known as ACE (African Coast to 
Europe), which will extend another fiber-optic cable starting in France to link Europe to 
Africa. The project, promoted by France Telecom Orange, will feature a 17,000 km cable 
and is expected to be operational as early as 2012. It will connect more than 23 
countries.252 Additionally, with the countries of the Central African region, Equatorial 
Guinea is schedule to be connected to the CAB during the second phase of the project, 
which aims to interconnect all the capitals of the subregion.253 Equatorial Guinea is also a 
member of the African telecommunications-satellite initiative, RASCOM, scheduled to 
reduce the cost of international communication and data transmission. 
Equatorial Guinea does not possesses, or plan to possesses, an Internet Exchange 
Point (IXP), but as a member of the CAB project, the IXP that is planned for Phase II of 
the project will be share by the three countries in the alliance.254  
Equatorial Guinea is estimated to have 2,600 MW of hydropower potential. But 
the estimation of its power-generating capacity varies, with 15.4 megawatts (MW) of 
certain installed capacity and 5-30 MW of estimated additional capacity. Generating 
capacity is made up of thermal generation (80%) and hydroelectric generation (20%). 
About 5.0 MW are located on the mainland, including 4 MW of oil-fired thermal capacity 
                                                 
251 “Equatorial Guinea Connects to the Future With New Telecommunications Projects,” PRNewswire-
USNewswire, July 30, 2010, accessed July 12,2012, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/equatorial-
guinea-connects-to-the-future-with-new-telecommunications-projects-99628819.html. 
252 “Equatorial Guinea Minister discusses telecommunications advances,” EquatorialGuineaNews, Jul 
29, 2010, accessed July 12, 2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zTutYbgoWR0&lr=1&uid=w-
fAmKLbw6kNshkn2_iTcg. 
253 “Cable: Cameroon will interconnect the 10 regional capitals in less than one year (General Paper),” 
Emploi Service, August 10, 2012, accessed July 12, 2012, 
http://www.emploiservice.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=254&lang=en&limitstart
=20. 
254 “Central African Backbone Project - APL1A in Chad: Harmonization and Modernization of the 
Legal and Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications,” World Bank – WB DEVEX, July 28, 




and 1 MW of hydroelectric capacity. Bioko Island receives electricity from two thermal 
plants and one hydroelectric plant. The expansion of natural- gas production at the Alba 
field in recent years has provided a convenient fuel source for new power generation in 
the country. The 10.4MW, natural gas-fired Punta Europa plant began operation in 1999, 
supplying gas-fired electricity to Bioko Island. Another 4-6 MW of generation capacity is 
currently under construction at the AMPCO complex on the island.  
Equatorial Guinea's electricity sector is owned and operated by the state-run 
monopoly, SEGESA. Like other countries in the region, the power supply is unreliable, 
due to aging equipment and poor management, as demonstrated by regular blackouts in 
Malabo. As a result, small diesel generators are widely used as a backup power supply. 
Nevertheless, some improvements can be expected as the government contemplates the 
liberalization of energy sector. 
Equatorial Guinea has no ICT industrial facilities. All equipment is imported, 
from access equipment (radio and television sets, computers, telephones) to routine-
maintenance equipment. 
B. INFORMATION SYSTEMS, BUSINESS, AND INDUSTRIES 
The ICT infrastructure in Equatorial Guinea operates in standard and basic way. 
As usual, industrial infrastructures use proprietary OSs and their types are likely tied to 
the companies’ internal policies. But at the level of the end user, the most commonly 
used systems are Microsoft Windows based. There is not much sign of the use of Open 
Source OS.   
The services offered in cyberspace revolve around web hosting, communications 
(VOIP, SMS, e-mail), and web navigation. Electronic commerce is yet to be introduced. 
Some few small and medium enterprises (SME) marketing ICT products and services 
exist and are based mainly in Malabo and Bata, the two major cities. Most of them are 
local branches of foreign firms or have concluded local-representation agreements with 
such firms (for software and networking solutions and IT security).  
 142
In the public sector, Equatorial Guinea is ranked 151/190 (thus regressing 13 
steps since 2010) on the index of electronic government by the United Nation in his 2012 
survey,255 showing a slowdown in the effort done to use information technology in the 
government. There is no evidence of interconnection project between different entities of 
the government or the development of information systems in order to ease the quality of 
services in the public administration. 
Overall, the ICT activity in this country is closely tied to the oil industry, and the 
initiatives are private to these companies for the purpose of their operations with the 
external world. 
C. LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND ORGANIZATION 
1. Strategies and Policies 
The country is not officially known to possess a NICI plan, but information exists 
about the preparation of such a plan. Although a strategic plan for ICT does not exist, the 
government of Equatorial Guinea has made clear its ambitions to develop and promote 
ICT in the country. In his development strategy for horizon 2020, the ICT sector is 
clearly cited as a priority.256  
2. Laws, Regulations, and Organization 
The legal and regulatory framework for the telecommunications sector in 
Equatorial Guinea is still rudimentary. In November 2005, the first telecommunications 
act, Act No. 7/2005 (the General Telecommunications Act) was promulgated, opening up 
the telecommunications market in the Republic of Equatorial Guinea and putting an end 
to the monopoly that had previously governed the sector. This telecommunication act 
allowed the creation and the implementation of a ministry of transport, technology, posts 
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and telecommunications, and a regulatory agency for telecommunications (ORTEL). This 
later entity was charged with the responsibility of legislating and regulating the sector 
with views towards effective establishment of competition and consistency in the 
telecommunications market.257 
Equatorial Guinea is member of several international organizations, one of which 
is the ITU. At the regional level, it is active in the work of the Economic Community of 
Central African States (ECCAS) in the area of telecommunications and has participated 
in the region's efforts to harmonize the legal framework for telecommunications.258  
Overall, the legal framework of ICT in Equatorial Guinea is characterized by the 
existence of numerous gaps in the telecommunications act. Indeed, the Equatoguinean 
Act ignores numerous activities that have developed in the ICT sector worldwide. The 
concept of new information technologies and communication and the Internet does not 
appear in the act on telecommunications. Also, legislation is silent on the repression of 
breaches committed by means of information technologies and communication. 
D. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN THE SOCIETY AND CULTURE 
1. Education 
At independence, Equatorial Guinea inherited a relatively good educational 
system from the Spanish, but it deteriorated quickly by years of mismanagement. In the 
1980s educational enrollment improved again, and the net enrollment rate has been close 
to 90% since the beginning of the 1990s. Although the country’s 87% overall literacy rate 
is significantly above the 63% average for sub-Saharan Africa, major gender inequalities 
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persist. Human resources and skills are not well developed, partly because the share of 
budget resources devoted to the education sector continues to be very small. 259, 260 
In the absence of a national strategy for ICT development, it is logical that 
Equatorial Guinea remain vague on its educational policy toward new technologies. As 
the research seems to confirm, there is not much being said on developing ICT training 
capabilities. At the discharge of the country, the Law of Education, Section 6, Article 46, 
opened a windows for distance training, stating that “Distance education is one of the 
educational tools that makes it possible to pursue and/or continue educational studies in 
any circumstance.” But this provision remains to be fully developed. 
However, the needs for skills in ICT have pushed forward some private and NGO 
initiatives for training and education. Among the initiatives worth noting are:  
- The Prepaly initiative, enacted on a platform called “Prépaly” (interactive 
multimedia training for PREParing high school students (LYcéens) in advanced scientific 
and technological studies), with the aim to respond to the needs of young people in terms 
of information in science and technology; give them basic training in computers and 
multimedia that will be their key to a successful academic career and help prepare them 
for the world outside of school; reinforce the ties between secondary and higher schools 
in the north with those in the south and reinforce the ties between schools and academic 
institutions in different areas of the south; and finally, facilitate the creation of 
multimedia content for teaching in francophone Africa. This plan is clearly based on the 
organization, production, and diffusion of knowledge and knowhow from higher 
education towards secondary education, through ICT in education.261 
- The French Cooperation supports the National University of Equatorial Guinea 
(UNGE) in their approaches by using ICT to develop centers for teaching and accessing 
                                                 
259 Hamet Aguemon and Yann Pambou, “Equatorial Guinea : Country Profile,” accessed July 13, 2012, 
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digital teaching resources. The Malabo Center and the Bata Center, which opened in 
2002 and 2005, respectively, run computer labs connected to high-speed Internet.262  
- The RESAFAD-ICTE initiative, funded by the Cultural Cooperation and Action 
Service (SCAC), has been operating in Equatorial Guinea since July 2002. The initiative 
has created some multimedia centers that host several servers, training rooms equipped 
with workstations, and a room to produce educational resources. The center functions 
through a network, with branches located in the country linked with centers in other 
countries. Resafad-ICTE is reported to possess multimedia centers hosted by the National 
University of Equatorial Guinea.263 
2. Social Status 
Ranked 136 over 187 on the UNDP human-development index of 2011,264 
Equatorial Guinea remains a country underdeveloped despite great oil resources. Since 
the discovery of oil and natural gas over a decade ago, Equatorial Guinea has become the 
richest country in sub-Saharan Africa (measured by GDP per capita). Despite this wealth, 
the majority remain extremely poor. With a population of just 633,000, oil and gas wealth 
has raised GDP per capita to over $26,000, making Equatorial Guinea one of the world’s 
high-income countries. Yet more than 60 percent of the population struggles to survive 
on less than U.S. $1 per day. One measure of this extreme poverty is the high rate of 
child mortality, which increased between 1990 and 2006. The proportion of children 
dying before age five now is higher than some of the poorest countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa. The vast wealth of Equatorial Guinea appears not to have benefited its people.265 
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3. Access and Acceptance of Technology 
Given the socioeconomic context and underdevelopment of the basic 
telecommunications networks, access to ICT is for now only possible in urban areas, 
where there are around 13,500 Internet subscribers, which represent about 2.1% of the 
population266 Cyber cafés remain the chief mode of access for the vast majority of 
Equatoguinean Internet users.  
Currently, there are 23,260 Facebook users in Equatorial Guinea, which makes it 
number 181 over 213 in the ranking of all Facebook statistics by country. Facebook 
penetration in this country is 3.57% of the population, and 161.53% in relation to number 
of Internet users. The total number of FB users in GNQ is growing; it has increased by 
5,080 in the last 6 months. This trend demonstrates a growing interest in social media by 
Internet users. The largest age group of social network users is currently 18–24 with total 
of 7,908 users, followed by the users aged 25–34.267 The Twitter database does not show 
any activity in Equatorial Guinea, although there are some Twitters accounts captioning 
topics on Equatorial Guinea, those accounts are usually operated by people outside the 
country, either for political activism or commercial purposes.268  
Overall, it is hard to penetrate the society of Equatorial Guinea, which is locked 
by multiple factors like language (being from a Spanish culture, there is not too much 
material available online in English or French), the political climate, and protectionist 
behavior in a country is not favorable to foreign involvement of any nature. But from all 
reports, the country remains far behind its part of the subregion in term of ICT access and 
use by the general population. 
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4. Information Technology Dependency 
As confirm by the low level of activity in social media and lack of useful 
information on potential information systems operating in the country, IT use in 
Equatorial Guinea is still in its infancy. Although the state is engaged in infrastructural 
programs for interconnection to undersea fiber-optics cables, the level of corporate use of 
ICTs is very low. The use of applications depends entirely on the duties of the enterprise 
and is essentially concentrate on oil-production matters. Overall, there is no indication of 
dependency on technology at all in Equatorial Guinea. 
E. CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES 
Regarding the cybersecurity picture in Equatorial Guinea, nothing serious has 
come to attention from that domain. Despite of its involvement in regional collaboration, 
authorities in Equatorial Guinea still have to adopt and develop a legal framework of 
cyberspace. The types of cybercrime activities known in Equatorial Guinea, though rare, 
are essentially spam related.  
The website ProjectHoneyPot.org, which conducts surveys of malicious activities 
online base on honey-pot servers has generate the results presented in Table 10. These 
results show the very low amount of malicious activities of coming from IP addresses 
within the Equatorial Guinea-allocated range of IP addresses.269 They essentially involve 
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Table 10.   Honey Pot Results for Equatorial Guinea270  
N° Type of Attack Period of activity of the 50 
most recent IP 
Total number of 
attempts registered 
1 Harvester IP   July 2012 0 
2 Spam Server IP Feb 2008 – July 2012 1 407 
3 Bad Web host IP July 2012 0 
4 Comment Spammer IP May 2008 - July 2012 10 
5 Dictionary Attacker IP Jan 2008 - July 2012 1 758 
6 Rule Breaker IP July 2012 0 
7 Search Engine IP July 2012 0 
 
F. CONCLUSION 
Oil has brought great wealth and growth to the Equatoguinean economy, but 
challenges remain. Real GDP has increased forty-fold since 1995, and large oil revenues 
have allowed the government to embark on an ambitious infrastructure-investment 
program while amassing foreign savings. Basic infrastructure is being developed as well 
as the telecommunications sector.271 One can only expect that all aspects of ICT will be 
addressed in the upcoming years. 
 
                                                 
270  “Equatorial Guinea: Directory of Spam Server Ips,” Honey Pot Project. 
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APPENDIX F.  
THE REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO  
Located in Central Africa, the Republic of the Congo is endowed with immense 
natural resources: oil reserves, rich forest, mineral resources, fauna, and hydrographic 
network. Since it independence in the sixties, the Republic of Congo has been plague by 
multiple civil war and political instability. In the early 2000, the country regained a 
relative stability and a new constitution was ratified in 2002 opening the path to 
democratization.  
The Congolese economy has grown significantly since 2008. Real GDP is 
estimated to have expanded by 8.8 percent in 2010, compared to 7.5 percent in 2009, 
based on continued high growth in the oil-sector as well as accelerated growth in the non-
oil sector. Economic growth was projected to 5.0 percent in 2011. In this context of 
general growth, Information Technologies did also follow the movement, leading the 
Congolese telecommunications systems to one of the most dynamic of the subregion. 
Though ICT has not yet penetrate every facets life in Congo, the government clearly 
shows that it is a focus and is committed to do so.  
In 2006, The Korea Agency for Digital Opportunity and Promotion (KADO) and 
the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) evaluate the country Digital 
Opportunity Index (DOI) to 0.17 in a scale of 0 to 1 for a rank of 152/181.272 






                                                 
272 “The Digital Opportunity Index (DOI)," World Information Society Report 2007,  Chapter Three, 
ITU-UNCTAD (2007), http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/doi/material/WISR07-chapter3.pdf, 38. 
 150
Technology has seen some improvement this last decade. Good progress has been 
made in developing mobile telephony market in recent years, with high levels of signal 
coverage. The cost of international connectivity which was initially high is expected to 
significantly drop with the country connection to the international submarine cable and 
the complete interconnection by a domestic fiber optic network. Conversely, the 
physically dilapidated and financially depleted condition of the fixed-line telephone 
operator is becoming a constraint to raising Internet penetration. 
Table 11.   Socioeconomic Indicators: Republic of Congo273  
N° Indicator  Value 
1. Area 342,000 square km 
2.  GDP  $18.48 billion (2011 est.) 
3.  Official language  French  
4.  Total population  4,366,266 (July 2012 est.) 
5.  Population rate between 0-14 years  45.6% (male 973,332/female 960,100)
6.  Population 15-64 years 51.7% (male 1,091,531/female 
1,101,057) 
7.  Life expectancy  55.27 years 
8.  Urbanised population  62% of total population (2010) 
9.  Average annual growth rate of urban 
population  
3% (2011 est.) 
10.  Per capita gross national income (US 
dollars) GNI  
1 379 
11.  Population below $1 a day  54.1% (2005) 
 
A. INFRASTRUCTURES 
Most of the telecommunications network, including the national microwave 
transmission backbone, was destroyed during the multiple civil wars, living only one 
telephone exchange at Pointe-Noire in an acceptable operational shape. Since then, 
Congo Telecommunications has undertaken a limited infrastructure rehabilitation 
program. The core of the network is essentially using wireless connections base on HF 
and VHF links.  
                                                 
273 “Africa: Republic of Congo,” The CIA World FactBook, June 25, 2012, accessed July 25, 2012, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cf.html. 
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The fixed line density in the Republic of Congo is low and declining. Coverage 
was 0.41 subscribers per 100 people in 2005. That figure dropped to 0.35 subscribers per 
100 people in 2007 from 0.24 in 2008. Moreover, the quality of the fixed line network is 
rapidly deteriorating, and it is becoming a constraint to expanding and improving ICT 
services. To overcome this deteriorating trend of landlines communication, mobile 
services have exploded. Due to a liberalization policy of the sector by the government, 
competition has increased in the Republic of Congo’s mobile market in recent years. As a 
result, about 70% of the country’s population is covered by a GSM signal.274 Mobile 
telephony penetration is relatively high (90%) compare to the neighboring countries and 
reaches 35 percent.  In 2003 there were 330,000 subscribers, and by the end of 2007, this 
had risen to an estimated 760,000 served by three key mobile operators: Zain Bharti 
Airtel, MTN Congo, and Warid Telecom. A fourth operator entered the market in 2010.  
Despite the competition observe in the mobile sector, fixed telephony remains in 
the hands of the public monopoly, Congo Telecom, the former “Société des 
Télécommunications du Congo, or SOTELCO.” Despite a desire to privatize this 
company, the financial instability of the company did not aloud that process to go 
through. Additionally, poor availability, high costs and slow speeds for installation of 
fixed line services have obstructed the market for Internet access in the Republic of 
Congo. At the end of 2009, there were only 15,000 Internet subscribers in the country, 
the bulk of which connected via GPRS (General Packet Radio Service) networks. ADSL 
(Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line) connections in May 2010 totaled just 121, of 
which only eleven had access to downlink speeds of 512kbps, the highest rate recorded at 
the time. The number of broadband subscribers was estimated to reach 124 in September 
2010.275 
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Internet Services are provided to the population by a total of ninety two276 
operators using principally dial-up and wireless local loops technologies for distribution, 
essentially WiMAX technology, but prices are still high and the Internet access very 
slow, due to the fact that Congo still rely on costly satellite connectivity for international 
Internet access. Although there is internal mobile competition, the cost of international 
connectivity is high in the Republic of Congo and is considered to be more expensive 
than in most of Africa.  
The Republic of Congo has committed to undertake several transformational ICT 
projects. First, the projet couverture nationale is intended to extend broadband access to 
remote areas and get closer to broadband universal access. Second, the country is on his 
way to connect to the West Africa fiber optic cable system through the Project West 
Africa System Cable (WACS). Indeed, the Republic of the Congo recently signed an 
agreement to connect to the submarine cable through the WACS Project, which is a 
planned submarine communications cable linking South Africa with the United Kingdom 
along the west coast of Africa.277 And finally, it is engage in a process of implementing 
an effective connectivity strategy, and a use of the connectivity to increase government 
efficiency as part of the World Bank financed Project CAB CITCG.278 Continuing in the 
same perspective of diversification of its broadband access means, Congo is member of 
the African satellite project RASCOM.279 The Republic of the Congo does not yet 
possess an Internet Exchange Point (IXP), but since May 2011 the country has made 
clear it intension to have one.  
The Republic of the Congo’s power sector is underdeveloped in terms of 
generation capacity, power consumption, access, and reliability. Though the country no 
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longer depends on imports from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the power supply 
is unreliable. Frequent outages have forced firms and households to accumulate a stock of 
self-generation capacity of 207 MW. The stock of self-generation capacity represents 
nearly 60% of the capacity of the national system. Access to electricity is very low in 
both urban and rural areas, but the situation is particularly dire in rural areas—rural 
access to electricity is only 16.74 percent. Despite the low quality of service, power 
tariffs remains very high although the country is energy system is predominantly 
hydroelectric. The national power utility, Société Nationale d'Electricité (SNE), is the 
main source of inefficiencies in the sector. Transmission and distribution losses are 47 
percent of power generated. The associated financial losses are equivalent to 37 percent 
of SNE’s revenue. This is likely due to lack of maintenance and rehabilitation of the 
existing distribution network and a permissive policy regarding illegal connections. The 
high rate of overstaffing also contributes to the low performance of the company. Finally, 
the utility only collects 88 percent of billings. These significant difficulties hamper 
SNE’s ability to recover costs and therefore limit investment in rehabilitation and system 
expansion.  
Only the south of the country has access to grid electricity from SNE, while the 
north has to rely on costly off-grid generation. As a result, the effective price of power is 
three times higher in the North. For example, all forest concessionaires in the north (and 
some in the south) are too remote to benefit from grid electricity and must rely on diesel 
powered own generation facilities for onsite timber processing.  
The government had ambitious plans to double access to electricity by 2011. 
Efforts are underway to upgrade generation and transmission capacity to reach this goal. 
The country currently has a generation capacity of around 361 MW: the hydroelectric 
plants in Moukoukoulou and Djoué provide 74 MW and 15 MW, respectively, the gas 
powered thermal plant in Brazzaville provides 32 MW, the newly commissioned gas 
fired plant at Pointe Noire with a capacity of 150 MW and the Imboulou hydroelectric 
power station currently produces 90 MW. The capacity of Imboulou hydroelectric dam 
located 215 km north of Brazzaville, being built by a Chinese company will be increased 
to 120 MW through the commissioning of the fourth unit later this year. The capacity of 
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the gas fired power plant in Pointe-Noire will be doubled to 300 MW in 2011. 
Transmission improvements are also planned. In particular, the transmission line from 
Pointe-Noire to Brazzaville will be rehabilitated and extended northward in the direction 
of Ouando (550 km from the capital).280 
The Republic of the Congo has no ICT industrial facilities; all ICT equipment is 
imported, including access equipment (radio and television sets, computers, telephones) 
as well as routine-maintenance equipment. The country is totally dependent on imports as 
far as the acquisition of equipment and software for ICT development are concerned. 
B. INFORMATION SYSTEMS, BUSINESS, AND INDUSTRIES 
As for most of the countries in the Africa, apart from proprietary systems used for 
telecommunication infrastructures, the vast majority of OSs in use in the Congo 
(Brazzaville) are Windows based, generally the initial system delivered with personal 
computers. Services offered in Congo cyberspace are essentially web hosting, 
communications (VOIP, SMS, e-mail), and web navigation.281  
Access to ICTs has significantly changed Congolese society. Companies that use 
ICTs are improving their performances. As a result of ICTs, many projects are being 
implemented. The banking sector has experienced a significant change from the use of 
ICTs. Customer transactions are no longer performed manually. This has not only 
reduced the waiting time for customers, but also improved working and living conditions 
for bank agents. Today, cards for automated teller machines (ATMs) allow users to carry 
out banking operations at any time. Several innovative services and jobs are also created 
through ICTs. These include the development of agencies for fund transfers through 
major localities of the country and express parcel-delivery services. It has made it easy 
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and fast to transfer funds to a family member or business partner located in centers 
around the country. The transfer is automatic, using a phone and a computer. As in the 
neighboring DRC, mobile banking is taking off consistently in the Republic of the 
Congo.282 ICT-related companies, mainly GSM mobile companies, are now amongst the 
biggest employers in the Republic of the Congo. Formal and informal enterprises, 
including travel agencies, have sprung up as a direct and indirect result of mobile 
operators.283 
IT engineering providers (software engineering, networks and applications) are 
well spread across the majors cities of the countries and are organized as small and 
medium enterprises (SME). In the rural areas, these SMEs work with NGOs to offer IT 
services that fit some of the needs of the population for their daily tasks.  
In the public sector, the Republic of the Congo is ranked 157/190 on the 2012 
index of electronic government by the United Nations, dropping nearly 20 steps since 
2010.284 Currently, several projects of implementation of networks and computerization 
are introduced by diverse government administrations and are producing interesting 
results in terms of easiness of public services. The Congolese administration, including 
security services, has brought out computerized identity cards and biometric passports. 
The time for obtaining these identity cards has been significantly reduced from several 
months to a few weeks, or even days.285 
C. LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND ORGANIZATION 
1. Strategies and Policies 
In the Republic of the Congo, the national ICT policy was formulated in 2004 and 
was aimed to reduce poverty and introduce the Congolese population to the information 
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era.286 To do this, several objectives were established: accelerate the development of a 
viable and sustainable economic network that will contribute to job creation; support ICT 
access for populations living in cities and rural and disadvantaged areas; secure ICT 
infrastructure; define a legal and regulatory framework adapted to ICTs; develop ICT 
capacities and transform the educational system by means of ICTs; and finally, promote 
good governance by utilizing ICTs. The implementation of the policy has not been easy. 
Over the last decade, there have been many changes of ministers of postal services and 
telecommunications, who are in charge of new technologies. At the same time, few 
institutions and NGOs in the Republic of the Congo were involved in ICT policy and the 
ICT sector.287 
To maintain its effort in promoting the development of ICT in the Congo, in April 
2012 the government signed a contract with a French company, NexrtiraOne, for the 
definition of a national grand strategy for information technology.288  
2. Laws, Regulations, and Organization 
In 2009, the Congo designed and adopted a new policy and strategic vision for the 
ICT sector, a roadmap intended to bring the country to the next stage of ICT connectivity, 
with the goal of becoming a regional ICT hub. Using the “heavily indebted poor 
countries” process in which the Republic of the Congo was engaged from 2006 to 
January 2010, the country wisely established a new regulatory framework for the 
telecommunications sector that opens the way to competition in international gateways 
and services, and local wireless distribution. Along with the liberalization process, the 
new legislation creates an independent telecommunications regulatory authority 
(ARPCE) to ensure clear and transparent regulatory regimes. 
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The legal and regulatory framework for the telecommunications sector is quite 
complete and addresses most of the aspects of legal issues. But there are still questions 
about cybersecurity, cyber liberties, and electronic commerce to be resolved. The 
authorities of the Republic of the Congo are involved in a subregional consultation for a 
common legal platform for cybersecurity. 
D. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN THE SOCIETY AND CULTURE 
1. Education 
Education and training facilities are mostly concentrated in the large cities of 
Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire, and most of the country does not have sufficient 
educational institutions. Although the educational sector was significantly damaged 
during the civil war, the government has worked hard to rehabilitate it with international 
assistance.289  
According to the World Bank ICT report on education in 2007, ICTs are not yet 
part of the national curriculum. In some schools, there are no computers for learners. 
Only the national university, Marien Ngouabi University in Brazzaville, has faculties or 
departments that have integrated computer-training modules into their coursework. The 
digital campus at the university, Agence Universitaire de la Francophonie (AUF), offers  
distance learning and provides both students and teachers with easy access to the Internet. 
There is also a distance-learning program affiliated with Cisco in the faculty of 
sciences.290  
For a long time, students from the Republic of the Congo have travelled abroad to 
study computer science at the postgraduate level. Most of them enroll in universities and 
colleges in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, France, and other African countries. 
Several NGOs, such as AZUR Development, the IT Professionals Association (AIP), the 
Committee for the Promotion of Information Technologies in Congo (COPTIC), and the 
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Congo Community Telecenters Network, provide access to computer equipment and 
training in basic computer skills. There are also several schools and private centers across 
the country training senior technicians in the field of IT, including the maintenance of 
networks and computer systems. State-owned enterprises such as the Congolese 
Informatics Office provide training and offer ICT-related services.291 
2. Social Status 
Congo-Brazzaville continues to face enormous economic and social challenges 
left over from years of civil war and political turbulence. Ranked 137 over 187 on the 
UNDP human-development index of 2011,292 the Republic of the Congo remains a 
country underdeveloped despite its oil resources. More than 50% of the population is 
living in a situation assessed as extreme poverty by international standards. A very tiny 
class of people in the state elite, military, and business circles can be perceived as rich, 
while the middle class is small. Poverty, along with a low standard of economic and 
social development in the non-oil sectors of the country, has impaired the ability of 
individuals and society to organize. Although oil is the backbone of economic 
development and the elites, the majority of the population is forced to rely on the 
informal sector and subsistence agriculture to survive. Extended families, village 
communities, and women’s groups are major frameworks of solidarity and self-
organization. Within these forms of self-organization, interpersonal trust appears to be 
high.  
On a more national scale, however, matters are very different. Due to the 
increasing dominance of Cuvette regionals in high-level political positions and economic 
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commonly viewing each other as adversaries to be defeated than compatriots. The civil 
wars between 1993 and, to some extent, the present are both evidence and aggravator of 
this.293  
3. Access and Acceptance of Technology 
Penetration of ICT is small. The proportion of households with a computer was, 
in 2007, 0.3% (against 10.1 in Cameroon, 5.0 in Congo Brazzaville, and 4.3 in the 
Gabon) and households having access to the Internet was 0.2 % (against, respectively, 
5.2, 1.4, and 3.6 in countries above).  
For now, wireless technology seems to provide the best hope to bridge the digital 
divide. This has been demonstrated by the imaginative use of GSM phones. The 
development of services such as mobile broadband and WiMAX that offer scalable 
solutions provides for access to low-income communities as well as developed 
communities in sparsely settled areas.  
Multimedia and digital technology has revolutionized the habits of the Congolese 
population. Mobile phones and digital cameras now film the events of society. Digital 
photos are developed quickly. Before, the process was quite long and involved expensive 
equipment and training. ICTs have also made a considerable contribution to state 
administration and the revision of the electoral register.  
In education, ICTs have proven themselves with the introduction of bar codes for 
examinations. Results for secondary schools and higher institutions are now published on 
the Internet. In the past, it could take several weeks, or even months, for students to 
access their results, especially for students living in rural areas. Several other projects 
using ICTs are being implemented or planned. These include the incorporation of ICTs in 
immigration control and the computerization of the port authority.  
Thanks to the economies of scale generated by the vast global market, the cost of 
buying and using a mobile phone is falling steadily and mobile penetration is rising 
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rapidly in the country. There is, nevertheless, still much to do to improve the affordability 
of telecommunications. Some of the Congolese regard mobile phones and broadband 
Internet as luxuries rather than essential communications tools. In large cities, the 
Congolese have access to the Internet in cybercafés, mainly to read and send e-mails. 
More and more young people go to cafes to use social networks, but the very slow 
connection speed generally prevents video playback.  
Currently, there are 89,680 Facebook users in the Republic of the Congo, which 
makes it number 150 over 213 in the ranking of all Facebook statistics by country. 
Facebook penetration in the Congo is 2.17% of the country's population and 36.57% in 
relation to the number of Internet users. This number has been steadily increasing over 
the past six months, showing a serious interest in social media by the population. The 
largest age group of social network user is currently 18–24, with 33,182 users, followed 
by those aged 25–34.294 The Twitter database on the Social Bakers website does not show 
any activity from Congo, but there are some Twitter accounts captioning topics on the 
Congo that can be found when browsing online, those account are usually operated by 
people outside of the country, either for online activism of all sorts or commercial 
purposes.295  
4. Information Technology Dependency 
Although the level of utilization of the Internet and ICT is relatively interesting 
for the subregion, multiple limitations from infrastructure, energy, bandwidth, and others 
hinder the wide spreading of ICT. Thus, for now, the country is not dependent on 
technology for its daily survival. 
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E. CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES 
The growing use of ICTs in the Congo has been followed by some collateral 
misbehavior, which include fraud practices at all levels, access to pornography on 
television and the Internet, and cyber scams.  
A survey conducted by the website ProjectHoneyPot.org, which track malicious 
activities online base on honey-pot servers generated the results presented in Table 12. 
These results show a relatively low amount of malicious activity coming from IP 
addresses within the Republic of the Congo’s allocated range of IP addresses.296 These 
malicious activities essentially concerned spamming and dictionary attackers. 
Table 12.   Honey Pot Results for the Republic of the Congo297  
N° Type of Attack Period of activity of the 
50 most recent IP 
Total number of 
attempts registered 
1 Harvester IP   July 2012 0 
2 Spam Server IP Feb 2008 – July 2012 15 720 
3 Bad Web host IP July 2012 0 
4 Comment Spammer IP May 2008 - July 2012 2 273 
5 Dictionary Attacker IP Jan 2008 - July 2012 17 339 
6 Rule Breaker IP July 2012 0 
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F. CONCLUSION 
Despite being among the last countries to acquire ICTs, due to political instability, 
the Republic of the Congo is now on the road of development, making some huge strides 
in the ICT sector. Although there have been some significant political and strategic 
moves to improve the ICT sector, much remains to be done to fully grasp the potential 
available through ICT. Particularly in the domain of cybersecurity and regulation of 
cyber transactions, the country still needs a suitable legal framework along with the 
infrastructure and qualified personnel to enforce them. 
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APPENDIX G.  
THE REPUBLIC OF SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE 
Sao Tomé and Príncipe (STP) is a small island nation on the equator off the 
central west coast of Africa. It comprises two principal islands: Sao Tome, and Principe, 
with a total area of 964 km2 of land. A Portuguese colony until 1975, the island is 
essentially an agricultural and fishery-based economy. Cocoa is the primary export crop, 
grown on what were once large Portuguese estates. Starting with little, the country has 
slowly evolved from a single-party socialist state into a vibrant multi-party democracy. 
STP is admired for its free press, the absence of serious human-rights abuses, and for one 
of the highest literacy rates in Africa. Unlike many African countries, it is free of ethnic 
tensions and violent crime.  
STP is also a poor country, with a GDP per capita of around USD 1,222 in 2011. 
With a population of nearly 183,176 inhabitants in the 2011 estimation, it constitutes a 
small domestic market that lacks attractiveness for international investors. However, 
STP, which lies in the Gulf of Guinea (a well-known oil zone), is endowed with oil 
resources yet to be fully exploited. On the UNDP human-development index of 2011, the 
country is ranked 144 over 187.298  
Telecommunications is one of the bright spots of STP’s infrastructure, with 
indicators significantly better than those of most African countries. Indeed, the country 
was ranked 159/182 on the ITU digital-opportunity index (DOI) (0.15 in a scale of 0 to 1) 
in 2007.299 The long-standing monopoly of the Companhia Sãotomense de 
Telecomunicacões (CST), which was 51% owned by a Portuguese company, with the 
remainder held by the São Tomean government, ended in 2007, and the market was 
opened to competition. The mobile cellular network is also growing rapidly. Internet use 
is still low because of the high costs involved. But Internet cafés are popular with young 
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people. While it is possible to call anywhere in the world, with very good lines from São 
Tomé and Príncipe, calling into the country is often difficult from the United States and 
Europe. Internet dial-up service and high-speed broadband remain excessively high. 
The following indicators show the status of efforts in the telecommunications 
sector: the penetration rate of telephony services is estimated at 60.83% of the 
population, with a landline teledensity of 4.82% and mobile teledensity of 54.81% in 
2011. Internet penetration rate is estimated to reach around 19.217% of the population.300 
Table 13.   Socioeconomic Indicators: Sao Tome and Principe301 
N° Indicator  Value 
1- Area 964 sq km 
2- GDP  $306 million (2011 est.) 
3- Official languages  Portuguese (official) 
4- Total population  183,176  (July 2011 est.) 
5- Population rate between 0-14 years  44.7% (male 40,777/female 39,386) 
6- Population rate between  15-64 years 52.2% (male 46,114/female 47,509) 
7- Life expectancy  63.49 years 
8- Urbanized population  62% of total population (2010) 
9- Average annual growth rate of urban population  2.8% annual rate of change (2010-15 est.) 
10- Per capita gross national income (US dollars) GNI  $ 1,130302 
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Made of a digital-switch network, the telecommunications infrastructure in STP is 
quite modest and is considered adequate to provide ICT services to its tiny population. 
Until last year, the Companhia Santomense de Telecomunicações (CST), a state  
telecommunications joint-venture company, was the sole provider of ICT services in the 
country, of which 51 percent is owned by Portugal Telecommunications International 
(PTI). Mobile service, which was launched six years ago, rapidly became CST’s main 
business area, accounting for over 60 percent of revenues. According to a recent 
declaration, CST plans to launch third-generation services in 2012, when the country will 
achieved its connection to the intercontinental undersea cable. Early in 2012, the 
government announced the grant of a second telecommunications license to another 
operator.304  
Internet services are provided exclusively by Tecnologia de Sistemas Informático, 
the main enterprise of the local computer community, which is jointly administered by 
the government and Bahnhof Internet AB of Sweden.305 While waiting for optical fiber 
connection, satellite solutions remain the principal means of connection with the world, 
as well as for ICT access in remote areas. Meanwhile, urban communications are 
dominated by technologies like ADSL, GSM, and WIFI. Internet access remains limited, 
although Internet cafés have spread to all major urban centers (islands).  
In 2011, the World Bank’s board of directors approved the finance of a major 
telecommunication project for STP. The project aimed at boosting information 
technology infrastructure and access to services in the Republic of São Tomé and 
Príncipe. Specifically, the country received a grant of US$ 14.9 million from the bank for 
its component in the CAB program. With this support, STP is expected to connect to 
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undersea cable by the end 2012.306 STP does not possess or plan to possess an Internet 
Exchange Point (IXP), but as a member of the CAB project, will certainly benefit from 
the infrastructure empowered in the project.  
Electrical production, estimated to be of 15 million kilowatt hours (kWh), comes 
from two main sources: imported fossil fuel (which generates up to 47 percent of total 
power) and hydroelectric power (up to 53 percent), generated from the nation's abundant 
water supply. However, only 53 percent of households have electricity and there are 
regular power cuts. A number of important measures have been taken to address these 
constraints. The electricity agency is planning to increase its capacity (through mini 
hydropower plants among other things). 
B. INFORMATION SYSTEMS, BUSINESS, AND INDUSTRIES 
Not much information is available on various information systems used in STP. 
But all the indications suggest an incipient phase in the development of information 
systems. The operating systems at the level of the end-user are Windows based; 
computers essentially are used for office support tasks. As usual, industrial infrastructures 
use proprietary OSs and their types are likely tied to the companies’ internal policies. 
Services offered by telecommunication companies are fully digitalized and reasonably 
efficient from a technical point of view, though there is a serious shortage of Internet 
capacity.  
The services offered in cyberspace revolve around web hosting, communications 
(VOIP, SMS, e-mail), and web navigation. Electronic commerce has yet to be introduces. 
Some few small and medium enterprises (SME) marketing ICT products and services 
exist and are based mainly in the capitals cities, Sao Tomé and Principe. Most of them are 
local branches of foreign firms, or have concluded local representation agreements with 
such firms (software solutions, networking solutions, IT security). The country is totally 
dependent on imports as far as the acquisition of equipment and software for ICT 
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development are concerned. However, there are some companies that provide industrial 
services such as the assembling and distribution of personal computers. 
In the public sector, Sao Tomé and Principe is ranked 138/190 (thus regressing 10 
steps since 2010) on the index of electronic governments by the United Nation in its 2012 
survey,307 showing a slowdown in the effort to use information technology in 
government. However, at the regional level, the country scores second in the e-
government readiness process. This good position in the regional ladder is certainly due 
to the small size of the country and the administrative apparatus that goes with it. The 
national website of Sao Tome and Principe, though providing mostly static information, 
has archived data including sectoral information on health, education, and the economy. 
There is no evidence of interconnection projects between different entities of the 
government or the development of information systems in order to increase the quality of 
services in the public administration. 
C. LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND ORGANIZATION 
1. Strategies and Policies 
The country is not officially known to possess a NICI plan, and there is no 
information about the preparation of such a plan. Although a strategic plan for ICT does 
not exist, the government of Sao Tomé and Principe have ICT included in it millennium 
goals of development.308 Additionally, there have been significant moves made by the 
government to enhance telecommunications in the country, like the ending of the 
monopoly of the incumbent operator and the ongoing connection of the country to the 
undersea optical fiber. Accountable for this endeavor is the 2006 creation of a regulatory 
authority of the telecommunications sector, the Autoridade Geral de Regulação (AGER), 
responsible for electricity, posts, telecommunications, and water.309 
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2. Laws, Regulations, and Organization 
The legal and regulatory framework for the telecommunications sector in Sao 
Tome and Principe is still rudimentary. Two entities are in charge of the 
telecommunications sector: the regulatory authority AGER, which is an independent 
body, and the CST, a public–private joint venture in charge of exploitation of 
telecommunications. 
The telecommunications sector is ruled by a law enacted in 2004 that defined the 
conditions for the establishment, management, and operation of telecommunications 
networks and services.310 Since then, other amendments and laws have completed the 
legal framework.  
Sao Tome and Principe is a member of several international organizations, one of 
which is the ITU. At the regional level, it is active in the work of ECCAS in the area of 
telecommunications and has participated in the region's efforts to harmonize the legal 
framework for telecommunications. 
D. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN THE SOCIETY AND CULTURE 
1. Education 
Education in STP is universal, compulsory through sixth grade, and tuition-free to 
the age of 15. Families have to buy books and school uniforms, though they are provided 
free to children from poor families. Primary school begins at seven and continues for six 
years. The pupil/teacher ratio in primary school is 32:1. Secondary education starts at age 
13 and is finished in five years. The literacy rate is 87.9% for those 15 years and older.  
Although the literacy rate is high in STP, like most least-developed countries, 
STP faces serious shortages of skills in the public sector and government. Skilled workers 
can earn three times as much as unskilled. Recent years have seen the growth of new 
technical schools and postsecondary training centers, as well as two new universities that 
should soon produce well-trained graduates. 
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In the absence of a national strategy for ICT development, the educational policy 
towards new technologies in STP remains vague. Few clues have been found to show a 
serious emphasis on ICT training in general. 
2. Social Status 
Sao Tome and Principe is ranked 144 over 187 on the UNDP human-development 
index of 2011.311 Although some positive steps have been made, approximately 54% of 
its population of 166,000 remains in poverty and 15% live in extreme poverty. The 
poverty remains widespread in rural and peri-urban areas. Urban migration is on the rise, 
due to the lack of employment opportunities in rural areas.312 
3. Access and Acceptance of Technology 
Access to ICT is for now only possible in urban areas, where there are around 
31,012 Internet users as of December 31, 2011, which represent about 17.3% of the 
population. Cyber cafés remain the chief mode of access for the vast majority of 
Saotomean Internet users.  
Currently, there are 5,420 Facebook users in Sao Tome and Principe, which 
makes it number 206 over 213 in the ranking of Facebook statistics by country. Facebook 
penetration represents 3.08% of the population, and 20.30% in relation to the number of 
Internet users. The total number of FB users in STP is growing; it has increased by 
2,100 in the last six months. This trend demonstrates a growing interest in social media 
by Internet users. The largest age group of social network user is currently 25–34, with a 
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show any activity coming from the STP, although there are some accounts captioning 
topic on STP, those accounts are usually operated by journalists and cultural 
promoters.314  
Overall, it is hard to penetrate the society of Sao Tome and Principe, which is 
locked by multiple factors like language (Portuguese; and there little material online in 
English or French), the isolated nature of the archipelago, and the small size of its 
population. 
4. Information Technology Dependency 
As confirmed by the low level of activity in social media and the lack of useful 
information on potential information systems operating in the country, information 
technology use in Sao Tomé and Principe is still in its infancy. Although the state is 
engaged in infrastructural programs for interconnection to undersea fiber-optic cable, 
corporate use of ICTs is very low. Overall, there is no indication of dependency on 
technology at all. 
E. CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES 
STP’s legal system is based on a collection of Portuguese colonial laws in force 
before the country’s independence in 1975. Generally speaking, the country lacks a 
modern legal system with the features of contemporary business law.315 
Regarding the cybersecurity picture, Sao Tomé and Principe does not show any 
serious concern regarding cybersecurity. It is worth mentioning though that the country’s 
domain name is not yet administrated by local authorities, a Swedish company manages 
it. This situation has led to illicit use of the official domain name of STP for inappropriate 
web services across the world, like Sex Telephony (.ST), or Style. The existing laws of  
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telecommunications are silent on cybersecurity issues and legislation. However, the 
country is involved in regional collaboration to define legislation to counter transnational 
cyber issues.  
The website ProjectHoneyPot.org, which surveys malicious activities online 
based on honey-pot servers, does not propose any statistical data on the country. This 
may be another indication of the absence of threat coming from that direction. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Although the country has a promising future due to its sociopolitical stability and 
the high level of literacy, the limited size of the population and territory does not play to 
the advantage of STP in its competitiveness on the world scene. The potential of oil 
exploitation and the imminent connection to undersea cable will certainly boost progress 
toward an information society.  
With the undersea cable, the costs of international links for voice telephony and 
the Internet will drop dramatically. Sao Tomé and Príncipe has made significant progress 
in mobile telephony. The challenge now with the arrival of optical fiber is to sustain that 
trend and introduce a second operator, then extend its success to broadband Internet 
access. Improvement of government and regulatory systems are a more general matter, 
not confined to telecommunications, where obviously further progress is required. 
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